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Abstract
The transition of U.S. economy, from a large primary products exporter
based on abundant endowments of natural resources to a leading industrial
producer and a successful manufacturing exporter from the late 19th cen-
tury to the early twentieth century, is a remarkable historical event. In
this thesis I investigate the quantitative importance of various factors and
policies behind the development of the U.S. and the North Atlantic econ-
omy from 1870 to 1913. The factors considered are exogenous changes in
: sectoral productivities; endowments in labour and land; and trade costs.
While these may not be all the factors that mattered, they were certainly
important forces behind the development of the region.
I then ask some historically interesting counterfactual questions which
are closely related to these forces. First, I explore the implications of the
high tariffs imposed on U.S. manufacturing imports. More particularly, I
ask “Could U.S. manufacturing and its economy grow as it did without the
tariffs?” The second counterfactual exercise is related to the mass migration.
There is no doubt that the mass immigration to the U.S. in the nineteenth
century contributed considerably to its overall economic growth. But what
is uncertain is its quantitative implications on the overall and the sectoral
development. I also look at its implications on the Anglo-American real
wage convergence.
The focus is on several dimensions of the development : the large increase
in U.S. share of world manufacturing output and the decline in that of
Britain; the growth of their primary and manufacturing output and real
GDP; and its structural transformation. In order to disentangle the effects
of each force, I build a model of the North Atlantic economy calibrated to
be consistent with some key facts during this period.
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Addressing the Question
The transition of U.S. economy, from a large primary products exporter
based on abundant endowments of natural resources to a leading industrial
producer and a successful manufacturing exporter from the late 19th century
to early 20th century, is a remarkable event. According to Bairoch (1982),
U.S. share of the world manufacturing production in 1860 was only 7.2% but
its share surged to 32.0% in 1913. In contrast, U.K share went down from
19.9% in 1860 to 13.6% in 1913. Figure 1 below depicts the relative devel-
opment path of U.S. and U.K. manufacturing from 1800 to 1928. From this
it can be observed that the growth of U.S. manufacturing accelerated from
the mid-nineteenth century, overtaking the U.K. in late-nineteenth century.
Also by 1913 the U.S. was the only non-European country in the Atlantic
Economy to establish its position as a net manufacturing exporter and rep-
resented the third largest share (13.3%) in world manufacturing exports,
having net exports of $368 million in 1913 prices (Yates, 1959)
In this thesis I investigate the quantitative importance of various forces
and issues behind the development of the U.S. and the North Atlantic econ-
1
omy from 1870 to 1913. In doing this I view the phenomenon in an interna-
tional context. In other words, I regard the rise of the U.S. and the relative
decline of Britain, especially their manufacturing sectors, as a closely related
event that happened through interactions of the forces that determined the
comparative advantages of each region. For this purpose I build a model
that accounts for several key characteristics of the North Atlantic economy
- featuring Britain, the U.S. and the rest of world - during the period from
1870 to 1913.
(Source : Bairoch (1982))
Figure 1: Share of world industrial output
Like most of the development experiences of nations or regions, the rise
of the U.S. (and the relative decline of Britain) was not an event that can be
attributable to one simple cause. It must have been a result of many forces
working together. Therefore to evaluate the effect of an individual force, it
must be isolated from other forces. And the model briefly mentioned above
is built to serve this purpose.
Basically, the forces considered are exogenous changes in : sectoral pro-
ductivities; endowments in labour and land; and trade costs. While these
may not be all the factors that mattered, they were certainly important
forces behind the development of the region. First, the productivity of
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the U.S. grew substantially relative to the most of other regions including
Britain.1 Second, the land area and labour force of the U.S. exploded, mainly
due to the westward movement and the mass immigration, respectively. Fi-
nally, the changes in trade costs are considered. It is well documented by
O’Rourke and Williamson (1999), that the large reduction in transport costs
was important in many respects for the North Atlantic economy during this
period. But here I do not restrict trade costs to transport costs only. They
are perceived as the implied trade costs that include observable as well as
unobservable components.2 These forces would have considerable implica-
tions under the closed economy framework. But under the open economy
framework considered here, they would have additional implications as they
shift the comparative advantages among the regions.
The focus is on several dimensions of the development : the large increase
in U.S. share of world manufacturing output and the decline in that of
Britain; the growth of their primary and manufacturing output and real
GDP; and its structural transformation. In order to disentangle the effects
of each force, I restrict the model to be consistent with some key facts in
the benchmark year of 1870. I then establish that the model accounts for
the important developmental facts, just mentioned above, in 1913 when the
changes in productivities, endowments and trade costs are fed in. Then the
effects of each force on the development of the U.S. are isolated and evaluated
by feeding in the change in each force while keeping others unchanged.
The baseline model features increasing returns to scale (IRTS) in manu-
facturing, following the evidences that there existed IRTS in U.S. manufac-
turing in the late nineteenth century.3 Given the significance of IRTS in U.S.
manufacturing, the quantitative implications of this will be investigated. In
order to isolate the effects of IRTS, a simple change is made to the baseline
IRTS model so that the manufacturing sector now exhibits constant returns
to scale (CRTS). It is established that the CRTS model yields identical cal-
1In the following chapter, the implied changes in sectoral productivities will be mea-
sured. Broadberry (1997) and Broadberry and Irwin (2006) clearly establish that the
sectoral labour productivities of the U.S. were growing substantially both in absolute
terms and relative to Britain during the period.
2For more discussion of this, see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).
3This will be discussed more in detail in the following section.
3
ibrated parameter values and equilibrium values in the benchmark year. It
is then shown that the CRTS model accounts for the key characteristics of
the economy closely when the changes implied by CRTS are fed in. These
properties make the two models highly comparable. Then the shocks im-
plied by the IRTS model are fed into this otherwise CRTS model. Then by
comparing the outcome with that of the baseline model, I disentangle and
evaluate the effects of IRTS.
I also ask some historically interesting counterfactual questions which
are closely related to these forces. First, I explore the implications of the
high tariffs imposed on U.S. manufacturing imports. More particularly, the
question I try to answer is “Could U.S. manufacturing and its economy grow
as it did without the tariffs?” or put in a more historical context “What
if the South had won the War?” The role of tariff in the development of
the U.S. in the second half of nineteenth century is still a hotly debated
issue among economic historians. I aim to contribute to these literatures by
providing some quantitative insights.
The second counterfactual exercise is related to the mass migration.
There is no doubt that the mass immigration to the U.S. in the nineteenth
century contributed considerably to its overall economic growth. But what
is uncertain is its quantitative implications on the overall and the sectoral
development. Even though it is not the main focus of the thesis, I also look
at its implications on the Anglo-American real wage convergence. This issue
is already explored in O’Rourke, Williamson and Hatton (1994) and they
find that the contribution of the mass migration on the convergence is quite
large. In doing this, they use a standard neo-classical model with constant
returns to scale. But the baseline model here assumes IRTS in manufactur-
ing, I investigate whether this assumption changes the result quantitatively
and qualitatively.
1.1.2 Assumption of the Model
In this section I discuss the main assumptions of my model. The details of
the model will be described in the next chapter. While I try to keep the
model as simple as possible, there are some assumptions that need more
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explanations. The first and foremost important feature of the model is
that there exists IRTS in manufacturing. Many previous works studying
the economy assume CRTS but at the same time there are arguments and
empirical evidences that there was IRTS in U.S. manufacturing during this
period.4 Given these evidences, assuming IRTS seems reasonable.
The goal of this thesis is to analyse the factors that contributed to the
development of the U.S. and one of the driving forces considered here is the
change in productivity, also called the technological progress. But in fact,
a large part of this is still a ‘black-box’. In the standard growth accounting
exercise, this is treated as a residual which is left unexplained by other
observable components. But by assuming IRTS - a reasonable assumption
given the evidences - I can reduce the size of the ‘black-box’ and attribute
larger parts of the development to more tangible factors. As we will see later
in Chapter 2, U.S. manufacturing TFP implied by IRTS is indeed smaller
than that implied by CRTS.
One more feature of the model that is closely related to the assump-
tion of IRTS is that the manufacturing sector uses manufacturing products
as intermediate goods. This basically generates the forward and backward
linkage effects, thus inducing the agglomeration of manufacturing when cer-
tain conditions are met.5 So this feature helps the model account for the
agglomeration of manufacturing in the U.S., without relying on an absurdly
large TFP. Crafts and Venables (2001) also argue that IRTS and the linkage
effects are needed to replicate the key features of the economy such as the
large growth of U.S. manufacturing and constant U.S. to U.K. real wage gap
during this period. In addition to this, without this assumption, the implied
manufacturing TFP under IRTS becomes identical to that of CRTS. So in
a way, this is crucial to distinguish the baseline IRTS model from the CRTS
variation.
Next assumption that deserves some explanation is that I do not include
capital in the model. According to the estimation of Kendrick (1961), cap-
ital increased by more than ten folds during the period for the U.S. And
4For example see Wright (1990) and O’Rourke and Williamson (1994) for the works
assuming CRTS and Chandler (1977), James (1983) and Cain and Paterson (1986) for the
works of IRTS.
5See Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) for more discussion.
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there is no doubt that the capital accumulation is one of the important
factors for U.S. economic growth from the growth accounting perspective.
Capital accumulation is usually treated as an endogenous process. And it is
true that a model with an endogenous capital accumulation can yield quan-
titatively different results from the outcomes implied by the current model
without capital, as the changes in the exogenous forces also influence capital
accumulation process as well. But the bottom line here is that the focus of
this work is not really on capital accumulation itself. In other words, the
model is not focusing on a question such as how the productivity growth
or the large increase in land change the pattern of capital accumulation.
Besides, including capital in the model complicates things hugely. Also the
tractability of the model is not guaranteed as the model needs to become
dynamic. Therefore the expense of including capital seems too high given
the objectives of the model and I choose simplicity over more realistic re-
flection of the history. In several numerical exercises, I include capital in an
exogenous manner.
Also even though the model does not include physical capital endoge-
nously, it does include land for primary production and manufacturing in-
termediate input for manufacturing sector. Land accumulation and capital
accumulation are very closely related, especially for U.S. primary sector.
According to O’Rourke and Williamson (1994), about 40% of the capital
stock in U.S. primary sector was used to improve land in 1870.6 And they
argue that this portion of capital is ‘analytically closer to land than capi-
tal’. So in this sense including land implies including substantial parts of
capital used in the primary sector, if not all. For manufacturing sector, the
link between manufacturing intermediates and capital is not so definite as
the link between land and capital for primary sector. But one can think
of manufacturing intermediate input as a short-lived capital or capital that
depreciates fully within a given period. The bottom line is that at least the
model includes some form of inputs that are similar to capital in several
senses.
6They calculate the value of capital stock was $6363 million of which $2538 million
was the value of land improvement.
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1.1.3 Outline of Thesis
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 of this
chapter, I summarize the results of Chapter 3, 4 and 5. In section 3 of this
chapter, I review the related works. In Chapter 2, I describe the model,
the data and the procedure for calibrating parameters and measuring the
changes in each force. I then simulate the model to generate the development
of the economy from 1870 to 1913 and establish that the model accounts
for the history closely. In the last part of Chapter 2, I introduce the CRTS
variation of the baseline model. In Chapter 3, I perform a growth decom-
position exercise of U.S. economy using the model introduced in Chapter
2. I quantitatively evaluate the impact of each force on the development
of U.S. economy. Then in Chapter 4, I study the implications of the tariff
imposed on U.S. manufacturing imports. Finally in Chapter 5, I investi-
gate the impacts of the mass migration on the development of the U.S. and
Anglo-American real wage convergence.
1.2 Results of Chapter 3, 4 and 5
In this section I briefly discuss the outcomes of each chapter. Chapter 2 is
designed for the model and the data so there really is no interesting result
to talk about. Therefore I begin from chapter 3.
1.2.1 Chapter 3 : Growth Decomposition Exercise
In the first part of Chapter 3, I evaluate the quantitative contribution of each
force to the development of the U.S. It turns out that the large increase in the
labour force stands out as the single most important factor. It alone accounts
for about 45% of the real GDP growth from 1870 to 1913. The increase in
the labour force has uneven impacts on sectors. The manufacturing sector
seems to benefit more from this exogenous shock than the primary sector.
The second implication arising from this exercise is that the changes in
trade costs are unfavourable to the development of U.S. manufacturing.
Without any changes in the trade costs, the manufacturing output would
have grown almost two times larger than it actually grew. I then take
7
different approaches of measuring trade cost and TFP shocks and perform
similar decomposition exercises. I also include exogenous capital and analyse
the contribution of the increase in capital stock.
In the second part of the chapter, I disentangle the effects of IRTS.
A caveat regarding this exercise is that it does not evaluate whether the
model with IRTS performs better than the CRTS one in accounting for
the development of the economy. But it tries to measure the quantitative
implications of IRTS assuming that there exists IRTS in manufacturing.
The effects of IRTS is not small. This force alone accounts for about one
third of the growth in U.S. manufacturing and 10% of the real GDP growth.
1.2.2 Chapter 4 : The Implications of the Tariff
The role of the high tariffs in the development of U.S. economy has generated
much controversy. In this chapter I try to add some contributions to this
ongoing debate. In order to do this, I perform a counterfactual exercise by
eliminating the tariffs on U.S. manufacturing imports. By doing this I can
disentangle the effects of the tariff and see its quantitative implications on
the development of U.S. economy. The model can serve as a good tool for
this purpose.
The overall results suggest that the manufacturing tariffs helped pro-
mote its manufacturing sector but its quantitative effects were not so large.
Even when I allow for the dynamic and cumulative effects of the tariffs by
assuming that there exists learning-by-doing process in U.S. manufacturing,
the quantitative effects of the tariffs in promoting the economy are not so
large. Under a plausible value of the learning rate, the tariff only accounts
for about 3% of the growth in U.S. manufacturing output and less than 1%
of the growth in the real GDP.
The model does not feature all the possible mechanism through which
the tariffs can influence the economy. But the result - generated under care-
fully devised model and parameters - suggests that the heavy protection of
U.S. manufacturing characterised by the high tariff rates on its manufactur-
ing imports, did not play a quantitatively important role in promoting its
economic development.
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1.2.3 Chapter 5 : The Implications of the Mass Migration
Another event that characterises the economy during this period is the mass
migration. The massive inflow of immigrants to the U.S. contributed hugely
to the increase of its labour forces. The model allows to distinguish the
effects of the mass immigration from other forces. In the first part of the
chapter I look at the development implications of the immigration. It turns
out that the mass migration has quantitatively large impacts on the develop-
ment. The net immigration to the U.S. contributes about 12.5% and 26.5%
to the growth of primary and manufacturing output, respectively. So the
impact is uneven across sectors. When the effects of the net immigration is
eliminated, U.S. primary loses 1.6 percentage point in the world share but
its manufacturing loses 7.5 percentage point from the world share. Also it
accounts for about 20% of the real GDP growth.
The second part of the chapter deviates a little from the main focus
of the thesis. While it mainly explores the quantity side of the economy,
this part looks at the price side. Namely, it investigates the implications of
the mass migration on Anglo-American real wage convergence. The general
consensus so far, based on the works of O’Rourke, Williamson and Hatton
(1994, OWH), is that the mass migration contributed substantially to the
convergence of the real wages between Britain and the U.S. The CRTS model
yields somewhat similar results as OWH who also used the standard neo-
classical model with CRTS. Without the mass migration, the ratio of U.S.
real wage to Britain’s real wage increases by 6%. But the result changes
qualitatively when the baseline IRTS model is used. It turns out that the
migration contributes to the divergence rather than convergence. In this
case, without the migration, the ratio decreases by 1.6%. The main force
behind this reversal is the IRTS, the force which increases labour produc-
tivity as labour force increases. I then assume that the land is endogenous
to the migration and this force quantitatively strengthen the result that the
mass migration contributes to the divergence.
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1.3 Related Literatures
The emergence of the U.S. as an industrial power is a remarkable historical
event that occurred within such a short span of time. Therefore many studies
focused on American economic growth during this period. I begin with those
literatures that focus on the role of technology. The modern debate on
American ascendancy began with Rothbarth (1946) and Habakkuk (1962).
They argued that the relative land abundance in the U.S. raised its real wage
rate, thereby increasing the cost of labour for manufacturers. In turn, this
induced American entrepreneurs to substitute capital for the dearer labour,
leading to a pattern of growth more capital intensive and more rapid than
that of Great Britain.7 In their views, the technology developed in the U.S.
was only ‘appropriate’ for the conditions in the U.S. thus not optimal to be
used in other countries with different endowment conditions. In the same
vein, Abramovitz and David (1996) argued that the U.S. developed based
on the technology that was intensive in using cheap and abundant natural
resources. And for these natural resources were not available to Britain and
Europe as cheaply, the technology was not transferable to them.
In a related study, Wright (1990) applied Heckscher-Ohlin model to ex-
amine the factor content of trade in manufacturing goods between 1880
and 1940 and drew conclusion that the single most robust characteristic
of American manufacturing was intensity in non-reproducible natural re-
sources. This result implies that American supremacy in natural endow-
ments was important in its industrial success. Hutchinson (2002) supple-
ments Wright’s findings using new data from the U.S. Census of Manufac-
tures.
A strand of literature also emphasizes the role of institution on the devel-
opment of the U.S. In exploring the comparative development trajectory of
North and Latin America, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) argued that initial
institutions differed between the two regions because of the different endow-
ments with regards to soils, climates and the size of the native population.
7Their argument sparked so called ‘Habakkuk Controversy’ because the interest rate
in the U.S. was actually higher than that of Britain. And Temin (1966), by using a simple
neoclassical model, concluded that U.S. manufacturing must have been capital scarce
relative to Britain, contrasting Habakkuk.
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More specifically, these conditions in Latin America favoured economic insti-
tutions dominated by large-scale estates and plantations which were granted
to only small portion of elites. As a result the distribution of wealth and
human capital were extremely unequal and opportunities were restricted to
the broad mass. On the other hand, the conditions in North America were
somewhat opposite to Latin America thus creating institutions that were
conducive to lower inequality. And this difference caused the divergent path
in the economic development of the two regions. Similarly North, Sum-
merhill and Weingast (2000) put forward an argument that the institutions
from Spanish colonial rule in Latin America persisted even after ending of
the colonialism. And the Latin American institutions contrasted with the
North American institutions which were the legacies of British colonialism
in the way that the latter promoted a strong sense of property rights and
the former didn’t. David and Wright (1997) linked the nature of the Amer-
ican institutions that effectively utilized the resource-rich condition to its
economic supremacy. For example, they mentioned the role of institutions
that promoted and subsidized education and research in the relevant fields
such as mining.
In terms of modelling, it is largely based on Krugman and Venables
(1995) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). They introduced the
model of New Economic Geography in which the economies of scale and the
linkage effects generate the agglomeration of manufacturing in one region.
Also closely related is the work of O’Rourke and Williamson (1994). They
built a computable general equilibrium model of the North Atlantic economy,
calibrated to fit the data. The model, which was based on the standard
Heckscher-Ohlin neoclassical framework, was used to study the implications
of the global commodity market integration and the reduction in global
transportation costs on the factor price convergence. In addition to this,
it is also closely in line with the work of Herrendorf, Schmitz and Teixeira
(2012) in which they found the large reduction in transportation costs was
a quantitatively important force behind the settlement of the Midwest, the
regional specialization and the increase in real GDP per capita in the U.S.
from 1840 to 1860.
Finally, I discuss the works that documented the existence and the signif-
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icance of the scale economy in U.S. manufacturing. First, Chandler (1977)
argued that the capital deepening technological change, that was apparent in
the late nineteenth century U.S. manufacturing, generated the economies of
scale and this made possible the dramatic rise of the industry in the world
stage. James (1983) and Cain and Paterson (1986) tested this argument
empirically by estimating the translog production function and documented
that the economies of scale in U.S. manufacturing were substantial and per-
vasive in the late nineteenth century.
Cain and Paterson (1986) use the Generalized Leontief production func-
tion to derive real factor demand equations.8 Using this, they simultaneously
test the presence of economies of scale, biased technical change and factor
substitutability in U.S. manufacturing at the two digit level in the years
from 1850 to 1919. The result shows the evidence of the economies of scale
in U.S. manufacturing during the period. Out of 19 manufacturing sectors,
only two sectors, food and beverage (SIC 20) and leather goods (SIC 31),
are found to exhibit constant returns to scale technology. The presence of
economies of scale in the other 17 sectors was more attributable to capital
than labour.
James (1984) tests the hypotheses of Chandler (1977) that the rise of U.S.
manufacturing was mainly due to the labour-saving and capital-intensive
technological change which, in turn, made possible the development of large
firms and big business. Even though its main objective is to examine the
relationship between capital-biased technological change and changes in re-
turns to scale, it also establishes that there existed a significant degree of
scale economy and the range of economies of scale increased substantially
in 16 manufacturing sectors during the periods between 1850 and 1890. Fi-
nally, Atack (1977) estimates a Cobb-Douglas production function for 5 ma-
jor manufacturing sectors - boots and shoes, clothing, cotton, flour milling
and lumber milling - in the antebellum year of 1850 and 1860. He establishes
that there existed substantial economies of scale in U.S. manufacturing and
8The equation looks like Ai =
∑
j βij(Pj/Pi)
1/2 + βiY Y + βitt + i where Ai is real
factor demand for i per unit of gross real output, Pi is price of factor i, Y is real gross
output, t is time and βij , βiY and βit are parameters to be estimated. The parameter of
interest regarding the scale economy is βiY where a significant and negative value indicates
the presence of economies of scale with respect to factor i.
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the range increased from 1850 to 1860.
There are ample empirical evidences that support the presence of scale
economies in U.S. manufacturing in the late nineteenth century. However as
to whether this was internal or external economies of scale or a combination
of both, it is not so clear while this obviously affects my modelling choice.
As it will be more clear when I introduce my model in Chapter 2, I assume
that it is internal economies of scale. The implications of this assumption
will be discussed more in detail in Section 2 of Chapter 3.9
9More literature review relevant to questions in each chapter is included in the intro-
duction part of each chapter. For example, the literatures on the role of the tariffs are
included in Chapter 4 and on the mass migration in Chapter 5. The literature review in
Chapter 1 only includes more general reviews.
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Chapter 2
The Model and the Data
2.1 The Baseline Model
A benchmark model is constructed to account for some important charac-
teristics of the U.S. and the North Atlantic Economy in the late nineteenth
century. I consider factors that potentially could have been important forces
driving the outcome: differences in sectoral productivity or TFP, trade costs
and endowments.10
The economy consists of 3 regions : Britain, the U.S. and the rest of
the world. Each region has 3 sectors of production : primary, manufac-
turing and services. Primary and manufacturing goods are tradable while
goods produced in the service sector are non-tradable. There are 3 factors
of production : land, labour and manufacturing intermediates. The pri-
mary sector uses land and labour, the manufacturing sector uses labour and
manufacturing intermediates and the service sector only uses labour.11 The
manufacturing sector exhibits increasing returns to scale at the firm level
10Obviously, the Heckscher-Ohlin model assumes a common technology across regions
but differences in sectoral productivity in levels and in growth were significant between
two regions (Broadberry, 1997).
11Land is included in primary to reflect the comparative advantage of the U.S. in land
endowment. This was clearly an imporant competing force against the agglomeration.
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while the other sectors have constant returns to scale.12 Labour is perfectly
mobile across sectors so that wages are equalized across sectors. Basically
the model obeys the standard assumptions of the New Economic Geography
literature.
2.1.1 Consumer Behaviour
There is a measure Di > 0 of identical consumers. Every consumer shares
the same Cobb-Douglas tastes over the three types of goods,
U = (cai − ci)θacθmmi cθssi
where cai and cmi represent composite indexes of the consumption of pri-
mary and manufactured goods, respectively, and ci is the subsistence level
of consumption in primary and i={b, us, rw}. The index cai is a sub-utility
function defined over differentiated agricultural products that each region
produces. Likewise cmi is defined over a continuum of varieties of manufac-
tured goods:
cai =
[
γba
ρa
i,b + γusa
ρa
i,us + γrwa
ρa
i,rw
]1/ρa
, cmi =
[∫ n
0
m(j)ρmdj
]1/ρm
where ai,j represents region i’s demand for region j’s primary products and
m(j) represents manufacturing consumption of each available variety. n is
the total number of manufacturing varieties produced in all three regions.
This specification yields the price indexes for cai and cmi as
Gai =
[
γσab (pa,bT
a
bi)
1−σa + γσaus (pa,usT
a
usi)
1−σa + γσarw(pa,rwT
a
rwi)
1−σa]1/(1−σa) (1)
Gmi =
∑
j
nmj(pmjT
m
ji )
1−σm
1/(1−σm) (2)
12Later in the paper the assumption of increasing returns will be relaxed and some
features of constant returns in manufacturing sector will be discussed and compared with
the benchmark model.
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where pa,i is the price of a primary good produced in i and T
a
ji and T
m
ji are the
iceberg transportation costs of agriculture and manufacturing from region
j to i respectively; σa =
1
1−ρa and σm =
1
1−ρm . γi is the share parameter
and the meaning of this parameter will be discussed more in detail in later
in this chapter where I go over the calibration procedure.
2.1.2 Production
The primary good is produced using a constant returns to scale technology
under perfect competition. It uses land and labour as inputs and has a
production function as
Yai = Aai(Lai)
αa(Nai)
1−αa
where Lai is labour, Nai is land and Aai is TFP. Cost-minimization implies
the following condition,
pai = Γaω
αa
i d
1−αa
i (3)
where pai is the price of the primary good, ωi is the wage and di is land rent;
Γa = (Aaiα
αa
a (1− αa)1−αa)−1.
I assume the manufacturing sector exhibits IRTS. As in Krugman and
Venables (1995), these economies of scale arise at the level of a firm and
technology is the same for all firms in all regions and involves a fixed input
of F . I also assume that in addition to labour, it uses its own produced
variety. Its production function can be defined as
Ymi = Ami(lmi)
αm
∑
j
nmjm
ρm
ji
(1−αm)/ρm − F
where Ami is TFP, mji is input of each manufacturing variety produced in
region j and used in region i and nmj is number of manufacturing firms in
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region j. lmi is labour employed by a single manufacturing firm in region
i. It should be distinguished from an upper-case letter Lmi which denotes
the aggregate amount of labour employed in region i’s manufacturing sector
that will appear shortly.
The underlying assumption is that the elasticity of substitution among
differentiated products for manufacturing firms is the same as that for con-
sumers as they share the same ρm. In other words, this implies that firms
and consumers in each region face the same manufacturing price index. This
assumption would not be central to my results because the results are not
sensitive to the elasticity of substitution parameters but this makes anal-
ysis much more tractable and manageable. Cost minimization implies the
following,
ωilmi +GmiMi = Γmiω
αm
i G
1−αm
mi (Ymi + F ) (4)
where Γmi = (Amiα
αm
m (1− αm)(1−αm))−1 and Mi =
[∑
j nmjm
ρ
ji
]1/ρ
.
The service sector, like the primary sector, uses a constant returns to
scale technology under the perfect competition and uses labour as its only
input. Its production technology can be described as,
Ysi = AsiLsi
and profit maximization implies,
psi =
ωi
Asi
(5)
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2.1.3 Demand
The demand for manufacturing goods can be decomposed into two parts:
final goods or consumption demand and intermediate demand. The aggre-
gated world demand for a manufacturing good produced in region i is
(pmi)
−σm
∑
j
θm(Yj−Ci Gaj)
(
Tmij
Gmj
)1−σm
+
∑
j
(1−αm)nmjpmjqmj
(
Tmij
Gmj
)1−σm (6)
where Ci = Di ci. The first term is the world consumption demand and
the second term is the world intermediate demand. Yj represents income of
region j and qmj is sales of a manufacturing firm in region j that is in line
with the zero-profit condition. Using (6) and profit maximization, the price
index for the composite manufacturing good, pmi, can be derived and qmi
can be obtained by imposing the zero-profit condition.
pmi =
σm
(σm − 1)Γmi ω
αm
i G
1−αm
mi (7)
qmi = F (σm − 1) (8)
It is easier to obtain the demand for primary goods as it is only used in
consumption. The world demand for a primary good produced in region i
is ∑
j
[θa(Yj − Ci Gaj) + Ci Gaj] (pai)−σa
(
T aij
Gaj
)1−σa
(9)
Finally, the demand for a non-tradable service good in region i is
θa(Yi − Ci Gai)
psi
(10)
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2.1.4 Reformulation
In this section, I reformulate the equations in order to define the equilibrium
in a simpler way. Primary and service expenditure of region i only come
from final consumption while manufacturing expenditure comes from final
consumption and intermediate usage. Therefore, region i’s expenditures are
given by
Eai = θa(Yi − Ci Gai) + Ci Gai (11)
Emi = θm(Yi − Ci Gai) + (1− αm)nmipmiqmi (12)
Esi = θs(Yi − Ci Gai) (13)
The second term on the right hand side of (12) is intermediate demand.
Wage income in the manufacturing sector, ωiLmi (Lmi is total labour
force in the manufacturing sector) is equal to the total value of manufactur-
ing output times the share of labour, αmnmipmiqmi. The number of manu-
facturing firms can be expressed as
nmi =
ωiLmi
αmpmiF (σm − 1) (14)
Using (7) and (14), the manufacturing price-index (2) can be expressed in
terms of wage and allocation,
(Gmi)
1−σm =
∑
j
BjLmj(ωj)
1−αmσm(Gmj)
σm(αm−1)(Tmji )
1−σm (15)
where Bj = (αmFσσmm (σm − 1)(1−σm)Γσmmj )−1. Substituting (3) into (1), the pri-
mary price-index can be re-written as
(Gai)
1−σa =
∑
j
γσaj Γ
1−σa
aj (ωj)
αa(1−σa)(dj)
(1−αa)(1−σa)(T aji)
1−σa (16)
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The service-price index is the same as in (5) :
psi = Gsi =
ωi
Asi
(17)
I reformulate the goods market clearing conditions in terms of expendi-
tures (Ei), price-indexes (Gi) and wage (ωi). First, for the primary sector
in each region to clear, Yai has to equal (9). Using (3) and (11), I have
[
Γa(ωi)
αa(di)
1−αa
γi
]σa
Yai =
∑
j
Eaj
(
T aij
Gaj
)1−σa
(18)
Likewise for the manufacturing sector, (8) has to be equal to (6). Using (7),
(12) and (14), it can be expressed as,
Ci ω
αmσm
i (Gmi)
(1−αm)σm =
∑
j
Emj
(
Tmij
Gmj
)1−σm
(19)
where Ci = Fσ
σm
m (σm − 1)(1−σm)Γσmmi . Finally, using (10), (13) and (17), the
goods market clearing condition for the service sector can be given as,
ωiLsi = Esi (20)
Total endowment of labour in each region is given as Li and the labour
market clearing condition is
Li = Lai + Lmi + Lsi (21)
Total endowment of land in each region is N i and the land market clearing
condition is
N i = Ni (22)
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Finally, the income of each region i is
Yi = ωiLi + diN i (23)
Two additional equations are required to define the equilibrium. They are
factor demands for land and labour in the primary sector.
Ni =
1
Aai
(
1− αa
αa
ωi
di
)αa
Yai (24)
Lai =
1
Aai
(
αa
1− αa
di
ωi
)1−αa
Yai (25)
2.1.5 Equilibrium
The general equilibrium determines each region’s wage and land rent: {wi,
di}, land and labour allocations: {Ni, Lai, Lmi, Lsi}, price-indices: {Gai,
Gmi, Gsi}, expenditures: {Eai, Emi, Esi}, agricultural output {Yai}, and
income: {Yi}. The expenditure equations (11)-(13), price-index equations
(15)-(17), goods market clearing equations (18)-(20), labour and land mar-
ket clearing equation (21)-(22), income equation (23) and factor demand
equations (24)-(25) constitute 14 equations to solve for 14 unknowns for
each region. Obviously there are three regions so that makes 42 equations
with 42 unknowns.13
I use Matlab to solve this system of equations. It does not guarantee
a unique solution as the New Economic Geography model typically has
multiple equilibria. However I tried many different initial values and they all
converged to the same equilibrium. The parameters are calibrated to match
13In this system of equations, the outputs for other sectors, Ymi and Ysi, do not appear
because they are substituted out in terms of other variables in order to simplify the
expression.
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various features of the economy during this period. A detailed description
of the calibration procedure is discussed in the following section and in the
appendix of Chapter 2.
2.2 Restricting the Model Parameters
In this section I restrict the parameters of the model to make them con-
sistent with some key characteristics of the economy circa 1870, along with
detailed descriptions of data. Essentially, I need to calibrate the following
parameters. The region specific preference parameters γi for i={b, us, rw},
c, θa, θm and θs; the TFP parameters Aai, Ami and Asi for each region;
the endowments N i and Li for each region; the elasticity parameters σa and
σm which are common across regions; the production share parameters αa
and αm which are common across regions; the fixed cost in manufacturing
production and the amount of production by a single firm F ; and the trade
costs T aij and T
m
ij
2.2.1 Classification
Tradeables are classified according to the Standard International Trade Clas-
sification (SITC, revision 4). Products under section 0, 1, 2 and 4 are clas-
sified as primary good and under section 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are classified
as manufacturing good.14 So basically food products (processed or unpro-
cessed), raw materials or materials in crude state and products from farm
are included in primary sector.
For sectoral output, due to limited availability of disaggregated data, I
do not classify them using raw data. But rather I take them from other
14Section 0-food and live animals; section 1-beverages and tobacco; section 2-crude
materials, inedible, except fuels; section 3-mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials;
section 4-animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes; section 5-chemicals and related prod-
ucts; section 6-manufactured goods classified chiefly by material; section 7-machinery and
transport equipment; section 8-miscellaneous manufactured articles
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sources, mainly from Bairoch (1982), Broadberry and Irwin (2006) and
Federico (2004). Their classifications are very similar to the conventional
system based on International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) or
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Primary sector
includes farming, fishing and forestry and manufacturing sector includes
mining, manufacturing and construction.15
Discrepancies necessarily arise between the definition of tradeable goods
and of sectoral output, given the way they are classified. Basically, trade-
able items are classified based on the characteristics of products whereas
industries are classified based on the characteristics of production activities.
For example, in my model, the food processing industry is included in man-
ufacturing but the processed food itself is classified as a primary tradeable.
This is reasonable as processed food contains disproportionately more value
accrued from the primary activities (farming, fishing and so on).16
2.2.2 Gross Output or Value-added?
In the model manufacturing output of region i, Ym,i, corresponds to gross
output rather than to value-added. More specifically, Ym,i is gross output
only including manufacturing intermediate inputs. Broadberry and Irwin
(2006), one of the sources which I use to construct these figures, define
manufacturing output in terms of value-added. Bairoch (1982) does not
clearly specify whether they are value-added or gross output. Given the
limited data availability, each region’s manufacturing output data reflecting
gross output are not available.
The model however implies that the value-added is a fixed proportion
of the gross output. Real value-added in manufacturing of region i can be
15Engineering and metal manufactures; textiles and clothing; food, drink and tobacco;
paper and printing; chemicals; wood industries; miscellaneous manufactures
16According to the U.S. Census, in 1869 the gross output in the food processing industry
was $870.3 million, of which $672.6 million was material. And these materials mostly came
from primary sectors (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1994).
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defined as
Real value added =
pm,iYm,i −Gm,iMi
pm,i
where Mi is manufacturing intermediate input. The equilibrium condition
implies that Gm,iMi = (1−αm)pm,iYm,i. Plugging this into the above equation,
the real value-added is αmYm,i. When it comes to the relative terms, the
model implies there is no difference between gross output and value-added.17
2.2.3 Normalization
Several normalizations are in order. To begin with, θa + θm + θs = 1 for
each region and γb + γus + γrw = 1. Moreover, I normalize the TFPs, land
and labor endowments in Britain: Aa,b = Am,b = As,b = N b = Lb = 1. I
also normalize domestic trade costs to 1, so T aii = T
m
ii = 1. The choice of
F , the fixed cost in manufacturing sector, proportionally scales up or down
the number of firms in these industries, but leaves the values of all other
aggregate variables unchanged in a relative sense. Therefore I can normalize
them to arbitrary numbers and I set F = 0.1. F affects the economy through
the zero-profit production level of a single manufacturing firm in equation
(8) and the number of manufacturing firms in region i in equation (14). Of
course different values of F yield different absolute values of qmi and nmi but
as long as F is equal across regions, the relative values are not affected by the
choice of F including the manufacturing price-index. I am mainly interested
in the relative performance of U.S. economy (in terms of its growth over the
periods and its performance relative to Britain), the relative values only
matter. Also in the sense that it does not affect the relative price levels, it
does not affect the relative real wages which will be the focus of Chapter
5.18
17Of course this comes from the underlying assumption that αm is constant across re-
gions. As we will see shortly, I am mostly interested in relative terms such as U.S. manufac-
turing output relative to Britain’s output, Ym,us/Ym,b or the growth factor, Ym,b,1913/Ym,b,1870.
18The crucial assumption for the normalization is that F is the same across regions.
Choosing different values of F for each region allows for the case that each region ex-
24
2.2.4 Parameters I Calibrate Individually
σa and σm : the elasticity of substitution
I start with σa and σm which are the elasticity of substitution in primary
and manufacturing products, respectively. According to Anderson and van
Wincoop (2004), it is likely to be in the range of 5 to 10. So initially I choose
7.5 for both. Later, in a sensitivity analysis, I vary these values within this
range to see how sensitive the results are.
Li and N i : endowments
I continue with the endowments of land and labour force in each region.
Feinstein (1972) reports the total labour force for Britain in 1870 is 13,950
thousands and Kendrick (1961) reports it for the U.S. in 1869 as 11,910
thousands. Therefore the share of U.S. labour force relative to Britain’s is
about 0.85. Given the normalization Lb = 1, I set Lus = 0.85. Employment
data for the rest of world circa 1870 is incomplete therefore I infer world
population from Maddison (2001) to calibrate Lrw. The rest of world popu-
lation is about 40 times larger than Britain’s, so I assign Lrw=40. Abstract
of British Historical Statistics and the U.S. Census of Agriculture reports
land usage for Britain and the U.S., respectively. According to them, land
usage in the U.S. in 1870 is about 4 times larger than that of Britain, so I
set Nus = 4 given N b = 1.
19 Again, land usage data for the rest of world is
incomplete, so I assign N rw = 40.
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hibits different degree of IRTS. This, however, is not a possible option under the current
methodology because then the model solving procedure can get immensely complicated.
Certainly this would be an interesting possibility to consider in many aspects including
the real wage convergence story to be covered in Chapter 5. In this case I would need
more realistic choice of F to reflect the difference in the degree of IRTS across regions.
19According to the Historical Statistics, 46, 018 thousands acres of land was used for
crops and pasture in Britain in 1870. The Census reports that 188, 921 thousands acres
of ‘improved land’, the classification which corresponds to the land usage in Britain, was
used for the U.S.
20Indeed, Lrw only influences the equilibrium value of drw and the calibrated value of
Aa,rw and is not critical for the overall results.
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αa : the share of labour in the primary sector
Next, I continue with the share parameters in primary and manufacturing
production. As these parameters are assumed to be common across regions,
I take the arithmetic average of each region’s share. I start with the share
of labour in primary sector. For Britain, O’Rourke and Williamson (1994)
calculate the share of wage income in the primary sector in 1871 as 0.53.
Clark (2010) estimates the share of farm capital and land income in total
farm income for 1860-1869 as 0.48. If I take the residual as farm wage income
then the share is 0.52, so they yield almost identical share parameter values.
For the U.S., O’Rourke and Williamson (1994) calculates the share of capital
and land income as 0.41 and in turn, the wage income share is 0.59. I use
Sweden as a proxy for the rest of world as it is almost impossible to get all
the data needed. According to Edvinson (2005), the labour income share in
1870 is 0.69. And by taking the average of these numbers, I set αa = 0.6.
Admittedly, it may be too much of a generalization to say that Sweden is
a perfect representation of the rest of world circa 1870. But without loss of
generality, we can say that Sweden can be a sensible approximation because
it was a relatively more labour intensive economy than Britain or the U.S.
circa 1870. And given data availability, Sweden is a plausible proxy for the
rest of world in calibrating the labour share parameter.
αm : the share of labour in manufacturing sector
Next I move to the share parameter in manufacturing sector. Here I pin
down the share of manufacturing intermediates, 1−αm, and take the share
of labour as a residual using input-output tables. Unfortunately I do not
have input-output tables for 1870 and have to use the ones closest possible.
To do so, I classify each industrial sub-category into primary, manufac-
turing or services according to the classification rule described above. Then
I re-calculate the manufacturing gross output following my model specifi-
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cation. Manufacturing sector in my model does not include primary and
service intermediate goods, therefore gross output is defined as value-added
plus manufacturing intermediates only. Then 1−αm is obtained using this
new measure of the gross output.
For Britain, there are input-output table for 1851 and 1907 constructed
by Thomas (in progress) and Thomas (1984), respectively. I take the average
of the values implied by these two input-output tables. In 1851, the share
of labour turns out to be around 0.6 and in 1907, 0.49. So for Britain it is
about 0.55. For the U.S., the only available input-output table is for 1899,
constructed by Whitney (1968). And it yields a labour share of 0.53. For
the rest of world, which is again proxied by Sweden, I use an input-output
table for 1885 by Bohlin (2007) which estimates the labour share as 0.66.
By taking the average, I set αm = 0.58.
γi : the weight on consumption of primary products from region i
Next, I calibrate γb, γus and γrw which are assumed to be equal across re-
gions. The conventional way to calibrate γi parameters is to fit these to
the expenditure share of goods from each region (for example, the share of
imported products from Britain in U.S. total primary expenditure). This,
indeed, is what the utility function implies. This approach is typically used
in the standard computational general equilibrium (CGE) model. This,
however, means that γis are not equal across regions (For example I would
need to calibrate γus,i instead of γus that indicates the share of imported
products from region i in U.S. total primary expenditure. I would then
need 9 different parameters in total). This approach is problematic for the
purpose of this paper as my model can’t reflect other important features of
the economy during this period (for example, U.S. primary output relative
to Britain, the share of labour force in primary sector and so on). It also
makes analysis much more unmanageable and complicated. I therefore as-
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sume that γis are equal across regions. I calibrate these parameters using
the price index equation (1). To draw a meaningful interpretation of γis,
I compare equation (1) to equation (2), the manufacturing price index. In
this equation the counterpart of γi is nmi which corresponds to the number
of manufacturing firms in region i. This defines the distribution of manufac-
turing varieties (activities) across regions. We can think of γi in the same
manner. In other words, the number of varieties produced in a region is
proportional to the volume of primary goods produced in that region. In
my case, the rest of world which is the biggest producer of primary goods
also produces the largest number of varieties.21 The only difference between
the two is that γi is fixed or exogenous whereas nmi is endogenously deter-
mined. Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) takes this approach when they
assign values to these parameters. I use each region’s share of world primary
production as estimated by Federico (2004) to pin down these values.
As,i : TFP for region i’s services sector
Next, the TFPs for services sectors are calibrated. Broadberry and Irwin
(2006) estimate that U.S. labour productivity in the services sector is 0.77
given that of Britain is 1. So I set As,us = 0.77. For the rest of world, I set
As,rw = 0.5 arbitrarily. The overall results are not sensitive to this value
because the services sector is a residual sector that produces non-tradable
goods. The rest of world is not the focus in this paper anyway and the
non-tradable service sector of this region has small impacts on primary or
manufacturing sector of the U.S. or Britain which are the main focuses.
21For comparison I report the values of γs that match the expenditure shares of Britain
and the U.S. γi,j denotes the share of imported products from j in i’s total primary
expenditure : γus,b = 0.00, γus,us = 0.95, γus,rw = 0.05, γb,b = 0.67, γb,us = 0.09 and
γb,rw = 0.24
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Di : measure of region i’s consumer
This parameter only controls Ci = Di ci in the aggregate equilibrium. I
use the population of each region to proxy this. I normalize Db = 1 then
according to Maddison (2001), Dus = 1.37 and Drw = 40.
2.2.5 Parameters I Calibrate Jointly
At this point, I am left with 27 parameters. 12 trade costs: T aij and T
m
ij , 9
preference parameters: θa, θm and C for each region and 6 TFPs: Aa,i and
Am,i for each region. I choose them such that the model replicates key char-
acteristics of the benchmark year economy circa 1870. Specifically, I target:
(1) the shares of each region’s labour forces in each sector as reported; (2)
each region’s primary and manufacturing value-added relative to Britain;
(3) each region’s nominal GDP relative to Britain; (4) the income elasticity
of demand for food estimated by various sources; (5) Britain and the U.S.
exports to GDP ratio in current prices; (6) the ratio of Britain’s and U.S.
manufacturing imports to their total imports; (7) the ratio of Britain’s and
U.S. manufacturing exports to their total exports; (8) the ratio of Britain’s
primary and manufacturing exports to the U.S. to its total primary and
manufacturing exports, respectively; (9) the ratio of U.S. primary and man-
ufacturing exports to Britain to its total primary and manufacturing exports,
respectively. Below I provide a detailed description of data and algorithm
of the calibration procedure.
(1) The share of labour in each sector
Broadberry and Irwin (2006) report sectoral employment for Britain for 1871
and the U.S. for 1869 which is shown in Table 1 below.
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Table 1: Sectoral Employment circa 1870 (in thousand)
agriculture industry service whole economy
Britain 3,120 5,930 5,000 14,050
U.S. 5,758 2,831 3,321 11,910
Source: see the text
(2) Sectoral output relative to Britain
For each region’s value-added in the primary sector, I rely on Federico
(2004). He includes 49 countries and 23 products that account for more
than 70% of the world primary output. He measures relative prices for these
products in terms of wheat with which he obtains PPP-adjusted value-added
for these countries for 1913. In order to obtain the figures for 1870, I use
the volume indices that he provides from 1800 to 1938. Table 2 below re-
ports the primary value-added of each region in 1870 and 1913 with which
I construct value-added relative to that of Britain.
Table 2: Primary value-added (in wheat units)
in 1913 in 1870
Britain 17,152 18,387
U.S. 127,031 49,288
World 884,124 468,586
Source: see the text. Note: volume-index in 1870 was
107.2, 38.8 and 53.0 for Britain, U.S. and the world,
respectively with 1913=100.
To construct the value-added figures in the manufacturing sector I use
Bairoch (1982). Table 3 is taken from Bairoch’s (1982). This provides
comparable production figures for various years but not for 1870. I apply
the annual growth rate from 1860 to 1880 implied by his numbers to obtain
them.
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Table 3: Manufacturing output by major regions
Developed countries
U.K. U.S. Total Third World World
Absolute volumes (U.K. in 1900=100)
1860 45 16 143 83 226
1880 73 47 253 67 320
1900 100 128 481 60 541
1913 127 298 863 70 933
Percentages of the world share
1860 19.9 7.2 63.4 36.6 100
1880 22.9 14.7 79.1 20.9 100
1900 18.5 23.6 89.0 11.0 100
1913 13.6 32.0 92.5 7.5 100
Source : see the text
(3) Nominal GDP relative to Britain
Officer and Williamson (2010) provide nominal GDP for Britain and the
U.S. in domestic currencies. I use the bilateral exchange rates, from the
same source, to convert the GDPs in U.S. dollar. For the rest of world, as
nominal GDP is not available, I rely on Maddison (2001) which reports the
world’s and each region’s GDP in Geary-Khamis international dollars. I can
then subtract the Britain and U.S. GDP from world GDP to obtain the rest
of world GDP (relative to Britain).
(4) Income elasticity of demand for agricultural output
Crafts (1980) argues that this elasticity was likely to be between 0.5 and 0.7
during the British Industrial Revolution. According to Houthakker (1957)
who estimates the elasticity for food with respect to total expenditure, cov-
ering 30 countries and the period from 1853 to 1953, this elasticity ranges
between 0.5 and 0.75. Williamson and Swanson (1966) estimate the expen-
diture elasticity of demand for food for Massachusetts workers in 1875. It
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turns out to be about 0.607 for industrial workers, 0.570 for skilled workers
and 0.730 for unskilled workers. Given these, the most plausible value seems
to be around 0.6 and I rely on this value in my model.
(5)-(9) Trade data
Basically all the trade data are taken from the Annual Statement of Trade
of the United Kingdom and Annual Report of the Commerce and Naviga-
tion of the United States. I classify each good traded into either primary
or manufacturing according to the classification rule described above. Ta-
bles 4 and 5 below describe the trade statistics constructed for calibration.
Finally, Table 6 summarizes the targets and their values. In the appendix
I provide a detailed description of the joint calibration procedure. Table 7
summarizes the parameters common across regions, Table 8 summarizes the
region specific parameter values and Table 9 reports the trade costs.
Table 4: Britain and U.S. trade in 1870 (in millions)
prim. IM manu. IM prim. EX manu. EX
Britain(£) 211.2 40.5 11.4 182.6
U.S.($) 259.7 280.6 372.4 80.6
Note : Imports(IM) defined here are net-imports which are as imports - re-exports.
U.S. imports and re-exports are in gold-terms, so I convert them into currency terms using
an exchange rate of $1=0.742 gold$ as in O’Rourke and Williamson (1994).
Table 5: Bilateral exports between Britain and U.S. (in millions)
primary exports manufacture exports
Britain to U.S.(£) 0.5 25.9
U.S. to Britain($) 233.5 10.4
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Table 6: Calibration targets
Targets for benchmark year 1870 Value
Share of Britain’s LF in primary 0.22
Share of Britain’s LF in manufacturing 0.42
Share of US LF in primary 0.48
Share of US LF in manufacturing 0.24
Share of rest of world LF in primary 0.60
Share of rest of world LF in manufacturing 0.20
US primary VA relative to Britain 2.68
RW primary VA relative to Britain 21.8
US manu. GO relative to Britain 0.48
RW manu. GO relative to Britain 3.21
US GDP relative to Britain 1.30
RW GDP relative to Britain 9.57
Income elasticity of food consumption 0.60
Ratio of Britain’s exports to its GDP 0.19
Ratio of U.S. exports to its GDP 0.06
Ratio of Britain’s manu. imports to its total imports 0.19
Ratio of U.S. manu. imports to its total imports 0.52
Ratio of Britain’s manu. exports to its total exports 0.94
Ratio of U.S. manu. exports to its total exports 0.18
Ratio of U.S. manu. exports to Britain to its total manu. exports 0.13
Ratio of U.S. primary exports to Britain to its total primary exports 0.63
Ratio of Britain’s manu. exports to U.S. to its total manu. exports 0.14
Ratio of Britain’s primary exports to U.S. to its total primary exports 0.05
LF: labour force, GO: gross output
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Table 7: Common parameter values
σa σm αa αm F γb γus γrw
7.5 7.5 0.6 0.58 0.1 0.04 0.10 0.86
Table 8: Region specific parameter values
Britain U.S. R.O.W
N 1.00∗ 4.00 40.0
L 1.00∗ 0.85 40.0
θa 0.28 0.35 0.42
θm 0.30 0.32 0.30
θs 0.42 0.33 0.28
c 0.21 0.34 0.15
Aa 1.00
∗ 1.06 0.30
Am 1.00
∗ 1.04 0.33
As 1.00
∗ 0.77 0.50
* indicates normalization.
Table 9: Trade costs
Tab,us T
a
b,rw T
a
us,b T
a
us,rw T
a
rw,b T
a
rw,us T
m
b,us T
m
b,rw T
m
us,b T
m
us,rw T
m
rw,b T
m
rw,us
2.38 1.64 1.74 1.85 1.91 2.05 2.30 1.48 1.56 1.45 1.53 2.56
Conventionally, most of the trade cost literature assumes symmetric
trade costs between two regions.22 But from Table 9, it can be seen that
the calibrated trade costs yield quite large asymmetries between the U.S.
and other regions with a larger asymmetry for manufacturing goods. One
of the factors that can explain this discrepancy around 1870 is the trade
policy. It is well-know that the U.S. erected high barriers on its imports in
order to protect its industry during this period. On the other hand, Britain
was essentially a free trade country. Therefore this difference must have
22See Anderson and Wincoop (2004). One of the few exceptions that assumes asym-
metric trade cost is Waugh (2008).
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contributed to a significant extent to the asymmetry observed in the table.
More on this issue will be discussed in the following chapters.
One thing to note is that even though I do not target the model to match
the real GDP of the U.S. relative to Britain, the implied values match the
data quite closely. Real GDP can be defined as
Real GDP =
Y
Gθaa G
θm
m G
θs
s
where the regional subscript i has been dropped. The term in the denomina-
tor can be interpreted as a price-index. The implied ratio of U.S. real GDP
per capita to that of Britain is about 0.97. Maddison (2001) suggests that
this ratio is about 1.03 when measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis international
dollar.
Next I demonstrate that the benchmark year equilibrium generated by
the calibration is internally consistent - expenditure plus net exports, gross
output and factor costs of each region are equalized and trades are balanced.
To do this I construct a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) in the benchmark
year of 1870 implied by the model. Table 10 below presents the SAM. Note
that the value of U.S. primary gross output is normalized to 1 and all other
values are in relative terms.
First, the model correctly predicts that the U.S. is a net exporter of
primary product while being a net importer of manufacturing product (and
vice versa for Britain). The table shows that the value of each region’s gross
output in each sector is equal to the value of net exports plus expenditure
(GO = Expenditure + NX). It also shows that the trades are balanced in
each region (NX across sectors in each region add up to zero).
I provide a more detailed picture of trade flows between each region in
Table 11. The table can be read as follows. The numbers on rows indicate
the value of imports. For example, the numbers 0.39, 0.05 and 0.14 on the
first row of the table represent the value of Britain’s primary imports from
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Table 10: Social Accounting Matrix
Industry GO
Input Cost
VA NX Expenditure
L N M
U.S.
P 1.00 0.60 0.40 1.00 0.03 0.97
M 0.52 0.30 0.22 0.30 -0.03 0.55
S 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
Total 1.87 1.25 0.40 0.22 1.65 0.00 1.87
Britain
P 0.41 0.24 0.16 0.41 -0.18 0.58
M 0.80 0.46 0.34 0.46 0.18 0.62
S 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
Total 1.61 1.11 0.16 0.34 1.27 0.00 1.61
Rest of World
P 8.68 5.21 3.47 8.68 0.15 8.53
M 2.99 1.74 1.26 1.74 -0.15 3.14
S 1.74 1.74 1.74 1.74
Total 13.40 8.68 3.47 1.26 12.15 0.00 13.40
GO: gross output, VA: value-added, NX: net exports,
L: labour, N: land, P: primary, M: manufacturing and S: service
Britain, the U.S. and the rest of world, respectively. Because 0.39 is the
value of domestic trades (i.e. consumption of British primary products by
British consumers), 0.05 (imports from the U.S.) and 0.14 (imports from
the rest) add up to the foreign imports of primary products for Britain.
The numbers on columns are the values of exports. For example, the
numbers 0.05, 0.92 and 0.03 on the second column of the table represent the
values of U.S. primary exports to Britain, the U.S. and the rest, respectively.
In this case, the foreign exports add up to 0.08. The expenditure (in the
last column) can be derived by adding all the imports (for example U.S.
manufacturing expenditure is 0.03 + 0.50 + 0.02 = 0.55). As we can see, the
values of expenditures from this table are consistent with the values in the
previous table. The gross output, likewise, can be calculated by adding all
the exports which are again consistent with the values in the SAM table.
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Table 11: Trade flows in the benchmark year
Primary Britain U.S. Rest Imports Expenditure
Britain 0.39 0.05 0.14 0.19 0.58
U.S. 0.001 0.92 0.05 0.05 0.97
Rest 0.01 0.03 8.49 0.04 8.53
Exports 0.01 0.08 0.19
Net exports -0.18 0.03 0.15
Gross output 0.41 1.00 8.68
Manufacture Britain U.S. Rest Imports Expenditure
Britain 0.58 0.002 0.04 0.05 0.62
U.S. 0.03 0.50 0.02 0.05 0.55
Rest 0.19 0.02 2.93 0.21 3.14
Exports 0.22 0.02 0.06
Net exports 0.18 -0.03 -0.15
Gross output 0.80 0.52 2.99
I end this section with some discussions on alternative ways of calibrating
the parameters. First, the main purpose of my calibration is to match the
output side of the data in 1870 given the objectives of the thesis. But
depending on the objective, alternative strategies are possible. For example
I also tried to match the price side of the data such as the real wages, but
this distorts the output side of the economy hugely. Therefore in the end I
chose the current strategy over other possible options. Matching the price
side, however, can be a more relevant choice in analysing the convergence of
Anglo-American real wages in Chapter 5. I leave this for a future project.
2.3 Generating the Development of the Economy
In this section, before studying the effects of each force in isolation, I es-
tablish that the model can generate several features of the development in
the North Atlantic Economy. To this end I need to feed in the changes in
TFPs, endowments and trade costs. I start by quantifying these changes.
These changes are later fed into the equilibrium in the benchmark year and
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the performance of the model in accounting for the economy in 1913 will be
evaluated.
One thing to note before I proceed is that, as we will see, some changes
such as the change in primary and manufacturing TFP of the rest of world
and the changes in trade costs are calibrated to fit the model to the data
due to the lack of data availability. Therefore the model’s close fit to some
features of the data is not a new finding of this exercise but rather the result
of the imposition made at the onset.
2.3.1 Measuring the Changes
Changes in Sectoral TFP
I start with changes in sectoral TFP for each region. Using the production
function in the primary sector, the change in TFP in the primary sector of
region i can be represented as
(Aa,i)1913
(Aa,i)1870
=
(Ya,i)1913
(Ya,i)1870
[
(La,i)1870
(La,i)1913
]αa [(Ni)1870
(Ni)1913
]1−αa
(26)
The first term on the right hand side of (26) is obtained from Federico’s
(2004) value-added index for Britain and the U.S.23 The second term, the
change in labour force employed in primary sector, can be obtained from
Broadberry and Irwin (2006). It only provides 1871 and 1911 figures for
Britain and 1869 and 1909 figures for the U.S. Therefore I have to use
the growth rates from Broadberry and Irwin to obtain the 1870 and 1913
values.24 Finally, the change in land endowment is taken from the Abstract
of British Historical Statistics for Britain and the Census for the U.S.25
23The index for Britain in 1870 is 107.2 and for the U.S. it is 38.8 with the 1913 levels
for both countries normalized to 100.
24For Britain’s annual growth rate of labour force in primary sector from 1861 to 1871
is about -1.2% and from 1901 to 1911 is about -0.08%. And for U.S. it is about 0.74%
from 1859 to 1869 and 0.63% from 1899 to 1909.
25This will be discussed more in detail when I talk about changes in endowments.
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Next I move on to manufacturing TFP. It is clear from the model that an
αm share of revenue in manufacturing sector is distributed as labour income.
This implies the following equation
Ym,i =
wiLm,i
αmpm,i
(27)
I use equation (27) to derive an expression for TFP. To this aim I need the
following equations derived from the model.
pm,i =
σm
1− σm (Am,iα
αm
m (1− αm)1−αm)−1wαmi G1−αmm,i (28)
Gm,i =
∑
j
nj(pm,jT
m
j,i )
1−σm
1/(1−σm) (29)
Tmj,i =
(
nm,i
nm,j
) 1
1−σm
(
pm,i
pm,j
)(
pm,jmij
pm,imii
) 1
1−σm
(30)
These equations are just restatements of equation (7), (2) and (A.1), respec-
tively. Inserting (30) into (29), the price index can be expressed as
Gm,i =
[
nm,i p
1−σm
m,i X
−1
i
] 1
1−σm (31)
where I define Xi =
pmimii∑
j pmjmij
as the home trade share (share of expenditure
on domestic products in total expenditure). Also from the model we know
that nm,i =
wiLmi
αmpmiF (σm−1) which can be plugged in (31). Then this can be
substituted in (28) which yields,
pm,i = wi
[
A−1m,i(Lm,iX
−1
i )
1−αm
1−σm
] 1−σm
1−αmσm (32)
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In deriving (32) I dropped all the common parameters that will eventually
cancel out when I calculate the change in TFP. I plug (32) into (27) to
obtain,
Ym,i =
[
A1−σmm,i X
1−αm
i L
αm(1−σm)
m,i
] 1
1−αmσm (33)
With (33), I can obtain the growth rate of TFP from 1870 to 1913 as
Am,1913
Am,1870
=
(
X1870
X1913
) 1−αm
1−σm
(
Lm,1870
Lm,1913
)αm (Ym,1913
Ym,1870
) 1−αmσm
1−σm
(34)
where I dropped the regional subscript i. This approach of measuring the
manufacturing TFP shock has the advantage that data on manufacturing
intermediate usage does not have to be used as we do not have any accurate
data on it anyway.26 Instead, the home trade share X can be calculated
more accurately using trade and expenditure data.
To obtain Xus, I rely on The Historical Statistics of the United States.
It reports the ‘value of commodities destined for domestic consumption for
1869 to 1919’ (table Cd378-410). This corresponds to
∑
j pmjmij or total
expenditure and the value of imports is subtracted from this in order to
obtain pm,usmusus or the expenditure on domestic products. As a result
Xus,1869 = 0.72 and Xus,1913 = 0.86.
27 So the share of U.S. expenditure on
domestic manufacturing increased from 1869 to 1913.
I use Jefferys and Walters (1955) to calculate Xb. They provide values for
‘consumption of home-manufactured consumer goods’ which corresponds to
pm,bmbb in the model. But they only include the value of final consumption
which means that expenditure on intermediate goods is not included. Their
data are therefore rather limited for my purposes. The values for Xb,1870
and Xb,1913 are 0.865 and 0.714, respectively.
26From the specification of the production function Ym = AmL
αm
m M
1−αm − F , where
M is intermediate manufacturing usage, it is easy to see that data on M is needed to
implement the conventional growth accounting exercise.
27It reports only decennial data from 1869 to 1889.
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The second term on the right hand side of (34), the change in labour
force in the manufacturing sector, can be obtained from Broadberry and
Irwin (2006) for Britain and the U.S. in the same manner as for the change
in labour force in the primary sector.28 The third term comes from Bairoch
(1982) for Britain and the U.S.29
Finally, the change in service TFP implied by the model is
(As,i)1913
(As,i)1870
=
(Ls,i)1870
(Ls,i)1913
(Ys,i)1913
(Ys,i)1870
(35)
which I directly take from Broadberry and Irwin’s (2006) service sector
labour productivity figures for Britain and the U.S. Table 12 below reports
the changes in sectoral TFP.
I calibrate TFP changes for the rest of world to match its share of output
in 1913 as closely as possible given the TFP changes for Britain and the U.S.
The rest of world in this model is taken to be a residual and an imaginary
region of all other countries merged together. Therefore there is no ‘correct’
way to measuring a TFP shock for the rest of world including the method I
used for Britain or for the U.S.
Table 12: Changes in sectoral TFP
Britain U.S.
Aa,1913
Aa,1870
1.09 1.22
Am,1913
Am,1870
1.14 1.40
As,1913
As,1870
1.28 1.97
28For Britain annual growth rate of the labour force in the manufacturing sector from
1861 to 1871 is about 1.1% and from 1901 to 1911 is about 0.9%. For the U.S. it is about
2.9% from 1859 to 1869 and 3.6% from 1899 to 1909.
29See Table 3.
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Alternative Measures of TFP Changes
In the approach above, I measure the TFP shocks as implied by the pro-
duction functions. In other words, I assume that TFPs are residuals left
unexplained by other factors like land, labour and intermediate input. As I
do not include capital in my baseline model, the TFP measured according to
this methodology is not really total factor productivity but rather land and
labour factor productivity.30 Therefore it would be meaningful to use TFP
shocks taken from other literature that correspond more closely to the term
total. Since most of the works that measure TFP assume CRTS production
technologies, this approach can be problematic if there exists IRTS like in
my model because productivity increases arising from the scale economies
can not be identified from the pure technological progress. This issue will
be discussed more in details in the next section.
U.S. primary TFP shock is taken from Atack, Bateman and Parker (2000,
Table 6.1) according to which the average annual TFP growth rates are
0.45%, 0.54% and 0.58% during 1870-1880, 1880-1890 and 1890-1900 period,
respectively. They do not have the growth rate for 1900-1913 period so
I use the growth rate of 1890-1900 for this period. It implies that U.S.
primary TFP grew by a factor of 1.256 from 1870 to 1913. I take U.S.
manufacturing TFP shock from Kendrick (1961, Table 34). He measures
TFP as the ratio of real product to real income deflated by factor prices.
According to this, the annual growth rate before 1899 for U.S. manufacturing
TFP is 1.4%, 0.7% for 1899-1909 and 0.3% for 1909-1913. This implies that
it grew by a factor of 1.624 during the periods. For Britain there is no
a priori information like the case of the U.S. as far as I know. Therefore
I recover Britain’s sectoral TFP shocks using the approach by Broadberry
(1993, 1998).31 He takes a simple growth accounting approach where he
30Later I also include capital in an alternative specification.
31He does not explicitly calculates the TFP growth rates, rather he is interested in
Anglo-American comparative productivity levels in manufacturing sector.
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assumes that the production function is CRTS Cobb-Douglas function with
two factors of input, labour and capital. The share of wages is 0.77. The
capital data are taken from Feinstein and Pollard (1988) as in Broadberry
(1998). Britain’s manufacturing TFP shock from 1870 to 1913 turns out
to be 1.265. Broadberry does not include primary/agricultural sector in
his analysis but I can take a similar approach as the manufacturing sector.
I assume that there are three factors of input which are labour, land and
capital. Again the data for capital employed in the primary sector are taken
from Feinstein and Pollard (1988). The share of each input is taken from
O’Rourke and Williamson (1994) as 0.529, 0.275 and 0.196 for labour, land
and capital, respectively. Britain’s primary sector’s TFP grew by a factor
of 1.065.
Changes in Endowments
I begin with changes in land endowments for Britain and the U.S. According
to the Abstract of British Historical Statistics, 46,018 and 46,849 thousands
acres of land were used in 1870 and 1913 for crops and pasture, respectively.
The U.S. Census of Agriculture reports 188,921 and 478,452 thousands acres
of ‘improved land’ in 1870 and 1910, respectively. For the rest of world, I
assume it did not change. Again this assumption is not critical to the overall
result.
As discussed in the previous section for labour force endowments, I have
to interpolate the 1870 and 1913 levels from Broadberry and Irwin (2006).
First, I obtain the labour force in 1870 and 1913 for Britain and the U.S.
by adding up the sectoral labour force obtained from the previous section.
Then I use these figures to calculate the changes in labour force. For the
rest of world, I have to assume that it changed in accordance to population
growth which I obtain from Maddison (2001). Table 13 reports the values.
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Table 13: Changes in endowments
Britain U.S. R.O.W
N 1913/N 1870 1.02 2.53 1.00
L1913/L1870 1.49 3.21 1.37
Changes in Trade Costs
Next, I measure changes in trade costs. One possible option is to use theo-
retical gravity equations derived from the model (using equations (A.1) and
(A.2)). But the main drawback of this method is that I have to rely on
incomplete data series, especially regarding the price data. Moreover the
price for the rest of world is even more difficult to measure.32
Therefore I take an alternative approach. This approach measures the
changes to match the target trade data in Table 6 for 1913. Exactly matching
the data is possible but this yields trade costs in 1913 to be below 1. Hence
I impose an additional restriction that Ti,j > 1.1 for any i 6= j.
Table 14: Changes in trade costs (growth factor)
∆Tab,us ∆T
a
us,b ∆T
a
b,rw ∆T
a
rw,b ∆T
a
us,rw ∆T
a
rw,us
0.850 1.084 0.675∗ 1.894 0.601∗ 1.686
∆Tmb,us ∆T
m
us,b ∆T
m
b,rw ∆T
m
rw,b ∆T
m
us,rw ∆T
m
rw,us
0.808 1.251 1.447 0.723∗ 1.900 0.468∗
* indicates the cases where the restriction is needed.
Some discussions on this are in order. First, these numbers are growth
factors and for example, ∆T ab,us = 0.85 means that the level of the primary
trade cost from Britain to U.S. in 1913 is 85% of that in 1870. So it implies
that T ab,us has decreased from 2.38 in 1870 (Table 9) to 1.97 in 1913. In
32Indeed when the changes in trade costs measured this way are applied, the simulated
result seriously flaws the key trade statistics in 1913. The details are not reported here
but are available upon request.
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this particular case of the primary trade cost from Britain to the U.S., the
value looks plausible. O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) demonstrate that
the large reduction in transportation costs during this period contributed to
the reduction in trade costs. Jacks, Novy and Meissner (2010) also show that
bilateral international trade costs for major countries decreased significantly
relative to domestic trade costs.
The values involving the rest of world look much less plausible. For
example, the primary trade cost from Britain to the rest of world (T ab,rw) de-
creases by 33% while that from the rest of world to Britain (T arw,b) increases
by 89%. Another example is the manufacturing trade cost between the U.S.
and the rest of world. Tmus,rw increases by 90% while T
m
rw,us decreases by
53%. Admittedly, even if I allow for asymmetry in bilateral trade costs, the
calibrated trade costs that match the trade data seem to be far from being
realistic. This problem mainly comes from the aggregation of the rest of
the world. For example the rest of world in the model includes countries
that barely exported manufacturing goods to the U.S. as well as countries
in North-Western (NW) Europe that exported substantial amounts. In fact
those countries in NW Europe account for most of manufacturing imports
of the U.S. from the rest of the world. This implies that combining indus-
trially developed NW Europe together with industrially lagging countries
as the rest of world would generate a region that is relatively inefficient or
has less comparative advantage in manufacturing compared to NW Europe
while exporting the same amount of manufacturing goods as NW Europe
did in 1913. This would require the model to need a very low trade cost
from the rest of world to the U.S. to account for the manufacturing trade
flow.
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Alternative Measures of Trade Cost Changes
As mentioned earlier asymmetric changes in the bilateral trade costs can
not be constructed using the gravity equations implied by the model due to
lack of data. Some of the trade cost changes calibrated for this reason look
quite implausible. But I can, at least, get a sense of what more realistic
changes in trade costs were like during this period from the work of Jacks,
Novy and Meissner (2010). They derive a gravity equation implied by a
trade model that is similar to my model with which they recover bilateral
trade costs from 1870 to 1913.33 Since their model does not have multiple
sectors, their trade costs do not exactly correspond to the trade costs of my
model. Nevertheless, their measures provide some more insights regarding
the changes in trade costs during this period.
Table 15 presents the changes in trade costs implied by Jacks, Novy and
Meissner (2010). Note that I assume trade cost shocks in primary goods and
in manufacturing goods are identical as their model has only one sector. I
also assume that trade costs involving the rest of world are symmetric.34
Comparing the calibrated changes in trade costs from my model to that of
Jacks et al., the pictures are quite different. First, their model does not
predict such dramatic changes as my model does. In particular, the trade
costs involving the rest of world in Jacks et al. are not as extreme as the
counterparts calibrated from my model. Given the fact that Jacks et al. use
much more disaggregated data regarding the rest of world, one can judge
that, trade costs per se, their numbers are more realistic than mine. I also
use these shocks to simulate the model in later sections.
Accordingly the calibrated changes in trade costs (Table 14) can be de-
composed into two parts, ‘actual’ changes and ‘residual’ changes, rather
33The model is single-sector general equilibrium and features multiple countries where
monopolistically competitive firms produce differentiated products.
34Apart from Britain and the U.S. their analysis includes Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Denmark, Dutch East Indies, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. I treat them as the rest of world.
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Table 15: Changes in trade costs (growth factor) by Jacks et al.
∆Tab,us ∆T
a
us,b ∆T
a
b,rw ∆T
a
rw,b ∆T
a
us,rw ∆T
a
rw,us
1.003 0.972 1.006 0.946 1.006 0.946
∆Tmb,us ∆T
m
us,b ∆T
m
b,rw ∆T
m
rw,b ∆T
m
us,rw ∆T
m
rw,us
1.003 0.972 1.006 0.946 1.006 0.946
* indicates the cases where the restriction is needed.
than just treating them as ‘mere’ changes in trade costs. To do this, I use
the values by Jacks et al., shown in Table 15, as ‘actual’ changes. Their
measures are more ideal for my purpose than other alternatives. First, they
are derived from the theoretical gravity equations and include observable
as well as unobservable components of trade costs whereas other measures
only focus on transportation costs. Second, their measures, like the mea-
sures implied by my model, are not absolute changes but changes relative to
domestic trade costs. They also normalize domestic trade costs to 1, cap-
turing changes in international trade costs over domestic trade costs. For
example, ∆T ab,us having the value of 1.003 does not mean that the primary
trade cost from Britain to the U.S. has increased in absolute terms over the
periods. Instead it is saying that it has increased relative to domestic trade
costs. Therefore it could still mean that the trade cost was decreasing in
absolute terms if there was a substantial reduction in domestic trade costs.
More issues regarding domestic trade costs will be discussed shortly.
‘Residual’ changes are the values needed apart from ‘actual’ changes to
account for the trade data during the periods. Basically ‘actual’×‘residual’
equal the changes in trade costs presented in Table 14. Table 16 below
presents the values of ‘residual’ changes. A value close to 1, like that of
∆T aus,b, means that the calibrated change is close to the ‘actual’ changes
implied by Jacks et al. As discussed earlier, the trade costs involving the
rest of world need a larger ‘residual’ to account for the data.
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Table 16: Residual changes in trade costs (growth factor)
∆Tab,us ∆T
a
us,b ∆T
a
b,rw ∆T
a
rw,b ∆T
a
us,rw ∆T
a
rw,us
0.848 1.078 0.695 1.883 0.635 1.783
∆Tmb,us ∆T
m
us,b ∆T
m
b,rw ∆T
m
rw,b ∆T
m
us,rw ∆T
m
rw,us
0.805 1.244 1.489 0.719 2.009 0.495
* indicates the cases where the restriction is needed.
It may be more appropriate not to interpret the ‘residual’ changes in the
context of trade costs given the large discrepancy between the ‘actual’ and
the calibrated changes involving the rest of world. Instead it would be more
appropriate to interpret them as the part unexplained by the changes in
endowments, TFP and ‘actual’ changes in trade costs that gives each region
the ‘needed’ comparative advantage to account for the data.
I have briefly discussed about the implications of normalizing domestic
trade costs earlier. However more discussions about the role of domestic
trade costs are in order. One of the underlying assumptions regarding trade
costs are that intra-regional trade costs throughout the periods are constant
(normalized to 1). Of course this is far from true as it is well-known that
expansions in rail roads and advances in telecommunications in the late nine-
teenth century reduced intra-national trade costs hugely as well, probably
more so in the U.S. Given this, slight increases in some trade costs such as
∆T ab,us and ∆T
a
us,rw do not necessarily mean absolute increases, rather it is
still likely to mean decreases in absolute terms.
Treating domestic trade costs to reflect the history complicates the model
immensely. Of course it is hard to tell the exact consequences of treating
domestic trade costs like this. Changes in trade costs in my model broadly
have two implications which are not mutually exclusive. First, it shifts
comparative advantages of each region. Second, it also generates forces for
or against the agglomeration of manufacturing. Normalizing domestic trade
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costs may not distort the picture in terms of the first point but it may do so
for the second point. As discussed briefly, if we bring the large reduction in
domestic trade costs into picture during this period, we may observe larger
reductions in the overall trade costs. With all the changes in the TFP and
the size effect that were favourable to U.S. manufacturing during this period,
it could have a larger impact on the agglomeration of manufacturing in the
U.S. than the current methodology would suggest. But again it is impossible
to tell the magnitude of this effect at this stage.
Changes in Population
Maddison (2001) provides the changes in population from 1870 to 1913 for
each region. According to him,
Db,1913
Db,1870
= 1.37,
Dus,1913
Dus,1870
= 2.44 and
Drw,1913
Drw,1870
=
1.37.
2.3.2 Generating the Development
In this section, I apply these measured changes in endowments, trade costs
and TFP to the benchmark equilibrium of 1870 and evaluate how well the
model performs in accounting for the various features of the economy in
1913. This exercise is carried out in two parts. First I use the baseline
changes in TFP and trade costs which are measured or calibrated. I then
use the alternative shocks taken from the external sources.
Using the Measured/Calibrated Shocks
Table 17 compares the simulated equilibrium with the actual data in 1913.
Overall the model matches the data fairly closely. In particular, the model
is quite successful in generating the large increase in the world share of
U.S. manufacturing and its growth. It slightly over-predicts the growth of
U.S. sectoral and overall output (real GDP). Also the model generates a
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substantially bigger share of labour force in primary for the U.S. compared
to the data (37% vs. 30%). This means, given that the model predicts the
share in manufacturing closely, it does not generate enough shifts of labour
force into the services sector (31% vs. 40%).
In terms of predicting Britain’s economic development, the model over-
predicts the growth of its primary sector while slightly under-predicting the
growth of manufacturing. The model predicts Britain’s economy in 1913 to
be more agrarian than the data. In fact, the data says that over the period,
the share of labour force in manufacturing in Britain barely increased (42%
in 1870 to 44% in 1913). But most of the transformation occurred from
primary to service sector. The share in primary decreased from 22% in
1870 to 12% in 1913 while the share in service increased from 36% to 45%.
This suggests that the model needs some kind of mechanism that puts more
labour into service sector to account for the data.35 But this should not
change the overall picture drastically because Britain’s primary output still
occupies a very small share in world output and the services sector is treated
as non-tradable.
Next I evaluate the model’s performance on predicting the trade statis-
tics in 1913. As discussed previously, the changes in trade costs are cali-
brated to match these figures as closely as possible while maintaining plau-
sible values for trade costs. It is reported in Table 18 below.
Again the model generates the large increase and decrease in U.S. man-
ufacturing exports and imports, respectively, from 1870 to 1913 along with
other features. One noted deviation is that the model over-predicts Britain’s
primary exports to the U.S. This result may be attributable to the model’s
over-prediction of the growth of Britain’s primary sector that I just discussed
above.
35One possible way to incorporate this is to add non-homotheticity in the consumption
of service. Then the utility function would look something like U = (cai−ci)θacθmmi (csi+s)θs
where parameter s adds this feature.
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Table 17: Simulated results vs. data in 1913
Britain The U.S.
model data model data
Share in world primary (%) 2.5 1.9 13.9 14.4
Share in world manufacture (%) 13.4 13.6 32.2 31.9
Share of LF in primary (%) 23 12 37 30
Share of LF in manufacture (%) 40 44 32 30
Ya,1913/Ya,1870 1.45 0.93 3.04 2.58
Ym,1913/Ym,1870 1.94 2.15 9.74 9.46
RGDP1913/RGDP1870 1.72 2.24 5.52 5.26
The data for real GDP come from Maddison (2001)
Table 18: Simulated trade output vs. data in 1913 (current prices)
model data
Britain’s exports / GDP 0.18 0.21
U.S. exports / GDP 0.04 0.06
Britain’s manu. imports / total imports 0.28 0.29
U.S. manu. imports / total imports 0.32 0.44
Britain’s manu. exports / total exports 0.97 0.89
U.S. manu. exports / total exports 0.61 0.50
U.S. manu. exports to Britain / total manu. exports 0.15 0.14
U.S. primary exports to Britain / total primary exports 0.68 0.37
Britain’s manu. exports to U.S. / total manu. exports 0.06 0.05
Britain’s primary exports to U.S. / total primary exports 0.49 0.10
Using the External Shocks
In this section I use the alternative measures of trade cost and TFP shocks
which are culled from the external sources. First I only apply the external
trade cost shocks while keeping the baseline TFP shocks. Table 19 reports
the results. The values in the parenthesis are the equilibrium from the
baseline case, reiterated from Table 17 for comparison.
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Table 19: Simulated results: using the alternative trade cost shocks
Britain The U.S.
model data model data
Share in world primary (%) 2.4 (2.5) 1.9 13.9 (13.9) 14.4
Share in world manufacture (%) 12.2 (13.4) 13.6 33.3 (32.2) 31.9
Share of LF in primary (%) 18 (23) 12 29 (37) 30
Share of LF in manufacture (%) 46 (40) 44 40 (32) 30
Ya,1913/Ya,1870 1.24 (1.45) 0.93 2.62 (3.04) 2.58
Ym,1913/Ym,1870 2.24 (1.94) 2.15 12.76 (9.74) 9.46
RGDP1913/RGDP1870 1.87 (1.72) 2.24 6.05 (5.52) 5.26
The data for real GDP come from Maddison (2001)
From Table 19 we can find out that it also accounts for the data pretty
closely.36 One thing that stands out is that it substantially overpredicts the
growth of U.S. manufacturing compared to the baseline calibration method-
ology. For example, this methodology predicts U.S. manufacturing to grow
by a factor of 12.8 over the periods while the baseline methodology predicts
it to be 9.7. On the other hand, it matches the data for Britain and the
data for U.S. primary sector more closely.
Table 20 presents the simulated results for trade. The trade equilib-
rium generated under this methodology are more distorted than the baseline
methodology. First, the predicted share of U.S. manufacturing imports in
total imports is about 4% whereas it is 44% according to the data. On the
other hand, the predicted share of U.S. manufacturing exports in total ex-
ports is about 93% versus 50% according to the data. In line with Table 19,
the model predicts an excessive comparative advantage in U.S. manufac-
turing, virtually predicting that the most of the exports are manufacturing
exports while the most of imports are primary. The U.S., however, was not
36Note that given the way I calibrate the primary and manufacturing TFP for the rest
of world, Aa,rw and Am,rw, they take different values from the original calibrated values.
To reiterate the original values are Aa,rw = 2.232 and Am,rw = 1.096 whereas the newly
calibrated values are Aa,rw = 1.766 and Am,rw = 1.387
52
a country that completely specialized in manufacturing by 1913. Instead it
still maintained its position as a large primary-product-producing country,
exporting substantial amount of these products. Even though the model
does not predict the changes in U.S. trade pattern closely, it still predicts
the output side of the data pretty closely. Besides the U.S. never was a trade-
oriented country during this period, therefore this overprediction would not
affect the overall result much.
Table 20: Simulated trade output: using the alternative trade cost shocks
model data
Britain’s exports / GDP 0.25 (0.18) 0.21
U.S. exports / GDP 0.10 (0.04) 0.06
Britain’s manu. imports / total imports 0.27 (0.28) 0.29
U.S. manu. imports / total imports 0.04 (0.32) 0.44
Britain’s manu. exports / total exports 0.96 (0.97) 0.89
U.S. manu. exports / total exports 0.93 (0.61) 0.50
U.S. manu. exports to Britain / total manu. exports 0.07 (0.15) 0.14
U.S. primary exports to Britain / total primary exports 0.61 (0.68) 0.37
Britain’s manu. exports to U.S. / total manu. exports 0.03 (0.06) 0.05
Britain’s primary exports to U.S. / total primary exports 0.21 (0.49) 0.10
Next I use the external TFP shocks instead of the measured ones to
simulate the model. I also use the external trade cost shocks instead of the
calibrated trade cost shocks. Numbers in the parenthesis are the results from
Table 19. The results are presented in Table 21. It overpredicts the growth
of U.S. and Britain’s manufacturing sector substantially, as expected. This is
because of the higher values that Am,b and Am,us take than the baseline case.
In other words, given the IRTS technology in manufacturing, applying the
TFP implied by the CRTS technology yields a substantial over-prediction
of the growth of manufacturing sector. The growth of U.S. manufacturing
sector suffers more from over-prediction because the discrepancy between the
external value and the measured value is larger. Over-prediction problem
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of the relative position of manufacturing (share in world manufacturing) is
less severe. More about this issue will be discussed in the following section.
Table 21: Simulated results under external TFP shocks
Britain The U.S.
model data model data
Share in world primary (%) 2.4 (2.4) 1.9 13.9 (13.9) 14.4
Share in world manufacture (%) 11.4 (12.2) 13.6 34.2 (33.3) 31.9
Share of LF in primary (%) 19 (18) 12 28 (29) 30
Share of LF in manufacture (%) 45 (46) 44 41 (40) 30
Ya,1913/Ya,1870 1.23 (1.24) 0.93 2.67 (2.62) 2.58
Ym,1913/Ym,1870 2.72 (2.24) 2.15 16.99 (12.76) 9.46
RGDP1913/RGDP1870 1.99 (1.87) 2.24 6.76 (6.05) 5.26
The data for real GDP come from Maddison (2001)
2.4 Constant Returns to Scale in Manufacturing
One of the arguments about the rise of U.S. manufacturing during this period
is the existence of increasing returns to scale. Many studies such as Cain and
Paterson (1986) and James (1983) strongly suggest that there were IRTS in
U.S. manufacturing. Following this, my baseline model assumes that there
exists IRTS in manufacturing and I just demonstrated that this model works
quite well in accounting for the economy in 1913.
On the other hand, still more studies such as Wright (1990) and O’Rourke
and Williamson (1994) assume CRTS when analysing the economy during
this period. And it would be worthwhile to consider a model built and cal-
ibrated under the assumption of CRTS. With a CRTS model that performs
well I can draw some meaningful comparisons between the two assumptions
that are often employed in the literatures. In this section I consider a devi-
ation from the baseline model of IRTS.
54
2.4.1 The Model and Calibration
For this purpose I need to maintain the main features of the baseline model
as much as possible. The simplest way to do this is to eliminate the fixed cost
component, F , from the manufacturing production function. The composite
index of manufacturing consumption now looks similar to that of primary
consumption
Cmi = [γmbm
ρm
i,b + γmusm
ρm
i,us + γmrwm
ρm
i,rw]
1/ρm
As a result the manufacturing price index becomes
Gmi=
[
γσmmb (pmbT
m
bi )
1−σm+γσmmus(pmusT
m
usi)
1−σm+γσmmrw(pmrwT
m
rwi)
1−σm]1/(1−σm)
Basically dropping F eliminates the increasing returns component and the
number of manufacturing firms is no longer endogenously determined so that
the consumers consume a fixed proportion of manufacturing goods from each
region. Therefore the number of variety (or firms) is fixed or one can think
of a representative firm in each region producing everything. In this sense
the number of firms is indeterminate under CRTS but it does not matter
because it is fixed over time. Essentially the model is very similar to the
standard CGE model with an Armington assumption.
The procedure of restricting the parameters is almost identical to the
case of IRTS except that γm,i is pinned down in the same way as γa,i. More
detailed calibration procedure is described in the appendix at the end of the
chapter. The resulting benchmark equilibrium and parameter values are
exactly identical to the IRTS case. This is convenient as I can ignore the
possibility that the difference (between IRTS and CRTS) comes from the
differences in parameter and initial equilibrium values.
However the CRTS specification has different implications for the changes
in manufacturing TFP and trade costs. To see this more closely, I derive the
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change in manufacturing TFP under the CRTS specification, the counter-
part of equation (34).
Am,1913
Am,1870
=
(
X1870
X1913
) 1−αm
1−σm
(
Lm,1870
Lm,1913
)αm (Ym,1913
Ym,1870
)αm
(36)
Using (34) and (36), I can derive a relation between a change in TFP under
IRTS and that implied by CRTS as follows:
(
Am,1913
Am,1870
)
CRTS
=
(
Am,1913
Am,1870
)
IRTS
(
Ym,1913
Ym,1870
) 1−αm
σm−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
(37)
First thing to note from (37) is that given αm < 1, σm > 1 and
Ym,1913
Ym,1870
> 1,(
Am,1913
Am,1870
)
CRTS
is bigger than
(
Am,1913
Am,1870
)
IRTS
. It says that what is perceived as a
purely exogenous technological change in the CRTS model actually contains
an endogenous component (underbrace A on the right hand side of equation)
if there are IRTS. But if αm = 1 then the underbrace A becomes one and the
change in TFP under CRTS is identical to that of IRTS. This means that
the manufacturing sector using itself as intermediate goods is the crucial
feature that makes the difference between CRTS and IRTS.
(
Am,1913
Am,1870
)
CRTS
for Britain and the U.S is 1.20 and 1.63, respectively. As expected the CRTS
model yields larger TFP changes than the baseline model. If I compare these
values with the external sources, they are not so different from each other.
For comparison, I reiterate the TFP shocks measured under the different
approaches again in Table 22.
Under the ‘IRTS’ and ‘CRTS’ are the measured TFP shocks under the
assumption that there exist IRTS and CRTS in manufacturing sectors, re-
spectively. The values under ‘External’ are the ones taken or recovered from
the external sources, including capital. Overall the measured values and the
values culled from the external sources are quite similar. One noted differ-
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Table 22: TFP shocks
IRTS CRTS External
Aa,b 1.09 1.09 1.07
Am,b 1.14 1.20 1.27
Aa,us 1.22 1.22 1.26
Am,us 1.40 1.63 1.62
ence is U.S. manufacturing TFP shock between ‘IRTS’ and ‘External’. As
discussed earlier, Kendrick (1961) implicitly assumes CRTS technology and
the TFP is inevitably over-estimated if there exists IRTS. Instead the shock
measured under the assumption of CRTS is almost identical to the value
taken from Kendrick (1961). In this sense, my measures of TFP shocks also
represent the real total factor productivity well.
I discuss more about the implications of using the external TFP shocks.
TFP is conventionally measured as a residual from the production function
after accounting for factor inputs. This means one usually needs to make an
assumption about the form of production function to measure TFP. The ex-
ternal TFP shocks in Table 22 are derived by assuming that the production
function exhibits CRTS, as far as I understand. I also demonstrated that
those values for Britain and the U.S. are very similar to the TFP shocks
inferred from my CRTS model earlier. If there really exists IRTS in an
economy, the TFP shocks inferred from a CRTS assumption actually in-
clude the components contributed by the IRTS effects. Therefore if I use
the external TFP shocks inferred from CRTS models to simulate an IRTS
model, the effects of the scale economy are ‘double-counted’ and there is
an inevitable over-prediction of simulated results. In this sense it can be
problematic to use TFP shocks inferred from CRTS on IRTS model. What
I do in section 2.4.1 is to identify this effects coming from the assumption
of IRTS. To reiterate, the TFP change under CRTS,
(
Am,1913
Am,1870
)
CRTS
= 1.63
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and the change under IRTS,
(
Am,1913
Am,1870
)
IRTS
= 1.40 for the U.S. and the dif-
ference between these numbers can be identified as the effects of IRTS. For
the CRTS case, applying the external TFP shocks generates very similar
results as the baseline case (using the measured shocks), so I do not report
the results here.
Next I calibrate the changes in trade costs under CRTS specification.
The way that the changes in trade costs are calibrated, implies that those
under CRTS would take on different values from IRTS specification. Ta-
ble 23 reports the values below. One pronounced difference is in the change
in manufacturing trade costs between Britain and the U.S. Under the IRTS
specification, Tmb,us decreases while T
m
us,b increases but under the CRTS we
get the opposite result. This is probably because the IRTS gives relatively
more comparative advantage to U.S. manufacturing than the CRTS case
(even though Am,us is higher under CRTS). And because of this, a lower
trade cost from Britain to the U.S. is needed under IRTS to match the
given amount of Britain’s manufacturing exports to the U.S. Also for the
same reason, the trade cost from the U.S. to Britain should be higher under
the IRTS to account for U.S. manufacturing exports to Britain.
Table 23: Changes in trade costs under CRTS (growth factor)
∆Tab,us ∆T
a
us,b ∆T
a
b,rw ∆T
a
rw,b ∆T
a
us,rw ∆T
a
rw,us
0.850 1.084 0.669∗ 1.906 0.595∗ 1.696
∆Tmb,us ∆T
m
us,b ∆T
m
b,rw ∆T
m
rw,b ∆T
m
us,rw ∆T
m
rw,us
1.044 0.968 1.508 0.717∗ 1.532 0.489
* indicates the case that the restriction is needed.
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2.4.2 Simulation Results and Discussion
I feed in these newly measured changes under CRTS to the benchmark year
equilibrium to generate the development of the economy. Table 24 reports
the result. The results are not much different compared to the IRTS model.
Table 24: Simulated results vs. data in 1913 under CRTS
Britain The U.S.
model data model data
Share in world primary (%) 2.4 1.9 13.9 14.4
Share in world manufacture (%) 13.8 13.6 31.8 31.9
Share of LF in primary (%) 23 12 37 30
Share of LF in manufacture (%) 41 44 31 30
Ya,1913/Ya,1870 1.43 0.93 3.06 2.58
Ym,1913/Ym,1870 1.99 2.15 9.58 9.46
RGDP1913/RGDP1870 1.79 2.24 5.32 5.26
The data for real GDP come from Maddison (2001)
The CRTS model specified and calibrated in this way performs equally well
in accounting for the North Atlantic economy in 1913. Basically higher
implied TFP in manufacturing and the difference in trade cost make up the
difference coming from the absence of IRTS. Even though I don’t report it
here, the result for the trade statistics are also very similar to the baseline
case.
Then what can I learn from this exercise? Within this framework I
cannot make any comparisons between the IRTS and the CRTS models
because each model yields different implied values for some shocks and as a
result they yield almost identical results. In other words, I cannot answer
“Which model does a better job in accounting for the economy?” with these
two models. Instead I can ask answer “If we assume that there really existed
IRTS in the manufacturing sector, what are their quantitative contribution
to the development of the economy?”
I can do this by feeding in the shocks measured under IRTS assump-
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tion to otherwise CRTS model as specified above. Given that both model
yield very similar results. And also the parameters calibrated under each
specification and the benchmark year equilibrium values are identical, I can
effectively isolate the effect of IRTS. I perform a detailed analysis of this in
the following chapter.
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Appendix : Description of Calibration Procedure
This section describes the algorithm for the joint calibration procedure.
There are 27 parameters to calibrate jointly. 12 trade costs: T aij and T
m
ij ,
9 preference parameters: θa, θm and C for each region and 6 TFPs: Aai
and Ami for each region. In this procedure, these parameter values and
the benchmark year equilibrium are determined simultaneously such that
the equilibrium matches some key characteristics of the economy described
above.
The Baseline IRTS Model
To begin with, Ni for each region is determined by (22) given N i from the in-
dividual calibration. Then Lai is determined given the target of Lai/Li (the
share of labor force in primary sector from Table 1). Then given the nor-
malization Aa,b = 1 and the production function in primary sector, Britain’s
primary output, Ya,b, is determined. And by taking the ratio of each region’s
primary production function to that of Britain, Aa,us and Aa,rw are pinned
down given the target Ya,i/Ya,b (the ratio of each region to Britain’s primary
value added, Table 2)
Aa,i = Aa,b
(
La,b
La,i
)αa (Nb
Ni
)(1−αa)(Ya,i
Ya,b
)
This, in turn, determines Ya,us and Ya,rw from the production function in
primary sector.
Next, by dividing (24) by (25), wi/di for each region is determined.
wi
di
=
αa
1− αa
Ni
La,i
By assuming wb = 1, db is determined. Then given the target Yi/Yb (each
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region’s GDP relative to Britain) and using (24), wb, wrw, dus and drw are
determined. Again by (24), Yb, Yus and Yrw are determined.
I continue with pa,i (price of primary product in region i). It is de-
termined by (3), then pa,iYa,i for each region is determined. Also, given
Cobb-Douglas functional form,
wiLm,i = αmpm,iYm,i
which states that labour income in manufacturing sector should equal to
the sales value times the share of labour. And this determines the value of
gross output, pm,iYm,i, for each region. Given the targets of Britain and U.S.
imports to GDP ratios (in current prices), values of imports for Britain and
the U.S. are determined (At this point, I already obtained Yi which is GDP
within the model framework). Then the ratio of Britain and the U.S manu-
facturing imports to their total imports determine the values of their man-
ufacturing imports. Also the ratio of their manufacturing exports to total
exports determine the values of their manufacturing exports. Consequently,
the values of their net exports in manufacturing (NXm,i) are determined (by
adding up imports and exports). And given the balanced trade assumption,
the values of their net exports in primary products (NXa,i) are determined
as well. NXm and NXa for the rest of world are determined as to insure
the world trade is balanced. Then, expenditure in primary good (Ea,i) is
determined as,
Ea,i = pa,iYa,i −NXa,i
Similarly, expenditure in manufacturing good (Emi) is determined as,
Em,i = pm,iYm,i −NXm,i
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And Es,i is determined by (14).
Next I calibrate trade costs for primary goods. (9) expresses the world
demand for a primary good produced by a single firm in region i. Then the
world demand for region i’s primary products can be expressed as
(
γi
pa,i
)σa∑
j
Ea,j
(
T ai,j
Ga,j
)(1−σa)
This equation can be decomposed to show demand of each region. For ex-
ample the amount that the U.S. demands from Britain is
(
γb
pa,b
)σa
Ea,us
(
T ab,us
Ga,us
)1−σa
Indeed, given there are 3 regions, I can construct 9 of them including de-
mands for domestic products. And with these, I can express trade cost from
i to j as
T ai,j =
(
γj
γi
) σa
1−σa
(
pa,j
pa,i
)(
pa,iaji
pa,jajj
) 1
1−σa
(A.1)
where aji is j’s demand for i’s products. Therefore pa,iaji can be interpreted
as value of j’s imports from i. The share of Britain’s primary imports from
U.S. in its total imports and the share of its primary exports to U.S. in
its total exports determine pa,iaji for all i and j. Because as the value of
Britain’s total imports in primary goods is already determined, the share of
imports from U.S. determines the value of imports from the U.S. and the
rest of world (pa,usab,us and pa,rwab,rw). And the value of Britain’s domestic
imports (pa,bab,b) is determined by subtracting pa,usab,us and pa,rwab,rw from
its primary expenditure (Ea,b). Also the value of its total exports in primary
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goods and the share of its exports to U.S. determine the value of exports to
the U.S. and the rest of world which should be equal to the value of U.S.
and the rest of world’s primary imports from Britain (pa,baus,b and pa,barw,b).
Then in turn, the value of U.S. total primary imports determine its imports
from the rest of world (pa,rwaus,rw). And the value of its domestic imports
(pa,usaus,us) is determined by subtracting pa,baus,b and pa,rwaus,rw from its
primary expenditure (Ea,us). Moreover, the value of the rest of world’s
primary imports from U.S. (pa,usarw,us), or the value of U.S. primary exports
to the rest of world, can be calculated by subtracting pa,usab,us and pa,usarw,us
from the value of U.S. output in primary sector (pa,usYa,us). Finally, the rest
of world’s domestic imports (pa,rwarw,rw) can be determined by subtracting
pa,barw,b and pa,usarw,us from its primary expenditure (Ea,rw). And T
a
ij can be
pinned down by (26), consequently. With calibrated trade costs, Ga,i (price
level in primary sector) can be determined by (1).
I continue with manufacturing TFPs and trade costs. Like a primary
trade cost, a manufacturing trade cost from i to j can be expressed as
Tmij =
(
nm,j
nm,i
) 1
1−σm
(
pm,j
pm,i
)(
pm,imji
pm,jmjj
) 1
1−σm
(A.2)
where mji is j’s demand for i’s manufacturing products. pm,imji for all i and
j are determined similarly as in the primary sector case to match the man-
ufacturing bilateral trade targets. Next, plugging (2), (14) and (27) into (7),
pm,i =
[
σm
σm−1(Am,iα
αm
m (1−αm)1−αm)−1wαmi
(
wiLm,i
αmF (σm−1)
Em,i
pm,imii
) 1−αm
1−σm
] 1−σm
1−αmσm
Then I can use this equation to determine Am,us and Am,rw as
Am,j
Am,i
=
(
pm,iYm,i
pm,jYm,j
Ym,j
Ym,i
) 1−αmσm
1−σm
(
wj
wi
)αm (Bj
Bi
Em,j
Em,i
pm,imii
pm,jmjj
) 1−αm
1−σm
(A.3)
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where Bi =
wiLmi
αmF (σm−1) . Then given Am,b = 1, Am,us and Am,rw are pinned
down. And (27) and (14) determine pm,i and nm,i, respectively. Then T
m
ij is
determined by (27) which in turn determines Gm,i with (2).
Finally, I calibrate c, θa, θm and θs. Here the target is income elasticity
of demand for food which is set to be 0.6.
∂Ca
∂Y
Y
Ca
=
θaY
θaY +GaC(1− θa) = 0.6
where I utilized the optimal consumption for primary product, Ca = θaY/Ga+
C(1 − θa). Remember that these are all in aggregate terms and C = Pc.
And because Ea = GaCa, I can simplify the equation as
θa =
(0.6)Ea
Y
So this pins down θa. And given θa, C and c can be obtained as
C =
Ea − θaY
Ga(1− θa) , c =
C
P
Given the value for C and using equation (12) and (13), θm and θs are ob-
tained. Table 7 summarizes the parameters common across regions, Table 8
summarizes the region specific parameter values and Table 9 reports the
trade costs.
The CRTS Model
The calibration procedure for CRTS model is almost identical to that of
the baseline IRTS case. The key difference is to eliminate the fixed cost F
and introduce the weight parameter, γm,i in manufacturing sectors. These
changes generate slightly different procedures for the calibration process.
First, the implied equation to pin down the manufacturing TFP in 1870,
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Am,j becomes
Am,j
Am,i
=
(
pm,iYm,i
pm,jYm,j
Ym,j
Ym,i
)αm (wj
wi
)αm [(γm,i
γm,j
) σm
1−σm
(
Em,i
Em,j
pm,imii
pm,jmjj
) 1
1−σm
]1−αm
This equation replaces (A.3) in the appendix. Likewise the equations that
calibrate the manufacturing trade costs, Tmij and the price of domestic man-
ufacturing product, pm,i are replaced with
Tmij =
(
γm,j
γm,i
) σm
1−σm
(
pm,j
pm,i
)(
pm,imji
pm,jmjj
) 1
1−σm
pm,i =
(Am,iααmm (1−αm)1−αm)−1wαmi
(
γ
σm
1−σm
i
(
Em,i
pm,imii
) 1
1−σm
)1−αm 1αm
The calibrated Am,i and T
m
ij yield identical values as the baseline case and
the price of manufacturing relative to that of Britain is also identical to
that of the baseline case. Other than these differences I use exactly the
same equations (reported in the appendix) and the data moment (reported
in Table 6) as the baseline case.
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Chapter 3
Decomposition of U.S.
Economic Growth
With a model that accounts for the key characteristics of the economy from
Chapter 2, I am ready to undertake various numerical experiments. In this
chapter I evaluate the quantitative contributions of each shock to the devel-
opment of U.S. economy. That is, I disentangle the effects of the changes in
the sectoral TFP, in the labour force and land endowments and in the trade
costs to assess their individual as well as cumulative contribution. Then in
the second part of this chapter, I perform an analysis that isolates the effects
of IRTS, as mentioned earlier.
3.1 Quantitative Assessment of Each Force
In this section I evaluate the quantitative implications of each force in ac-
counting for the rise of the U.S. The rise of the U.S. as an industrial power in
such a short span of time is a remarkable historical event. U.S. economy as
well as the international environment surrounding it, went through a large
transformation during this period. Domestically, its population and labour
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force shot up, partially due to the mass immigration. Also the land area
began to increase rapidly after the Homestead Acts. It was not only the
period of increasing resources but also the period of technological progress.
The revolutionary production and managerial system, such as the mass pro-
duction, for its manufacturing sector began to settle during this period, too.
There is no doubt that all these changes contributed positively to the de-
velopment of the U.S. in one way or the other. But the focus here is on
the quantitative side so that the relative contribution of each factor can be
assessed.
3.1.1 Procedure and Results
I use the baseline model to perform this task. Later in the chapter, the
CRTS model will be used, the results of which will be compared with the
results from the baseline case. Before we turn to the results, I briefly describe
the procedure. To disentangle the effects of each force, I initially turn off
the measured changes in endowments, TFP and trade costs for the U.S.
while maintaining them for other regions. The endowments, TFP and trade
costs for the U.S are at year 1870 level while those for Britain and the
rest of world are at 1913 level. Then, to this initial state, I feed in the
change in each force individually.37 By doing this I measure the percentage
variance that each force contributes to various features of the development
of U.S economy. Then I feed in the changes cumulatively to see how the
combination of forces affect the economy. The variables of interests are real
GDP (RGDP), manufacturing output (Ym,us), primary output (Ya,us), and
changes in the world share of U.S. primary and manufacturing (
Ya,us
Ya,w
and
Ym,us
Ym,w
). Table 25 below reports the results.
The table is read as follows. The primary TFP shock (Aa,us), land endow-
ment shock (Nus) and manufacturing TFP shock (Am,us) together account
37The change in population, Dus, is fed in accordingly with the change in Lus.
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Table 25: Decomposing contribution of each shock (%)
Aa,us Nus Am,us Lus As,us T Am,us+Lus
RGDP
cumul. 1.6 4.6 11.6 85.2 111.9 100.0 -
indiv. 1.6 2.9 8.2 46.9 5.6 -∗ 78.3
Ym,us
cumul. 2.4 -2.5 27.1 198.1 198.1 100.0 -
indiv. 2.4 0.3 47.0 99.3 5.7 -∗ 243.6
Ya,us
cumul. 5.6 36.4 14.0 34.8 34.8 100.0 -
indiv. 5.6 17.9 -24.5 5.0 -6.5 -∗ -20.9
Ym,us
Ym,w
cumul. 5.4 3.5 14.2 56.8 56.8 32.2 -
indiv. 5.4 4.6 21.3 36.7 6.7 -∗ 67.9
Ya,us
Ya,w
cumul. 5.5 8.5 6.2 7.4 7.4 13.9 -
indiv. 5.5 6.7 2.5 5.1 4.3 -∗ 2.5
-* indicates no equilibrium
for about 11.6% of the predicted growth of RGDP and 27.1% of the pre-
dicted growth of Ym,us from 1870 to 1913. Am,us alone can only account
for about 8.2% and 47.0% of the growth in RGDP and Ym,us, respectively.
The last two rows present world share of U.S. manufacturing and primary
products. For example when the changes in Aa,us, Nus and Am,us are fed in
together while other changes are held fixed, the share of U.S. manufacturing
is 14.2%, about 18 percentage point short of the baseline value. Obviously
when all the shocks are applied simultaneously, we reach the baseline equi-
librium in 1913 and the shocks account for 100% of the growth predicted
by the model (in bold letters). Several interesting points arise here. First,
the increase in labour force (Lus) stands out as the single most important
contributor. It accounts for close to half of real GDP growth and almost
100% of manufacturing growth. But this has uneven impacts across sectors.
While it has massive impacts on the manufacturing sector, its impact on
the primary sector is relatively small. This means that most of the increase
was absorbed by the manufacturing sector. There are two forces working
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behind this result. The first and obvious force is the IRTS in manufactur-
ing. And the second force is the non-homothetic preference such that the
income elasticity for primary goods is less than one. This generates the
structural transformation from primary to manufacturing as the increase in
labour force raises GDP.
In the last column I consider an interesting combination of shocks where
I feed in the changes in Am,us and Lus simultaneously. Together they account
for more than three quarters of the increase in real GDP. Also they generate
the manufacturing output that is about 2.5 times larger than the equilib-
rium level. Of course, as other shocks that give the comparative advantage
to primary sector, such as increase in land and primary TFP, are also con-
sidered, the massive effects of the two shocks on manufacturing sector thins
out.
One more interesting result is that the changes in trade costs were not
favourable to U.S. economy in general. The cumulative effects of all shocks
excluding the changes in trade costs yields a real GDP that is 11.9% higher
than the equilibrium level. This effect is much greater on manufacturing with
output 98.1% higher than in equilibrium. On the other hand, the changes in
trade costs were favourable to the primary sector. They account for massive
65.2% of the growth in primary output. The equilibrium is not economically
interpretable when the trade cost shocks are applied individually because the
equilibrium value of Ym,us becomes negative. One way to interpret this is
that the manufacturing sector collapses due to the trade cost changes alone.
The result regarding the trade costs are perhaps exaggerated given the
problems arising from the aggregation of the rest of world.38 This yields a
very large reduction in T aus,rw and T
m
rw,us while T
a
rw,us and T
m
us,rw increase
hugely.39 The large reduction in T aus,rw and the large increase in T
a
rw,us give
a comparative advantage to U.S. primary and induces more production.
38Please see Section 3.1.3 of Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion.
39Please see Table 14 in Chapter 2.
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At the same time the large reduction and increase in Tmrw,us and T
m
us,rw,
respectively, give a comparative disadvantage to U.S. manufacturing, further
inducing the U.S. to relocate its resources to producing primary products.
If the rest of world can be disaggregated into finer regions and the
changes in trade costs between the U.S. and each region (within the rest
of world) are calibrated as in Chapter 2, then they may not appear as ex-
treme as the ones reported in Table 14. But on average it would still be the
case that the manufacturing trade costs from the U.S. to the rest increase
while those from the rest to the U.S. decrease over the period. In other
words, even if I include more regions, the direction or qualitative changes
in trade costs would not be altered even though the magnitudes would be
smaller. One of the main reason is that the share of U.S. manufacturing
imports in total imports was still very high in 1913 (52% in 1870 and 44%
in 1913) despite the sector’s rapid development and the huge comparative
advantage gained during this period. And in order for the model to account
for this figure, the manufacturing trade costs into the U.S. would need to
decrease.
The implication of the trade costs here suggests something for a direction
of future researches. Most of the literatures assume symmetric trade costs.
Jacks, Novy and Meissner (2010) also imposes symmetry in dealing with the
changes in trade costs from 1870 to 1913. But the implications of this paper
suggests that there was a substantial degree of asymmetry at the sectoral
level and this may have mattered for some facets of the development.
3.1.2 Decomposing Trade Cost
In the previous section I looked at the effects of the overall change in trade
costs on the U.S. as part of the analysis. In this section I perform a more
detailed analysis on the changes in trade costs. In order to do this I begin
with a model in which I feed in all the shocks except the shocks in trade costs
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(so the real GDP in the initial equilibrium is 111.9% that of the baseline
equilibrium). Then I apply the calibrated changes in trade costs individually
or in combination to this initial equilibrium. Table 26 reports the results.
It decomposes the trade costs and looks at the individual contributions of
trade costs.
First some explanations about the notations are in order. Tmus,i is the
manufacturing trade cost from the U.S. to i where i includes Britain and
the rest of world (∴ Tmus,b and Tmus,rw ) and T ai,us is the primary trade cost from
i to the U.S. (∴ T ab,us and T arw,us ). Tmus is the manufacturing trade cost that
involves the U.S. so Tmus,i and T
m
i,us. The changes in T
a
i,us and T
m
us,i have main
Table 26: Decomposing trade cost shocks (%)
T ai,us T
a
us,i T
m
i,us T
m
us,i T
a
us T
m
us
RGDP -6.5 0.0 0.0 -6.2 -6.5 -6.2
Ym,us -25.5 -0.3 -0.4 -24.1 -25.6 -24.3
Ya,us 45.9 0.6 2.2 43.5 46.0 43.9
impacts. The change in T ai,us alone depresses RGDP by 6.5% and Ym,us by
-25.5%. On the other hand it promotes Ya,us by massive 45.9%. The change
in Tmus,i has almost identical impacts as T
a
i,us, quantitatively. It decreases
RGDP and Ym,us by -6.2% and -24.1%, respectively while increases Ya,us by
43.5%. Impacts of T aus,i and T
m
i,us turn out to be minimal.
These results are quite intuitive when we consider the calibrated changes
in trade costs in Table 14 in Chapter 2. First as it becomes much more costly
for the rest of world to export primary goods to the U.S. (∆Tarw,us=1.686), the
comparative advantage in primary shifts to the U.S. inducing Ya,us to increase
and Ym,us to decrease. At the same time it becomes more costly for the U.S.
to export manufacturing products (∆Taus,b=1.251 and ∆T
a
us,rw=1.900). This fur-
ther shifts the comparative advantage in manufacturing away from the U.S.
In the aggregate the effects are quantitatively large and reduce the manu-
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facturing output substantially but also real GDP is reduced as resources are
relocated away from the faster growing productive manufacturing sector to
the slower growing productive primary sector.
3.1.3 Using the Alternative Shocks
In this section I perform a similar decomposition exercise using the alter-
native trade cost shocks taken from Jacks et al (Table 15). For the points
discussed in Section 2.3.1 and 2.4.1 on the implications of using the exter-
nal TFP shocks in the IRTS model, I do not use the external TFP shocks.
Table 27 presents the results.
Table 27: Decomposition Using Alternative Trade Cost Shocks (%)
Aa,us Am,us Nus Lus As,us actual T Am,us+Lus
RGDP
cumul. 1.6 7.4 11.0 75.2 99.2 100.0 -
indiv. 1.6 5.8 -∗ 41.4 5.1 0.2 63.1
Ym,us
cumul. -8.1 12.9 8.3 93.1 93.1 100.0 -
indiv. -8.1 16.5 -∗ 36.1 -5.0 -5.6 148.1
Ya,us
cumul. 29.4 5.5 39.1 107.0 107.0 100.0 -
indiv. 29.4 -8.4 -∗ 53.5 9.3 10.3 9.0
Ym,us
Ym,w
cumul. 0.1 8.1 6.3 31.2 31.2 33.3 -
indiv. 0.1 9.5 -∗ 16.1 1.4 1.1 47.6
Ya,us
Ya,w
cumul. 8.7 6.5 9.5 14.5 31.2 13.9 -
indiv. 8.7 5.2 -∗ 10.5 6.9 7.0 6.2
-* indicates no equilibrium
An increase in Aa,us has differential impacts on U.S. manufacturing sector
under the two different approaches. According to the calibration (of trade
cost shocks) approach, a rise in Aa,us has a positive impact as opposed to
that it has a negative impact under the second approach. Basically, Aa,us
contributes to the growth of Ym,us by 2.4% and -8.1% under the first and
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the second scenario, respectively. There are largely two opposing forces that
dictate the effects of Aa,us on Ym,us. First, an increase in Aa,us shifts the
comparative advantage toward U.S. primary products, inducing more pro-
duction of primary goods and less of manufacturing products. On the other
hand, the non-homothetic preference implies that a rise in the productivity
would generate the structural transformation, shifting labour forces out of
the primary sector into the manufacturing sector. As less labour forces are
employed in the primary sector and more in the manufacturing sector, it
tends to reduce Ya,us and increase Ym,us. Therefore whether Ym,us increases
or decreases is a question of which of the two forces dominate. Based on
this explanation under the baseline approach, the second force dominates
the first force, generating the net effect of increasing Ym,us while under the
second approach it is vice-versa. This difference mainly comes from the dif-
ferent calibrated values of the primary and the manufacturing TFP shocks
for the rest of world, Aa,rw and Am,rw. Under the first scenario Aa,rw = 2.232
and Am,rw = 1.096 whereas under the second scenario Aa,rw = 1.766 and
Am,rw = 1.387. It clearly tells something about the comparative advan-
tage of the rest of world under the two cases. It suggests that the rest of
world has more comparative advantage in primary sector under the first case
than under the second case because the calibrated Aa,rw shock is higher and
Am,rw shock is lower under the first than the second case.
40 Given that the
rest of world already has a huge comparative advantage in primary products
under the first scenario, the rise in U.S. primary TFP does not give much
comparative advantage in primary products to the U.S. In other words the
effect of the first force would not be so large under the first approach. As
this is the case, it speeds up the structural transformation process, shifting
labour forces out of the primary sector and into the manufacturing sector
which, in turn, increase Ym,us. In the end the second force dominates the
40Remember that I am only holding the shocks of the U.S. fixed. The shocks for Britain
and the rest of world are still being fed in.
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first and the net effect is an increase in Ym,us. Under the second scenario,
however, the net effect is reversed because the calibrated shocks for the rest
of world imply that the rise in Aa,us gives substantially more comparative
advantage to U.S. primary products, inducing diversion of resources from
the manufacturing sector into the primary sector.
Overall the role of trade costs is substantially downplayed under the sec-
ond scenario. While the trade cost shocks reduces Ym,us by half (from 198%
to 100%) and increases Ya,us almost by a factor of three (100/34.8) under
the first scenario, the effects of the shocks under the second scenario are
relatively minimal. These are straightforward given such extreme changes
under the first approach and much more moderate changes under the second
approach. As seen in the table, the trade cost shocks have slightly favourable
effects on Ym,us while having negative impacts on Ya,us.
3.1.4 Including Capital
The baseline model does not include capital as a factor of input. U.S. capital
stock increased more than ten folds during the periods (Kendrick, 1961) and
it is hard to deny that capital was one of the crucial factors for U.S. economic
growth. As discussed earlier, incorporating capital into the model properly
is a very complicated matter as it needs to be endogenized. However if one
is willing to be more ad-hoc, including capital as an exogenous factor can
still provide more insights. By doing this, I can analyse the contribution of
capital in U.S. economic growth. More importantly, this has an important
implication on the effects of immigration on the Anglo-American real wage
convergence to be covered in Chapter 5.
I need to introduce additional parameters in the model to include capi-
tal. I assume that all three sectors employ capital as an input. I then need
the capital share parameters in the production functions which I take from
O’Rourke and Williamson (1994). Changes in capital stock are taken from
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Kendrick (1961) and Feinstein and Pollard (1988) for the U.S. and Britain,
respectively. Calibration procedure is almost identical as the baseline model.
I perform a growth decomposition exercise similar to the previous one with-
out capital. For comparison I use the measured TFP shocks employed in the
baseline case and the trade cost shocks taken from Jacks et al. even though
this scenario substantially over-predicts the growth of U.S. manufacturing
sector.41 The results are reported in Table 28.
Table 28: Decomposing contribution of each shock with capital(%)
Aa,us Am,us Nus Kus Lus As,us actual T Lus+Kus
RGDP
w/ K
cumul. -∗ 4.9 6.2 34.1 87.2 99.1 100.0 -
indiv. -∗ 3.9 -∗ 18.6 14.3 -∗ -∗ 54.0
w/o K
cumul. 1.6 7.4 11.0 - 75.2 99.2 100.0 -
indiv. 1.6 5.8 -∗ - 41.4 5.1 0.2 -
Ym,us
w/ K
cumul. -∗ 4.8 2.9 38.6 94.3 94.3 100.0 -
indiv. -∗ 6.3 -∗ 15.0 1.9 -∗ -∗ 41.3
w/o K
cumul. -8.1 12.9 8.3 - 93.1 93.1 100.0 -
indiv. -8.1 16.5 -∗ - 36.1 -5.0 -5.6 -
Ya,us
w/ K
cumul. -∗ 10.4 30.7 37.7 109.6 109.6 100.0 -
indiv. -∗ -3.2 -∗ 17.7 62.6 -∗ -∗ 70.2
w/o K
cumul. 29.4 5.5 39.1 - 107.0 107.0 100.0 -
indiv. 29.4 -8.4 -∗ - 53.5 9.3 10.3 -
-* indicates no equilibrium
To make comparison easier I also report the results from the case without
capital (Table 27). One noted difference between the two cases is that the
role of the labour force shock is substantially downplayed when I include
the capital shock. Without capital, Lus contributes 41.4% and 36.1% to the
41If I measure the TFP as a residual like I did in the baseline case, capital needs to be
accounted for. Manufacturing TFP shocks for the U.S. and Britain are ∆Am,us = 1.10
and ∆Am,b = 1.01, respectively. Note that the shocks are smaller than the shocks in the
baseline case.
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growth of real GDP and Ym,us, respectively. But it decreases to 14.3% and
1.9% when I included capital. This is rather expected because as one more
factor of input is included, the roles of other inputs inevitably subdue. In this
sense, it would be more ideal to interpret Lus in the baseline case as factors
of inputs rather than labour force itself. In that vein, the contribution of
Lus in the case without capital and Lus+Kus in the case with capital should
be compared to evaluate the role of factor inputs. Lus alone in the former
case contributes 41.4%, 36.1% and 53.5% to the growth of real GDP, Ym,us
and Ya,us, respectively. In the latter case, Lus and Kus together contribute
54.0%, 41.3% and 70.2% to the growth of these variables. Comparing these
numbers, the model with capital puts slightly more weights on the role of
factor inputs, overall magnitudes of contributions of each force are similar
in both scenarios. Including capital in the model also predicts that the role
of input was substantially more important for the growth of U.S. economy
under the presence of the scale economies.
3.1.5 Implications Under Constant Returns
In this section, I perform the same exercise using the CRTS model. The
results from this exercise will be compared with the baseline results (Ta-
ble 25). Here let me restate and emphasize that two things are different in
the CRTS model, the implied change in the manufacturing TFP and the
trade costs. The implied change in Am,us under the CRTS is higher than
that under the IRTS and the magnitudes of change in trade costs involving
the U.S. in the CRTS are a bit smaller than those in the IRTS. The results
are presented in Table 29.
The overall result does not change much from the baseline result, in-
cluding that the increase in Lus still is the factor that contributes the most
to the overall development of the U.S. One noticeable difference, however
is that the CRTS model reduces the quantitative implications of Lus. Par-
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Table 29: Decomposing contribution of each shock under CRTS (%)
Aa,us Nus Am,us Lus As,us T Am,us+Lus
RGDP
cumul. 1.3 5.1 12.8 75.6 100.5 100.0 -
indiv. 1.3 3.0 7.3 38.8 5.4 -∗ 62.1
Ym,us
cumul. 3.2 0.2 33.8 157.5 157.5 100.0 -
indiv. 3.2 1.8 50.6 58.0 5.5 -∗ 206.7
Ya,us
cumul. 4.0 30.7 12.3 59.9 59.9 100.0 -
indiv. 4.0 14.9 -22.9 25.3 -7.0 -∗ -4.7
Ym,us
Ym,w
cumul. 5.8 4.5 16.1 44.7 44.7 31.8 -
indiv. 5.8 5.2 21.7 23.7 6.6 -∗ 54.4
Ya,us
Ya,w
cumul. 5.3 7.9 6.1 9.9 9.9 13.9 -
indiv. 5.3 6.4 2.6 7.1 4.3 -∗ 4.1
-* indicates no equilibrium
ticularly, its contribution to the real GDP growth decreases from 46.9% in
the baseline case to 38.8% in the CRTS case. The reduction of its impact
is more pronounced in the manufacturing sector. It alone accounts for 58%
of the increase in Ym,us compared to 99% in IRTS. On the other hand, its
role is relatively more important in the primary sector, contributing 25.3%
of the growth, compared to mere 5.0% in IRTS. The intuition behind this
result is very clear. The existence of economies of scale highlights the role
of Lus in the baseline model.
Also note the implications of the trade costs. The trade cost shocks do
not have much impact on the real GDP unlike the baseline case. Feeding in
the trade cost shocks on top of everything else only depresses the real GDP
by 0.5% whereas in the baseline it is reduced by 11.9%. So the changes in
trade costs are not so unfavourable to the overall economy. But at the sec-
toral level, it generates similar results as the baseline model. The changes
depress the manufacturing sector while promoting the primary sector. But
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Table 30: Decomposing trade cost shocks under CRTS (%)
T ai,us T
a
us,i T
m
i,us T
m
us,i T
a
us T
m
us
RGDP -1.1 0.1 0.6 -0.9 -1.1 -0.7
Ym,us -21.7 -1.0 -0.7 -12.5 -21.9 -13.1
Ya,us 24.5 1.1 2.0 14.5 24.6 15.4
the magnitude of impact is smaller under the CRTS assumption with Ym,us
decreasing by 57.5% (vs. 98.1%) and Ya,us increasing by 40.1% (vs. 65.2%)
due to the trade cost shocks. As discussed earlier, these quantitative dif-
ferences mainly come from the different implied changes in trade costs. In
Table 30 below, I perform an exercise that decomposes the contribution of
trade costs, similar to the ones in Table 26.
The results in Table 30 are very similar to the results in Table 26 quali-
tatively, if not identical. Basically the changes in T ai,us and T
m
us,i are the ones
that matter most as the changes in T aus,i and T
m
i,us have much less impact
on these variables. The quantitative implications are smaller because the
magnitudes of the implied changes are smaller than the baseline case as
discussed above.
3.2 Assessing the Effects of IRTS
3.2.1 Introduction
In this section, I disentangle the effects of increasing returns to scale in
manufacturing. As discussed in Chapter 1, while the existence of IRTS in
U.S. manufacturing during this period is still a debated issue, some studies
point out that this was a crucial feature that promoted the development of
U.S. economy during this period.42 But, to my knowledge, its quantitative
42See Chapter 1 for more discussion about this.
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effects have never been evaluated and in this section I try to pursue this
goal. Before I turn to the procedure and result, I discuss more about the
IRTS assumption imposed in the model.
There are several ways to consider the economies of scale. For exam-
ple, Johnston (1990), in investigating the possible impact of Civil War debt
repayment, assumes that there existed learning effects from investments in
U.S. production technology. More specifically, he postulates that invest-
ments also generate industrial knowledges about how to manage and pro-
duce more efficiently. This knowledges cannot be kept private but ‘spill over’
to other producers, thus creating positive externalities. In other words, he
applies the famous mechanism emphasized by the endogenous growth liter-
ature. According to this line of thought, the production function would look
like the following,
Y = ALαK1−α+µ where 0 < α < 1 and µ > 0
where Y is output, L is labour supply and K is capital. Obviously, µ > 0
creates the economies of scale as well as positive externalities. This kind of
externality is called ‘non-pecuniary externality’ or ‘technological external-
ity’. According to Ottaviano and Thisse (2000), this kind of IRTS and the
externalities generated seem to be more reasonable to explain ‘geographi-
cal cluster of somewhat limited spatial dimension such as cities and highly
specialized industrial districts’.
On the contrary, the externality generated by the kind of IRTS consid-
ered in the model is called ‘pecuniary externality’. The origin of externality
is clearer in this case as it emphasizes the role of market interactions among
consumers and firms whereas ‘non-pecuniary’ externality is perceived as a
‘black-box’. More specifically, the pecuniary externality is generated by the
agglomeration force due to the backward and forward linkages which are
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responses to changing prices and market conditions.43 Also Ottaviano and
Thisse (2000) puts forward an argument that the pecuniary externality is
more ideal to explain ‘inter-regional agglomeration such as the Manufactur-
ing Belt in the U.S. and the Hot Banana in Europe’.
Finally, under the current assumption about the IRTS, it seems much
easier to pin down the parameters that control the degree of IRTS and ex-
ternality. For example, the value of the fixed cost, F , can be anything as
it does not influence the aggregate variables. And αm, the parameter that
determines the share of manufacturing intermediate usage and the agglom-
eration effect, can be calibrated using input-output tables. On the other
hand, at least, the process of determining µ does not look as simple as that
as one needs to correctly identify the pure technology (or residual) shock
from the spill-over effects.
3.2.2 Procedure and Results
The CRTS model from the previous chapter yields identical calibrated pa-
rameters and benchmark equilibrium as the baseline IRTS model. In addi-
tion the results generated from the CRTS model account for the data in 1913
quite closely and yield almost identical results as the baseline IRTS model.44
This gives an ideal condition to isolate the effects of IRTS. A simple way
to do this is to feed in the shocks implied by the IRTS framework to the
CRTS model. Note that the changes in endowments are measured using a
priori informations so that they are identical under both frameworks. The
measured changes in TFP for primary and services sector for Britain and
the U.S. are identical as well, as they are assumed to have same functional
forms. But the implied changes in the manufacturing TFP for all regions
and the primary TFP for the rest of world and the trade costs take different
values. The effects of IRTS can be isolated as the difference between the
43see Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) for the details.
44See Chapter 2 for details.
81
results generated by this exercise and that by the IRTS model. Table 31
below presents the result for U.S. economy.
The first two columns are restatements of the data and of the base-
line equilibrium for the sake of comparison. The last column presents the
simulation results. We can see that without IRTS, U.S. share of world
manufacturing is reduced to 25.1% from 32.2%. Therefore IRTS contribute
about 7 percentage point increase in the share. And without the IRTS the
model only accounts for around 67% of increase in manufacturing output
(6.52/9.74). So the remaining 33% can be attributed to the presence of
IRTS. On the other hand, the primary sector grows about 7% without the
IRTS in manufacturing (3.24−3.043.04 ). This is natural because the U.S. loses
its comparative advantage in manufacturing coming from the scale economy
and consequently the comparative advantage shifts to the primary. This can
be readily seen in the results for the trade in Table 32 below. Finally IRTS
accounts for about 10% of the increase in real GDP.
Table 31: The effects of IRTS on U.S. economy
Data BL IRTS IRTS removed
Share in world primary (%) 14.4 13.9 14.8
Share in world manufacture (%) 31.9 32.2 25.1
Share of LF in primary (%) 30 37 41
Share of LF in manufacture (%) 30 32 27
Ya,1913/Ya,1870 2.58 3.04 3.24
Ym,1913/Ym,1870 9.46 9.74 6.52
CF RGDP / BL RGDP - - 0.90
BL: baseline, RGDP: real GDP
The effects of IRTS in manufacturing are not small and they are more
pronounced in manufacturing, as expected. But again I emphasise that these
results are more meaningful if the assumption of IRTS is valid.
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Table 32: Implications of IRTS on U.S. trade
Data BL IRTS IRTS removed
Exports/GDP 0.06 0.04 0.05
manu. exports / total exports 0.50 0.61 0.19
manu. imports / total imports 0.44 0.32 0.74
BL: baseline simulation
3.3 Conclusion
In the first part of this chapter, I disentangled the effects of changes in land,
labour force and sectoral TFP on U.S. economy. Two main points emerge
from this exercise. First, it depends on how I treat the trade cost shocks but
the massive increase in labour force and capital was the single outstanding
force that contributed to the development of the U.S. over the period. In
terms of sector, it was unproportionately more beneficial to manufacturing
than primary.
The second point is that the changes in trade costs were not beneficial to
the U.S. at all, especially to its manufacturing sector, when the trade cost
shocks are calibrated. The trade statistics suggest that by 1913 the U.S.
was still importing too much manufacturing despite its huge comparative
advantage in this sector and for the model to account for this historical fact,
the implied changes in manufacturing trade costs from other regions to the
U.S. have to be very low as depicted in Table 14 and 23 in Chapter 2. On the
other hand this may be partially attributable to the aggregation of the rest
of world, as discussed earlier. In order to remedy this, the changes in trade
costs need to be measured/calibrated more accurately. For this purpose, the
rest of world should be disaggregated into more regions and the trade costs
between the U.S. and those particular regions need to be calibrated.
When I include more realistic values for the trade costs, the role of the
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shocks changed dramatically both qualitatively and quantitatively from the
baseline case. Their quantitative significance reduced substantially and the
shocks were beneficial to the manufacturing sector as opposed to it benefited
the primary sector in the baseline case.
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Chapter 4
Tariffs and the Development
of the U.S.
4.1 Introduction
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the U.S. maintained
high tariff rates on manufacturing imports, averaging about 33%. This pe-
riod of high protectionism is associated with the rapid economic growth,
especially the development of its industrial or manufacturing sector. Ac-
cording to Bairoch (1982), U.S. share of world manufacturing production
in 1860 was only 7.2% but its share surged to 32.0% in 1913. This corre-
lation between growth and high tariffs has often been used as a historical
justification for protective trade policies by politicians, scholars and other
prominent figures.45 However others argue that the tariffs mattered far less
for U.S. economic development.
The controversy generated many works that shed light on this issue.
45See Batra (1993), Buchanan (1998) and Chang (2002). Irwin (2001) also provides a
summary of this when the debate was heated in 1990’s.
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O’Rourke (2000), Clemens and Williamson (2004) and O’Rourke and Lehman
(2008) clearly document that tariffs are positively correlated with growth by
analysing a cross-section of countries including the U.S. during this period.
Irwin (2001 and 2002), in a partial equilibrium analysis, finds the high tariffs
on U.S. iron imports did not play a quantitatively large role in promoting the
domestic iron industry in 1869. James (1978), using a computable general
equilibrium model, analyses the antebellum U.S. economy and concludes
that the quantitative impact of the tariffs on the development of its manu-
facturing was small in 1859.46 This paper attempts to contribute to these
existing works by exploring the quantitative implications of the manufactur-
ing tariffs on the development of U.S. economy from 1870 to 1913. To do this
I ask a historically counterfactual question: Could the U.S. have developed
as it did if tariffs on its manufacturing imports had been eliminated?
My work differs from those studies in several aspects. First, I use a
general equilibrium model that focuses on the postbellum U.S. economy.
This period deserves a similar quantitative analysis as in James (1978) and
Harley (1992) because U.S. manufacturing during this period experienced an
unprecedented growth while the tariff rates on manufacturing imports were
maintained at even higher levels than the antebellum period. Secondly, I in-
troduce a simple dynamic by assuming that there exists learning-by-doing in
U.S. manufacturing sector.47 The static nature of the previous studies allow
one to see only one-time effects of eliminating the tariffs. So these studies do
not investigate a question like: what the U.S. would have been like in 1859
46The U.S. was a net exporter of primary products such as raw cotton and a net
importer of manufacturing products during the antebellum period. In his model the pro-
tection of U.S. manufacturing had terms of trade improving effects because of the market
power it had in raw cotton. This force acted against the expansion of the manufacturing
sector. Harley (1992) argues that this effect generated in James’ model is largely due to
his unintended assumption that the U.S. also had market power in food. He demonstrates
that if this is corrected, the tariff protection does not generate such a large terms of trade
improving effects and the quantitative impacts of the tariffs on U.S. manufacturing are
much larger than what James suggests.
47David (1970) argues that there existed strong learning effects in U.S. textile industry
during the nineteenth century.
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if it had not imposed any tariff on the manufacturing imports since 1812.
In contrast my model allows one to explore this kind of question. Finally
my model has a novel feature that there exists increasing returns to scale
(IRTS) in the manufacturing production. More specifically this assump-
tion is teamed up with another assumption that the manufacturing sectors
use manufacturing intermediate inputs. These features can generate the
agglomeration of manufacturing, as emphasized in the New Economic Ge-
ography literature. Indeed these are important features that have not been
considered in this kind of quantitative analysis on U.S. economy. James
(1983) and Cain and Paterson (1986) clearly document that economies of
scale in U.S. manufacturing were substantial and pervasive during this pe-
riod. Also Crafts and Venables (2001) argue that the agglomeration effect
was an important force behind the industrialization of the U.S. These ad-
ditional features allow me to explore the role of tariffs in generating the
agglomeration of manufacturing in the U.S.
I focus on several dimensions of the development: the large increase in
U.S. share of the world manufacturing output; the growth of its primary
and manufacturing output; and its structural transformation. When doing
this analysis, it is important to account for forces other than the tariffs
that could have mattered for the rise of U.S. manufacturing during this
period. To do this I use the model introduced in Chapter 2 to isolate the
effects of the tariffs from other forces. It allows for exogenous changes in
sectoral productivities; endowments in labour and land; and trade costs.48
The tariffs make up a part of the trade costs - expressed in tariff-equivalent
terms - calibrated in Chapter 2.
The calibrated model from Chapter 2 is used to analyse the quantitative
implications of the tariffs. I proceed in two steps. First, I look at the static
implications of the tariffs. I do this by feeding in the counterfactual changes
48See Chapter 1 for more discussion of these forces.
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in trade costs when U.S. manufacturing tariffs are removed in 1913, while
keeping other changes unaltered. The results from this exercise suggest that
even though tariffs help promote the manufacturing sector, its quantitative
impacts are small, contributing only 3% to the growth of manufacturing
output. Intuitively, this is because a large part of comparative advantage
shifted to the manufacturing by 1913 due to the exogenous increase in its
productivity and economies of scale. Also the role of tariffs in generating
the agglomeration effect is somewhat limited.49
Then I look at the dynamic implications of the tariffs by assuming that
learning-by-doing effects exist in U.S. manufacturing sector. In particular
I assume that cumulative experiences, proxied by cumulative output, have
positive spill-over effects on productivity. For this I decompose U.S. manu-
facturing TFP and identify the part contributed by learning effects. With
learning effects, eliminating the tariffs during the period generates further
amplifying effects than in the first exercise. Because now manufacturing
TFP is endogenous to the cumulative output and a no-tariff-economy would
generate less cumulative output by 1913 than in the static case. And the
counterfactual level of the manufacturing TFP in 1913 would be lower than
the static case. Even with learning-by-doing effects, the results don’t change
much. Under an extreme case where the entire TFP increase comes from
learning, tariffs only contribute about 7% to manufacturing growth and its
world share of manufacturing output drops only by 2 percentage points. The
overall results of this exercise quantitatively support the recent arguments
made by Irwin (2001 and 2002).
In addition to the works introduced earlier, more works investigate the
role of the tariffs in promoting U.S. iron industry. Head (1994) introduces
49In this framework, the agglomeration of manufacturing is generated by the positive
feedback between the backward and the forward linkage, as emphasized in the New Eco-
nomic Geography literature. The forward linkage in a region arises as it becomes less
costly to produce in that region and the backward linkage arises as firms in that region
face increased demands for their products. The positive feedback between the two linkage
effects induce more firms to locate in that region, thus generating the agglomeration.
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learning-by-doing to examine the impacts of tariff on U.S. steel rail industry
and finds that the overall welfare effects of the tariff were positive. Naknoi
(2008) demonstrates that without tariff protection the industry would have
been wiped out by 1881 when learning-by-doing effects are considered. These
studies focus on particular industries and use partial equilibrium analysis. In
contrast mine focuses on the overall economy and uses a general equilibrium
model.
4.2 Effects of Tariffs on U.S. Manufacturing
Before moving to numerical exercises I explore the channels through which
the tariffs can influence the manufacturing production in a more analytical
fashion. To simplify I consider the case when the manufacturing tariffs im-
posed on imports from Britain are decreased which, in turn, reduces Tmb,us.
Substitution Effect : U.S. demand for Briatin’s manufacturing products,
mus,b can be easily derived from equation (6) as
mus,b = nbp
−σm
b Em,usG
σm−1
m,us (T
m
b,us)
1−σm
A direct effect of reducing Tmb,us is that mus,b increases as
∂ mm,us
∂ Tb,us
< 0. This
is because Britain’s manufacturing products for U.S. consumers get rela-
tively cheaper and they demand more of them. And they replace domestic
products with imports from Britain. As a result demands for Britain’s man-
ufacturing relative to their own also rise.
∂
∂Tb,us
(
mus,b
mus,us
)
= (1− σm)
[
nb
nus
] [
pb
pus
]−σm
T−σmb,us < 0
As they substitute domestic products with Britain’s, the domestic manufac-
turing sector shrinks and nm,us or Ym,us decreases.
Demand Effect : As mus,b increases this instantaneously raises nm,b or Ym,b.
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Then Britain’s demands for U.S. intermediate manufacturing, denoted as
imb,us, will increase.
imb,us = (1− αm)nm,bpm,bF (σm − 1)
(
Tus,b
Gm,b
)1−σm
It is easy to see
∂ imb,us
∂ nm,b
> 0. This effect alone will increase exports of U.S.
manufacturing to Britain, therefore nm,us.
According to the substitution effect, eliminating the tariffs would shrink
the size of U.S. manufacturing while the exports effect says it would promote
the sector. But this is not the end of the story. There is one more important
force to consider that is closely related to the model’s assumption that the
manufacturing sector exhibits IRTS and it uses itself as intermediate inputs.
Price Index Effect : From equation (2), it can be seen that a decrease in Tmb,us
directly reduces Gm,us because for U.S. consumers, Britain’s manufacturing
goods become relatively cheaper. This effect alone generates the forward
and backward linkage effect, emphasized in the New economic geography
literature. As manufacturing inputs become cheaper, more firms will be lo-
cated in the U.S. leading to an increase in nm,us and Ym,us (forward linkage).
As more firms are located in the U.S., the demand for manufacturing inter-
mediate will increase, inducing further increase in nm,us (backward linkage).
This effect can also simply be summarized as a multilateral resistance effect
from Anderson and Wincoop (2003). Of course this is the direct effect of
decreasing Tmb,us while holding other variables constant. In the general equi-
librium framework, we can not hold other variables constant. For example,
nm,us and nm,b that affect Gm,us vary as well. Thus the linkage effect can
arise from the substitution and export effect too. To see whether eliminating
the tariffs generate a positive or a negative linkage effect, I have to resort to
simulation exercises.
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Considering learning-by-doing has additional effects on Ym,us through
its influence on Am,us. For now I will assume that a reduction in T
m
b,us
decreases Am,us. Then this instantaneously raises the domestic price of U.S.
manufacturing, pm,us. This affects Ym,us negatively through two channels.
(Additional) Demand Effect : region i’s demand for U.S. manufacturing can
be written as
mi,us = (pm,us)
−σmEm,i
(
Tus,i
Gm,i
)1−σm
=
(
ωαmus G
1−αm
m,us
Am,us
)−σm
Em,i
(
Tus,i
Gm,i
)1−σm
It is easy to see that
∂ mi,us
∂ Am,us
> 0. Obviously as the price of U.S. manufac-
turing increases the demand for U.S. products goes down. And this will in
turn decrease U.S. manufacturing output.
(Additional) Price Index Effect : From equation (1) we can see that
∂ Gm,us
∂ pm,us
>
0. An increase in pm,us will increase Gm,us and generate the linkage effects
that will decrease Ym,us further.
In this comparative static exercise I demonstrated main channels through
which the tariffs can have impacts on U.S. manufacturing output. Simula-
tion exercises later will evaluate which effects come to dominate.
4.3 The Average Tariff Rates
In this section I calculate the average tariff rates for U.S. imports. The
average tariff rate is defined as the amount of duties collected divided by
the amount of total imports. All the relevant sources are obtained from
The Statistical Abstract of the United States and The Annual Reports of
the Commerce and Navigation of the United States. Figure 1 illustrates the
average tariff rates of the U.S. from 1870 to 1913.
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The average tariff rate decreased substantially from 1870 to 1913. But
through out the period the level of manufacturing tariff rate was higher
than the overall rate with the gap being reduced as it gets toward the end.
Even though not illustrated here, the tariff rates on dutiable imports did
not change much during this period, thus the reduction of the average tariff
rates was mainly due to reduction in the contents of dutiable imports.
Figure 2: U.S. tariff rates from 1870 to 1913
4.4 Static Implications of the Tariff
To explore the role of tariff, the baseline model presented in Chapter 2 is
used except that I use the counterfactual changes in trade costs implied by
the case of no manufacturing tariff for the U.S. The relevant number here is
the tariff rate on manufacturing imports in 1913 which is 0.188. I subtract
this number from the relevant trade costs, Tmb,us and T
m
rw,us in 1913. Then I
can calculate counterfactual changes in trade costs from 1870 to 1913. I feed
in these changes to see the implications of U.S. manufacturing tariffs. One
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thing to note is that under the assumption, removing the tariffs during the
whole periods and only in 1913 have identical impacts on the economy in
1913. This is because the changes in tariffs do not influence other exogenous
forces. But it would be interesting to know the implications of eliminating
the tariffs in other years, especially in the earlier years of the period. So I
look at the effects of the tariffs in 1870 when the rate is 0.408. As we can
also observe from Figure 1 the average rate actually decreased substantially
from 1870 to 1913. But as noted the tariff rate on dutiable imports did not
change much during the period. This could imply that the effective rate
of protection did not change much from that in 1870. So I add one more
counterfactual exercise where I assume that in 1913 the level of protection
is similar to that of 1870.
4.4.1 Main Results
Now I am ready to study the effects of the manufacturing tariff on the
development of U.S. economy. Table 33 presents the outcomes of these
exercises.
Eliminating U.S. manufacturing tariffs in 1913 transforms U.S. econ-
omy into a relatively more agrarian economy with its primary share rising
from 13.9% to 14.1% and its manufacturing share decreasing from 32.2% to
31.3%. Also the share of the labour force in the primary sector increases
from 37% to 38% while the share in the manufacturing sector decreases from
32% to 31%. The manufacturing tariff contributes about 3% to the growth
of manufacturing output in 1913 (9.74−9.479.74 ). In 1870 removing the tariffs
has larger impacts on the manufacturing output, contributing about 14%.
Finally assuming that the rate in 1913 is the same as that of 1870 at 40.8%
and eliminating this amount decreases the manufacturing output by 8%.
In all cases, the tariffs contribute positively to U.S. manufacturing output.
As the tariff is eliminated foreign manufacturing goods become relatively
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cheaper and the U.S. imports more of them. As the foreign manufacturing
imports replace the domestic manufactured goods (in terms of final, as well
as intermediate consumption), resources are diverted away from the manu-
facturing to the other sectors. So the manufacturing activity shrinks while
the primary one expands (the substitution effect).
To see this more clearly I perform an exercise that decomposes the contri-
bution of the tariffs to the growth of Ym,us the results of which are presented
in Table 34. When the tariffs are removed in 1913, due to the demand effect
the total exports of the U.S. rises and its contribution to U.S. manufac-
turing growth is about 1.6%. But as U.S. consumers substitute their own
products with cheaper imports, the domestic production of manufacturing
decreases. In other words, the substitution effect drives Ym,us down by 4.3%.
The net effect is that the manufacturing output is reduced by about 3% by
elimination of the tariffs as we saw in Table 34.
The decrease in nm,us (or Ym,us) due to removing the tariffs creates a force
against the backward linkage in U.S. manufacturing sector. This is because
as less firms are located in the U.S., there is relatively less demand for the
manufacturing intermediate inputs by U.S. firms. This reduces incentives for
firms to locate in the U.S. What about the forward linkage? As we can see
from Table 34, the manufacturing price index for the U.S. relative to other
regions (∆
Gm,us
Gm,b
and ∆
Gm,us
Gm,rw
) decreases due to the tariff elimination. This
is largely due to the decreases in Tmb,us and T
m
rw,us that directly reduce Gm,us
relative to others. This implies the tariff elimination creates the forward
linkage because lower Gm,us means it is cheaper for firms to locate and
buy the intermediate inputs in the U.S. Summing up, the tariff protection
promoted U.S. manufacturing by creating the backward linkage but at the
same time it also created a force against the forward linkage by increasing
the manufacturing price index. So it did not really generate any feedback
between the forward and the backward linkage. This means that the role
94
of the tariffs teamed up with IRTS in generating the linkage effects and the
agglomeration of manufacturing in the U.S. was somewhat limited. This
can be one reason why its quantitative impacts are small.
The reason that the tariffs have larger impacts in 1870 than in 1913 is
partially because the average tariff rate is lower in 1913 than in 1870. But
as can be observed in Table 33, eliminating the 1870-tariff-rate in 1913 still
yields the qualitatively same results. Intuitively, this is because the ma-
jor part of U.S. comparative advantage was already in the manufacturing
sector by 1913, due to the growth in the manufacturing productivity and
economies of scale arising from the large increase in labour force. So the role
of tariff protection became less important in 1913 compared to in 1870.50
The impacts of the tariffs can vary according to the economy’s comparative
advantage. In other words, if one has a strong comparative advantage in the
primary sector, then by imposing high tariffs on manufacturing imports, it
can better prevent the movement of labour out from the manufacturing sec-
tor. This is indeed a point made by Irwin (2002) who analyses 27 countries
from 1870 to 1913. But by 1913, the U.S. already had a strong comparative
advantage in the manufacturing and the effects of tariffs were not so large.
This is the conclusion that can be drawn if the TFP is exogenous to the
levels of tariffs. But this does not always have to be the case. If I assume
that there exists learning-by-doing effects in U.S. manufacturing then the
tariffs affect the level of productivity. Because learning-by-doing assumes cu-
mulative experiences generate spill-over effects and positively affect produc-
tivities. So I analyse the implications of the tariffs when learning-by-doing
is present. But before moving on to this exercise, I perform a sensitivity
50To see this point more clearly, I performed an exercise (not reported here) to look at
the implication of the tariffs when the U.S. has a smaller degree of comparative advantage
in manufacturing by controlling for its productivity growth. More specifically I assume
a counterfactual world where U.S. manufacturing TFP grows at the same rate as that of
Britain from 1870 to 1913 while keeping the changes in other forces identical as in the
baseline case. In this case the tariffs contribute to about 14% (not mere 3%) of the growth
of manufacturing output.
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analysis first.
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Table 33: Static implications of tariffs
1913 (18.8%) 1870 (40.8%) 1913* (40.8%)
BL CF CONT BL CF CONT BL CF CONT
Share in world primary(%) 13.9 14.1 -0.2 p.p 9.7 10.9 -1.2 p.p 13.9 14.4 -0.5 p.p
Share in world manufacture 32.2 31.3 0.9 p.p 10.2 8.8 1.4 p.p 32.2 29.7 2.5 p.p
Share of LF in primary 37 38 -1.0 p.p 48 51 -3.0 p.p 37 39 -2.0 p.p
Share of LF in manufacture 32 31 1.0 p.p 24 21 3.0 p.p 32 29 3.0 p.p
Ya,1913/Ya,1870 3.04 3.08 -1.3% - - -3.8% 3.04 3.16 -4.0%
Ym,1913/Ym,1870 9.74 9.47 2.8% - - 14.3% 9.74 8.96 8.1%
CF RGDP/BL RGDP - 1.00 -0.2% - 1.00 -0.4% - 1.00 -0.8%
BL: baseline simulation, CF: counterfactual, CONT: contribution, LF: labour force, p.p: percentage point
1913*: If the tariff rate were the same as that of 1870 at 40.8%.
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Table 34: Effects of removing the tariffs on trade and price variables
Contribution of exports to growth of Ym,us (%) Change in manu. price index (%)
us→ b us→ rw foreign total us→ us ∆Ym,us ∆
(
Gm,us
Gm,b
)
∆
(
Gm,us
Gm,rw
)
1913 (18.8%) 0.2 1.4 1.6 -4.3 -2.8 -3.6 -3.6
1870 (40.8%) 0.2 1.3 1.5 -15.8 -14.3 -6.9 -6.0
1913* (40.8%) 0.9 5.7 6.6 -14.7 -8.1 -10.9 -11.4
us→ b: U.S. exports to Britain, us→ rw: U.S. exports to the rest, us→ us: U.S. domestic exports,
1913*: If the tariff rate were the same as that of 1870 at 40.8%.
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4.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The levels of calibrated trade costs are very sensitive to the elasticity of sub-
stitution parameters, σa and σm. And these parameters are pinned down
using prior information. For example, under the value used for the bench-
mark calibration (σm = 7.5), the level of manufacturing trade cost to the
U.S., Tmb,us and T
m
rw,us, are 1.88 and 1.23 in 1913, respectively. But if I assume
σm = 6, T
m
b,us and T
m
rw,us become 2.27 and 1.32, respectively. Thus under
different values of the parameter, the proportion of the manufacturing tariff
in trade cost varies.51 And this difference can have quantitatively different
implications. Table 35 below presents a sensitivity analysis by varying the
value of σa and σm. In addition to the benchmark value of 7.5, I consider
the case where σm = σa = 6 and 9.
First of all the baseline result is not sensitive to the different values of the
elasticity of substitution parameters within the plausible range suggested by
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004). Also the effects of the manufacturing
tariff turn out to be almost identical under the different values of σm.
52
This sensitivity analysis also has some implications on the home bias in
international trade. The home bias in international trade is well documented
and pervasive. This may be no exception to the late nineteenth century
North Atlantic economy. Introduction of more home bias in manufacturing
would mean that the agglomeration of manufacturing is less likely. This is
because even if the strong comparative advantage in manufacturing exists
in the U.S., other regions would still prefer to consume unproportionately
more home manufacturing goods and the relocation of manufacturing from
other regions to the U.S. based on the linkage effects is less likely.
51For example when σm = 7.5, the share of the tariff in the trade cost from Britain to
the U.S. is about 24% (0.21/0.88) but when σm = 6, it decreases to 17% (0.21/1.27).
52The elasticity applies to the whole manufacturing sector. Within this sector there is
a large degree of variation with elasticities quite different across products at more disag-
gregated levels (Broda and Weinstein, 2006). Therefore it is possible that the robustness
at this level might mask heterogeneity a more disaggregated level.
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Table 35: Sensitivity analysis
σm = 6 σm = 7.5 σm = 9
BL CF BL CF BL CF
Share in world primary(%) 13.9 14.0 13.9 14.1 13.8 14.0
Share in world manufacture 32.6 31.8 32.2 31.3 32.7 32.1
Share of LF in primary 37 38 37 38 37 37
Share of LF in manufacture 32 31 32 31 33 31
Ya,1913/Ya,1870 3.06 3.09 3.04 3.08 3.02 3.07
Ym,1913/Ym,1870 9.74 9.50 9.74 9.47 9.81 9.60
CF RGDP/BL RGDP - 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00
BL: baseline simulation, CF: counterfactual simulation
The elasticity of substitution parameter dictates the degree of home bias.
A higher value of σm means home goods and foreign goods are more sub-
stitutable and would mean relatively less home bias. On the other hand
a lower value of σm means they are less substitutable and more prone to
the home bias. The sensitivity analysis also tells that the results are not so
sensitive to the degree of home bias.53
4.5 Learning-by-doing Effect
So far I have assumed that the productivity is exogenous to the level of
tariff. But if there existed a learning-by-doing in U.S. manufacturing during
this period, the outcome could have been different from the above. Ac-
53If we look at Table 10 which illustrates the trade flows among the three regions in
the benchmark year of 1870, the equilibrium reflects the home bias clearly. For example,
the U.S. even though it did not have a strong comparative advantage in manufacturing
around 1870, the share of domestic manufacturing consumption is 90%. Out of the total
expenditure of manufacturing products, 0.5, the U.S. consumes 0.45 from the domestic
market and imports 0.03 from Britain and 0.02 from the rest of world. Similar patterns can
be observed for Britain and the rest of world. If I narrow the focus on the consumption
of manufacturing intermediates, 95% of U.S. intermediate expenditure comes from the
domestic market so this market is even more home biased. This is partly the results of
my calibration strategy that I match the exports to GDP ratio of each region.
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cording to the learning-by-doing mechanism, the growing experiences have
positive spill-over effects on the productivity. And within this framework the
domestic industry could have accumulated more experiences due to the tar-
iff protection and with learning-by-doing effects this had additional effects
on the economy through enhanced productivity growth.54 In this section
I quantitatively evaluate the role of the tariff when the learning-by-doing
effect is present. But before proceeding any further I discuss more about
the learning-by-doing in the historical context.
Arrow (1962) was the first to lay down the theoretical groundwork of
the learning-by-doing. But empirically the famous case study of the Liberty
ship by Searle (1945) and Rapping (1965) demonstrated how experiences
could have important implications on productivities. The Liberty ship case
drew attentions of many economists because of the dramatic increase in
labour productivity observed within such a short span of time. It grew, on
average, by 40% annually over three years and until recently most scholars
attributed this to the learning-by-doing. But in a recent study, Thompson
(2001), using new and improved data set for capital, documented that the
increase was more attributable to capital-deepening than to accumulated
experiences.
There are a number of literatures that explore the role of learning-by-
doing in the nineteenth century U.S. development. David (1970) finds that
the learning effect contributed substantially to the development of the ante-
bellum U.S. cotton textile industry. Naknoi (2008) also concludes that the
learning effect was important for U.S. pig iron industry from 1870 to 1940
and without the tariff protection the industry would have been wiped out
by 1881.55
54Please see the discussion of Additional Demand Effect and Additional Price Index
Effect in Section 4.2 for more detailed analysis of the interaction between tariffs and
learning-by-doing.
55Both works use the cumulative output as a proxy for the cumulative experience.
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4.5.1 Strategy
Essentially the goal is to obtain a counterfactual level of U.S. manufacturing
TFP in 1913, Am,us in case of no tariff protection. Obviously it would be
smaller than the measured level in the previous section because eliminating
the tariff would shrink the cumulative experience in the sector and this would
negatively affect the TFP when there is a learning effect. Then I feed this
counterfactual TFP to the model along with other shocks to disentangle the
effect of learning-by-doing coming from the tariff protection.
In order to proceed I need to introduce a few additional assumptions to
the baseline model regarding the manufacturing TFP. I do this in a sim-
plest way possible following the literatures on the learning-by-doing.56 As
discussed earlier I now assume that the level of the manufacturing TFP
depends on the cumulative experience and it can be expressed as
(Am,us)t = atE
αe
t−1
where a is the productivity coming from sources other than the learning
effect, E is the amount of cumulative experiences and the coefficient αe
determines the learning rate. t is time subscript so the level of productivity
at period t depends on the cumulative output until t−1. The learning rate is
formally defined as 1−2αe and interpreted as the rate at which costs fall with
each doubling of cumulative experience. I use the cumulative manufacturing
output as a proxy for the cumulative experience following the literatures.
Then the equation looks like
(Am,us)t = at (CYm,us)
αe
t−1 (38)
where (CYm,us)t−1 is the cumulative output of U.S. manufacturing until pe-
riod t− 1.
56See Arrow (1962), David (1970), Irwin and Klenow (1994) among others.
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Given the specification in (38), it is important to effectively identify at
and the no-tariff-counterfactual CYm,us. Then I can recover the counterfac-
tual (Am,us)t. I describe the process below. For the ease of description I
separate equation (38) into two cases.
(
ABLm,us
)
t
= at
(
CY BLm,us
)αe
t−1 Baseline(
ACFm,us
)
t
= at
(
CY CFm,us
)αe
t−1 Counterfactual
The first equation decomposes U.S. manufacturing TFP under the baseline
specification. And the second equation describes the no-tariff-case. So for
example
(
Y CFm,us
)
t−1 indicates the manufacturing output at period t − 1 in
case the tariff is eliminated. Also note that at is identical across the cases
because this is the contribution to the TFP outside the learning effect.
1. I generate the sequence of
(
Y BLm,us
)
t
for t = {1871, ......, 1913}. In order
to do this I introduce dynamics in a very simple manner. I assume uniform
growths for the endowments, the TFPs and the trade costs from 1870 to
1913.57 In this process I also obtain
(
ABLm,us
)
t
for all t. And I feed in the
yearly changes to the baseline model to obtain the sequence of
(
Y BLm,us
)
t
.
2. I obtain the sequence of
(
CY BLm,us
)
t
for t = {1870, ......, 1913}. The initial
year’s cumulative output,
(
CY BLm,us
)
1870
, is calculated from Bairoch (1982).
According to this, the cumulative output of U.S. industrial output from
1800 to 1870 is about 19 times larger than the output produced in the single
year of 1870.58 And with the series of
(
Y BLm,us
)
t
obtained previously, I can
easily calculate
(
CY BLm,us
)
t
for t = 1871, ......, 1913.
3. I calculate the sequence of at for t = {1871, ......, 1913}. With
(
ABLm,us
)
t
,
57I already calibrated these values for 1870 and 1913 in the previous chapter and I
calculate the annual growth rates implied by these numbers.
58The reason that I chose the initial year as 1800 is because Bairoch’s data only begins
from that year. But given the output of the single year 1800, the cumulative output until
1800 should be minimal compared to the cumulative output until 1870.
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(
CY BLm,us
)
t−1 and αe given, at can be calculated. Choosing the value for αe
will be discussed more in detail in the following section.
4.
(
ACFm,us
)
1871
is calculated. Using
(
CY BLm,us
)
1870
and a1871 from 2. and 3.
respectively, it can be obtained.59
5. I simulate
(
Y CFm,us
)
1871
by feeding in the counterfactual trade costs without
the tariff (see figure 1 for the tariff rate) along with other shocks. And using(
Y CFm,us
)
1871
, I calculate
(
CY CFm,us
)
1871
.
6.
(
ACFm,us
)
1872
is calculated using
(
CY CFm,us
)
1871
and a1872 followed by simu-
lation of
(
Y CFm,us
)
1872
. This process is repeated until
(
Y CFm,us
)
1913
is obtained.
Then I can isolate the effects of the manufacturing tariffs in an economy
where the learning-by-doing effect is present.
4.5.2 Choosing αe
The parameter αe that represents the learning rate is very important in
this exercise because it determines the overall magnitude of the learning-
by-doing effect. There are many papers that estimate this parameter for
particular industries for post World War II era. But there are not many
works that focus on the late nineteenth century American industry. A few
exceptions are David (1970) and Naknoi (2008) as discussed earlier, but they
focus on particular industries like cotton textile and pig iron. Estimation is
one option but the data usually required for the estimation procedure are
lacking for this time period.60
Therefore I take an alternative approach. I set αe such that the learning-
by-doing contributes to all of the increase in the manufacturing TFP from
1870 to 1913. In other words, at in equation (38) is set to be more or less
constant for all t. Of course this is unreasonable as there must have been
59I remove the tariff from 1871, thus
(
CY BLm,us
)
1870
=
(
CY CFm,us
)
1870
60Usually one needs price or cost data for the industry of interest, but, to my knowledge,
appropriate price or cost data for U.S. manufacturing sector as a whole are not available.
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many other factors that contributed to the productivity growth. But at
least this can serve as an upper-bound. So here, the goal is not to pin down
an exact value for αe but rather to define a range with an upper-bound.
And the value of αe that satisfies this condition turns out to be around 0.15,
implying the learning rate of around 10%.
4.5.3 Implications of the Tariff with Learning Effect
Now I am ready to study the effects of removing the tariffs when the learning
effect is present. First I plot the evolution of
(
ACFm,us
)
t
, U.S. manufacturing
share, its manufacturing output and real GDP under various learning rates
against the baseline cases. In doing this, I try several different learning rates
which are 5%, 10% and 15%. As I have argued, the learning rate of 10% is
the upper-bound implied by the model. But I also include the learning rate
of 15% as this is close to the rate estimated by Naknoi (2008) for U.S. pig
iron industry from 1870 to 1940. The result is shown in Figure 3 below.
First, as I increase the learning rate, the counterfactual levels of all the
variables decrease for every year. Because a higher learning rate means a
given amount of cumulative experience or output generate more spill-over
effects. Therefore when the tariffs are removed, a higher learning rate implies
a larger foregone spill-over effects. And this implies a lower counterfactual
Am,us (the first panel) which, in turn, decreases the counterfactual level
and share of Ym,us more (the second and third panel). Also a lower Am,us
has negative impacts on the real GDP even though the effect is not as
pronounced as other variables (the forth panel).
Overall, the pictures illustrate that the effects of tariff are not quantita-
tively large even after taking the learning effects into account. Even under
an implausible learning rate of 15%, the quantitative effects do not seem
to be large. Especially, removing the tariffs has barely any impact on real
GDP. To see this more clearly, I report the results for 1913 in Table 36
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below. Under the learning rate of 10%, the counterfactual level of Am,us
in 1913 is about 98% of the baseline case (1.387/1.408). From this result
alone, one can tell that the tariffs did not generate much learning effect at
all. The share of its manufacturing only drops by 2 percentage points and
the manufacturing tariff only accounts for about 7% of the increase in Ym,us
((9.74-9.02)/9.74). Finally its impact on real GDP is minimal.
(LR=learning rate, Ym,us and real GDP in 1870 are normalized to 1)
Figure 3: Implications of the manufacturing tariff
The picture does not seem to change drastically when I use an even
higher learning rate of 0.15. In this case, the counterfactual Am,us is still
96% of the baseline level (1.360/1.408) and the tariffs account for about 13%
of the increase in Ym,us ((9.74-8.47)/9.74). Also the world share of Ym,us and
real GDP decline by 3.5 percentage points and by 2.4%, respectively, when
the tariff is eliminated ((5.929-5.788)/5.929).
Finally, under more plausible rate of 5%, the effects seem to be almost
infinitesimal. The counterfactual Am,us is more than 99% of the baseline
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Table 36: No manufacturing tariffs with learning effects in 1913
Baseline
Learning rate
0.05 0.10 0.15
Am,us,1913/Am,us,1870 1.408 1.401 1.387 1.360
share in world manu. (%) 32.2 30.9 30.2 28.7
Ym,us,1913/Ym,us,1870 9.74 9.32 9.02 8.47
RGDP1913/RGDP1870 5.929 5.914 5.871 5.788
level and the tariff only contributes about 4% to the growth of Ym,us.
A similar decomposition exercise as in the static case is conducted for a
learning rate of 10% (the upper-bound) the results of which are shown in
Table 37. First, when I eliminate the tariffs, U.S. exports contribute less to
the growth of Ym,us than the case without learning-by-doing effects (1.6%
vs. 0.9%). This is because as I remove the tariffs, Am,us decreases as well
and this directly increases the domestic price of U.S. manufacturing goods,
pm,us which in turn makes U.S. manufacturing relatively more expensive. So
the demand effect increases the demand for U.S. manufacturing products
by Britain and the rest of the world, but this is off-setted by the additional
demand effect arising from the decrease in productivity. That is why U.S.
exports increase less than the case without the learning effects.
On the other hand the domestic exports reduce Ym,us even more than the
static case (-4.3% vs. -8.3%). This is because the substitution effect is larger
due to the decrease in pm,us. Finally we can see that U.S. manufacturing
price index relative to others decreases less than the static case (-3.6% vs. -
2.3%). This is because even though reducing Tmb,us and T
m
rw,us instantaneously
decreasesGm,us, an additional force comes in. Now decreasing the trade costs
is associated with a lower Am,us and this alone leads to a higher pm,us and
higher Gm,us through the additional price index effect.
Summing up, the manufacturing tariffs when the learning effects are
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Table 37: Effects of removing the tariffs in 1913 on trade and price variables
Contribution of exports to growth of Ym,us (%) Change in manu. price index (%)
us→ b us→ rw foreign total us→ us ∆Ym,us ∆
(
Gm,us
Gm,b
)
∆
(
Gm,us
Gm,rw
)
0.1 0.7 0.9 -8.3 -7.4 -2.3 -2.3
present, contribute more to the growth of U.S. manufacturing sector. In
terms of the linkage effect, it creates a stronger forward linkage (larger nm,us)
but still generates a force against the backward linkage (as it increases Gm,us
relative to others) but to a weaker degree.
4.6 Tariffs and Capital Accumulation
As noted earlier, capital is not included in the model and I discuss the possi-
ble implications of the tariffs on U.S. capital accumulation and its economic
growth during this period. There are several channels through which a high
tariff could have promoted capital accumulation. Irwin (2001) proposes a
possible mechanism showing how the tariff on manufacturing imports could
have helped the domestic manufacturing to expand and thus accumulate
more capital as demand increased. But then he goes on to argue against
this scenario based on the evidence that the relative price of capital goods
and real interest rates declined sharply. He concludes that capital accumu-
lation during this period was saving-driven rather than demand-driven.
A version of learning-by-doing mechanism emphasizes that investment
produces not only capital but also knowledges and experiences which gen-
erate a positive externality and has a productivity enhancing effect. In
other words, in this framework the cumulative experience is proxied by the
amount of capital, instead of output. Thus capital deepening induced by
the tariff could have had a further amplifying effects through productivity
growth. But regarding this, De Long (1998) argues that the tariff had a
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depressing effect on capital accumulation. According to him, the tariff rates
on capital goods were as high as on other consumer manufacturing products
at about 40% throughout the period. And this not only raised the price of
foreign capital goods but also the price of domestic capital goods. And this
certainly would have had damaging effects on the rate of capital accumu-
lation. According to his simple back-of-the-envelope calculation, this effect
alone would reduce the real investment share of national product by 2 to
4% and the capital-output ratio by 10 to 20% in the long run. He goes fur-
ther on to argue that if there is a linkage between capital accumulation and
productivity, as emphasized by the learning-by-doing literature, then the
high tariff could have imposed even higher costs on productivity, because
depressed capital accumulation due to the tariff on capital goods must have
had damaging effects on the productivity as well.
In line with this, Estevadeordal and Taylor (2008) analyses the tariff
incidences before and after Uruguay Round and find that those countries
that “liberalized” the tariff barriers on capital goods imports had faster
GDP growth by a margin of 1 percentage point per annum. This amount
seems marginal in a short run but over 20 years it implies the difference
of 15-20% in the level of output. They confirm their empirical findings
by demonstrating that a calibrated Solow growth model generates a similar
magnitude of difference. Related to this, Taylor (1998) attributes the growth
slow down of Argentina after the World War Two to the inward-looking trade
policy that had implications on capital accumulation. He argues that the
protection distorted the domestic cost of capital goods that machinery and
equipments were 2 to 3 times more costly in Buenos Aires than in U.S. cities
during the periods.
I did not explicitly explore the quantitative implications of the tariffs on
investment and capital accumulation. But the U.S. was imposing high tariffs
on capital goods during this period. As discussed above, some theoretical
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and empirical evidences suggest that this would raise the user cost of capital,
thereby deteriorating capital accumulation and economic growth. Given
this, the results of my analysis that the tariffs did not have quantitatively
large implications, would not be biased by omitting capital accumulation in
the model.61
4.7 Concluding remarks
Using a quantitative general equilibrium model, I disentangle the effects of
U.S. manufacturing tariffs from other important forces to explore its devel-
opment. The results suggest that, contrary to some of the popular beliefs,
their quantitative effects are not so large. Not only their impact on real GDP
is marginal but also the manufacturing sector is marginally affected. Even
under unreasonably high learning rates, the effects are not so large. In ad-
dition, the role of tariffs in generating the agglomeration effect is somewhat
limited. The tariff protection initially increases the number of manufactur-
ing firms in the U.S. as consumers substitute more expensive imports for
cheaper domestic products. This creates the backward linkage effect but it
is not fed back into the forward linkage because the tariffs raise U.S. man-
ufacturing price index, making the U.S. more unattractive place for firms.
These results suggest that the role of tariff protection in the development
of U.S. manufacturing and economy as a whole was not so crucial, at least
on more aggregate levels. Then I ask what the important forces are. And it
turns out that the large increase in labour force is the single most important
factor behind the development of the U.S., accounting for a huge portion of
61Williamson (1974) proposes that the large fiscal surpluses generated by the tariffs
could have ‘crowded in’ private investment and raised capital accumulation. But according
to De Long (1998), whether this effect was quantitatively significant is not clear. He argues
that given that the average tariff revenue during this period was about 1.8% of national
product, about half of this was used to boost the national saving and investment and this
would, in the long run, increase the level of national product by 1 to 2%. This includes
the revenue from imposing tariffs on primary imports, so the amount of revenue due to
the manufacturing tariffs would be even smaller.
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the growth in manufacturing output and real GDP.
The results of this numerical exercise add contributions on the existing
works that view the effects of tariff as marginal. These works include Taussig
(1915), Temin (1964) and Irwin (2000) which analyse the iron industry and
Irwin (2001) that analyses the economy as a whole.
The general equilibrium nature of this model allows for other interest-
ing couterfactual exercises. For example, given the importance of the large
increase in labour force in U.S. economic growth, I can turn my focus to
this and explore the quantitative implications of mass migration. Also it is
argued by Crafts and Venables (2001) that economies of scale in manufac-
turing and the large reductions in transport costs during this period could
have helped to industrialize some countries while de-industrialize others. By
including more regions and isolating transport costs, the model can test this
argument.
Admittedly, as discussed earlier, I do not consider the channel that the
tariff can influence U.S. economic development through capital accumula-
tion. But the effect of this is not clear. Evidences regarding this issue
provide mixed results. Some suggest that the effects of the tariff on capital
accumulation could not have been large. It may even be the case that the
tariff retarded capital accumulation and productivity if the negative effect
of tariff on capital good imports was the dominating factor, as argued by
De Long (1998). And if this was the case then the overall effect of the man-
ufacturing tariff would be smaller than the results generated above or even
be negative.
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Chapter 5
The Mass Migration and the
Development of the U.S.
5.1 Introduction
The nineteenth century was an age of mass migration and the U.S. was
a major receiving country during this period. According to Vandenbroucke
(2008), ‘without international migration, U.S. population in 1900 would have
been 52% below its actual value’. This implies that the mass migration to
the U.S. also contributed substantially to the increase of its labour force.
This will be discussed more in the following sections.
Given the significance of the mass migration on U.S. labour force, the
objectives of this section are twofold. First, I explore the implications of the
mass migration on the quantity side of the economy. For example I ask a
counterfactual question “how would the world share of U.S. manufacturing
change if there was no mass migration from 1870 to 1913?” Qualitatively
some of the predictions are easier to make. For example, it certainly would
have contributed positively to the economy’s overall output or real GDP
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as it meant increased resources for the economy. But what are harder to
predict are the direction of the structural transformation and the magnitude
of changes in sectoral output variables. This exercise is aimed to provide
some quantitative insights on the effects of mass migration.
Secondly, I focus on the price side of the economy. More specifically,
I explore how much the mass migration contributed to the convergence in
Anglo-American real wage gap during this period. The works of Hatton,
O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson explores this topic. But the main dif-
ference between their works and mine is that they use constant returns to
scale, competitive model whereas mine assumes increasing returns in man-
ufacturing.
I perform this counterfactual exercise in a simple way, using the baseline
model introduced in Chapter 2. I already calibrated the changes in labour
force endowments from 1870 to 1913 in Chapter 2. But here I calculate the
changes in labour force implied by the no-migration-couterfactual and feed
in these values instead of the actual ones. And by comparing the simulated
outcome with that of the baseline outcome, I can disentangle the effects of
mass migration.
A strand of papers explores the impacts of mass migration on U.S. econ-
omy. This includes O’Rourke, Williamson and Hatton (1994), O’Rourke,
Taylor and Williamson (1996) and Hatton and Williamson (1998) among
others. And their conclusion is that a substantial part of Anglo-American
factor price convergence can be attributed to the mass migration. But these
works are mainly concerned with the impacts of mass migration on the
labour market conditions such as the convergence of the real wages and un-
employment. Vandenbroucke (2008) analyses the effects of mass migration
on the westward movement of population and changes in fertility. But he
concludes that the migration played a minor role in the westward movement
from 1800 to 1900.
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The analysis of O’Rourke, Williamson and Hatton (1994) considers the
role of capital by endogenizing it in a very simple manner. They assume
perfect mobility of capital and it ‘chases after’ migrants. But in this exercise
I do not include capital in any manner.62
5.2 Counterfactual Changes in Labour Forces
In this section I discuss how I measure the no-migration-counterfactual
changes in labour forces. First the actual changes from 1870 to 1913 are
reiterated from Chapter 2 below.
Actual :
Lb,1913
Lb,1870
= 1.49,
Lus,1913
Lus,1870
= 3.21 and
Lrw,1913
Lrw,1870
= 1.37
Theses numbers imply average annual growth rates of about 0.93%, 2.75%
and 0.73% for Britain, the U.S. and the rest of world, respectively. According
to Taylor and Williamson (1997), annual net migration rates of labour force
from 1870 to 1910 are -0.30% for Britain and 0.53% for the U.S. These
numbers imply that Britain was a net sender whereas the U.S. was a net
receiver during the period. These numbers can be directly subtracted to the
actual growth rates to obtain the counterfactual rates.
Therefore without the net migration effect, the labour force would have
grown at about 2.22% instead of 2.75% for the U.S. and 1.23% instead of
0.93% for Britain. For arithmetic consistency I treat the rest of world as
residual and its labour force changes to account for the difference between
Britain and the U.S. Then the counterfactual changes in labour force from
1870 to 1913 turn out to be
Counterfactual :
Lb,1913
Lb,1870
= 1.69,
Lus,1913
Lus,1870
= 2.57 and
Lrw,1913
Lrw,1870
= 1.38
62See Chapter 1 for the discussion of capital in modelling of the North Atlantic economy.
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I feed in these counterfactual changes to the baseline model along with other
changes to isolate the effect of mass migration.
These are the changes only considering the immigrant labour forces
themselves. O’Rourke, Williamson and Hatton (1994) uses the changes in
labour force considering the influence of migrant children born after the
move. This alternative measure can serve as an upper-bound and in the
appendix I report the implications of the mass migration using this measure
instead of the one reported above.
Before I proceed one comment is in order. I assumed that the changes
in endowments in labour force and land are exogenous to the model. This
implies that the reduction in labour force due to eliminating the mass mi-
gration has no impact on land endowments. But one might argue that the
change in land endowment should be positively correlated to the change in
labour force endowment. In other words, it should either be the case that
an increase in land area induces labour force (and population) to increase
or vice-versa. In fact, the consensus among economic historians is that the
increase in land induced more immigration. Homestead Act in 1862, ignited
the westward movement of population and the land area increased massively.
The westward movement kept U.S. urban wages relatively high and this gave
prospective immigrants incentives to come to the U.S. So according to this
argument, a positive causality runs from increased land to increased immi-
gration. But here I am more interested in the reverse causality. Namely,
whether changes in labour force due to immigration induced changes in land
endowments. Vandenbroucke (2008) studies a model of U.S. westward move-
ment which endogenizes the land improvement activity. When he feeds in
the no-international-immigration counterfactual shock, the model predicts
a very small decrease in the stock of improved land by 1900. This outcome
can be one justification for the assumption that the immigration does not
affect the accumulation of land.
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5.3 Implications of the Mass Migration
Now I am ready to study the effects of mass migration on U.S. economy as
well as on Britain’s economy. I report the simulation results on the main
variables of interests for the U.S. and Britain below in Table 38. Erasing
the impact of migration is quite large for the overall U.S. economy. But the
effects are much larger for the manufacturing than the primary sector. Its
primary sector loses only about 1.6 percentage point in world share whereas
the manufacturing sector loses 7.5 percentage point. The net immigration
contributes about 12.5% to the growth of primary output (3.04−2.662.66 ) but in
the case of manufacturing output, it is massive 26.4% (9.74−7.179.76 ). In line
with this, we can observe that the migration contributes to the movement
of labour force away from the primary sector into the manufacturing sector.
Due to this, the labour force share in the manufacturing sector gains about 2
percentage point. The impacts on the overall economy are also large. About
19% of real GDP is accounted for by the net immigration.
Table 38: Implications of mass migration
Britain U.S.
Data BL CF Data BL CF
Share in world primary(%) 1.9 2.5 2.6 14.4 13.9 12.3
Share in world manufacture 13.6 13.4 17.4 31.9 32.2 24.7
Share of LF in primary 12 23 21 30 37 37
Share of LF in manufacture 44 40 44 30 32 30
Ya,1913/Ya,1870 0.93 1.45 1.48 2.58 3.04 2.66
Ym,1913/Ym,1870 2.15 1.94 2.45 9.46 9.74 7.17
CF RGDP/BL RGDP - - 1.14 - - 0.81
BL: baseline simulation, CF: counterfactual simulation
On the other hand Britain experiences industrialization as it gains an
additional share of 4.0 percentage point in world manufacturing. In line with
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this more labour force is relocated toward the manufacturing sector. Britain
could have grown, respectively, by about 14% and 26% in terms of real GDP
and manufacturing output, if it had not sent out its workers. Overall impact
of the mass migration on Britain’s economy is quite substantial too. Next
I report the implications of the mass migration on both countries’ trade
patterns in Table 39.
The results in Table 39 show that Britain’s trade pattern is not much
affected by the migration. The share of manufacturing exports goes up
only slightly while the share of manufacturing imports decreases slightly
as well. But for the U.S. the implication is much more substantial. Its
share of manufacturing exports decreases from 61% to 30% and the share of
manufacturing imports increases from 32% to 61%. So the U.S. loses much
of its position as a manufacturing producer and exporter.
Table 39: Implications of mass migration on trade
Data BL CF
Britain
Exports/GDP 0.21 0.18 0.20
manu. exports / total exports 0.89 0.97 0.99
manu. imports / total imports 0.29 0.28 0.18
U.S.
Exports/GDP 0.06 0.04 0.05
manu. exports / total exports 0.50 0.61 0.30
manu. imports / total imports 0.44 0.32 0.61
BL: baseline simulation, CF: counterfactual simulation
Why does the mass migration have uneven impacts across sectors? In
other words, why is U.S. (or Britain’s) manufacturing more affected than
the primary sector by the mass migration? It is quite straightforward. The
mass migration adds more labour force to the existing U.S. labour force.
And mainly due to the unrivalled productivity growth in manufacturing,
by 1913 the U.S. already had its comparative advantage in manufacturing.
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And in order to exploit this comparative advantage, proportionally more of
additional labour force is allocated in the manufacturing sector.
On top of this, increasing returns to scale (IRTS) generates amplified ef-
fects. The immigration directly increases the number of U.S. manufacturing
firm, nm,us and this generates the linkage effects. As more manufacturing
firms are located in the U.S. the demand for manufacturing intermediate will
increase, inducing further increase in nm,us (the backward linkage). A larger
nm,us lowers U.S. manufacturing price index, Gm,us, relative to others. This
means firms located in the U.S. are facing relatively cheaper manufactur-
ing intermediate inputs, leading to a further increase in nm,us (the forward
linkage).63 A positive feedback between the two linkage effects generate the
agglomeration of manufacturing in the U.S.
5.4 Convergence in Real Wages
In this section, I look at the implications of the mass migration on the Anglo-
American real wage convergence. According to standard economic theories,
with everything else fixed a large increase in labour force for the U.S. and a
large decrease in labour force for Britain due to the mass migration would
contribute to the convergence of the real wage. In fact this is the conclu-
sion drawn by O’Rourke, Williamson and Hatton (1994). They use a CGE
model to evaluate the quantitative implications of the mass migration on
the Anglo-American real wage convergence. They conclude that the con-
tribution of the migration was quantitatively large. In building the model,
they assume each sector exhibits CRTS and is competitive. They also allow
for the perfect international capital mobility and fix the effects of land and
technologies. They find that U.S. real wage would have been 9.2% higher
63The mass migration decreases
Gm,us
Gm,b
and
Gm,us
Gm,rw
by 13% and by 11%, respectively.
So the manufacturing price index of the U.S. relative to others decreases due to the mass
migration.
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and that of Britain would have been 6.6% lower without the migration when
they allow for perfectly elastic international capital flow (i.e. capital chasing
after labour).
In their model, the force that inhibits the convergence is the response of
capital flows. Because if capital ‘chases after labour’, this force alone would
increase the labour productivity for a net receiving country (the U.S.) and
decrease it for a net sending country (Britain) and mute the effect of migra-
tion. On the other hand, in my baseline model, exogenous changes in land
endowments and TFP act as off-setting forces. First, the land area for the
U.S. increased massively during the period relative to Britain and this would
have certainly acted as a buffer for the convergence. In addition to this, the
U.S. experienced higher overall TFP growth than Britain. This raised U.S.
labour productivity relative to Britain, making a positive contribution to
the growth of U.S. real wage.
One very important distinction between their model and my baseline
model is the assumption of scale economy. As mentioned above, they as-
sume no economies of scale but the baseline model here assumes that there
exists IRTS in manufacturing sector. As the existence of IRTS in U.S. manu-
facturing is supported by many evidences, it would be meaningful to explore
the implications of the mass migration on the real wage convergence when
the IRTS is considered.64
5.4.1 Generating the Real Wages
This section looks at the model’s prediction on the real wage. The real wage
is defined as
ωi =
wi
Pi
where Pi = G
θai
ai G
θmi
mi G
θsi
si (39)
Reiterating the notation, w is the nominal wage, P is the living cost where
Ga, Gm and Gs are the price-index for primary, manufacturing and services
64See Chapter 1 for the discussion of IRTS in U.S. manufacturing during the period.
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goods, respectively. θj is the share of consumption for good j. And the
subscript i indicates the region.
I need the data on real wages to compare them with the model’s pre-
dictions. Williamson (1995) constructs the PPP-adjusted real wage data
for unskilled urban workers from 1830 to 1913 for 15 countries including
Britain and the U.S. According to him, the real wage in the U.S. in 1870
was 66.7% higher than that of Britain and in 1913, it was still 54% higher.
Generating the real wages in 1913 from my model is identical to generating
other variables as discussed in Chapter 2. I report the predictions of the
model in Table 40 below.
Table 40: Anglo-American real wages
1870 1913
Data IRTS CRTS Data IRTS CRTS
ωus
ωb
1.67 0.99 0.99 1.54 1.58 1.46
Values under ‘IRTS’ and ‘CRTS’ column are the results generated from
the baseline IRTS model and the CRTS model, respectively. One noted
feature is that as the model is not calibrated to match the real wage data
in the benchmark year of 1870, ωusωb predicted by the model is not close to
the data in 1870. But in 1913, the predictions of the model matches the
data quite closely. So looking at the picture from dynamic perspective, the
exogenous changes in labour force, land, TFP and trade costs that are fed
into the model generate a divergence of the Anglo-American real wage from
1870 to 1913 while the data imply that there was a convergence of small
magnitude.
The reason that ωusωb in the benchmark year of 1870 does not match the
data is because the model is not calibrated to fit this data. The primary
focus of this whole work is on the quantity side of the economy, not the
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price side. So the model is calibrated to match the quantities rather than
the prices in the first place. Regarding the model’s predictability on the
real wages, it can mean several things. But one way to interpret this is that
the model is missing a factor that creates the gap in the benchmark year
(1.67 vs. 0.99). Secondly, the model also needs additional strong convergent
forces to account for the small convergence from 1870 to 1913 (1.67→1.54
vs. 0.99→1.58). It is not clear what these factors are. And it is not clear
how these factors would affect the results either.
One force that drives the divergent in the model is the change in the
services TFP for the U.S. (As,us) which I take directly from Broadberry and
Irwin (2006). To reiterate,
As,1913
As,1870
for the U.S. is 1.97 and 1.28 for Britain.
The difference is quite large and this difference would reduce the services
price for the U.S., Gs,us relatively more than that of Britain, Gs,b. But the
service sector in the model does not influence the overall results much as it
is non-tradable and treated as residual. For example, when I assume
As,1913
As,1870
for the U.S. to be equal to that of Britain at 1.28 then the model generates
much less divergence without changing the result much. Under the IRTS,
ωus
ωb
becomes 1.37 rather than 1.58 and it becomes 1.26 rather than 1.46 in
the case of CRTS. Again I emphasize the important results do not change.
So this implies that the difference in
As,1913
As,1870
between the U.S. and Britain, a
force that does not affect the important results, accounts for 37% and 44%
of the divergence in IRTS and CRTS case, respectively. The bottom line
is without this force, the model still generates a divergence but it is not
as big as it looks in Table 39. After all it would still be meaningful to see
the implications of the mass migration on the Anglo-American real wage
convergence albeit some dimensions that the model fails to account for.
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5.4.2 Implications of the Mass Migration on the Conver-
gence of Real Wage
In this section, I look at the implications of the mass migration on the
convergence of Anglo-American real wages. For better comparability with
O’Rourke, Williamson and Hatton (1994), I use the changes in labour force
that they used (see Appendix). I proceed in the exactly same manner as in
Section 3 where I explored the implications of the mass migration on the
quantity variables. But of course here I am interested in the real wages
instead of the quantities. Table 41 reports the effects of the mass migration
on the real wages.
Under the CRTS specification, the model predicts that the mass migra-
tion contributes about 6.0% to the convergence of the real wage between
Britain and the U.S. This result, even though the size of contribution is
smaller, is qualitatively in line with the results of O’Rourke, Williamson
and Hatton (1994).65 More interesting results arise under the IRTS speci-
fication. In this case, the mass migration implies a divergence rather than
convergence! The magnitude is not large at 1.6%
Table 41: Implications of the mass migration on real wages
CRTS IRTS
BL CF CONT(%) BL CF CONT(%)
ωus
ωb
1.46 1.54 6.0 1.58 1.56 -1.6
BL: baseline, CF: counterfactual, CONT: the percentage contribution of
the mass migration to the convergence, CF-BL
BL
The ratio of U.S. real wage to that of Britain can be defined as 66
65Their model and mine are not directly comparable due to the difference in modelling
and calibration strategy and factors considered. But in any case their model predicts that
the mass migration contributed to the convergence by 15.8%.
66Of course, θa, θm, θs for each region are different but the equation is expressed as it
is for the notational simplicity.
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ωus
ωb
=
wus
wb
(
Ga,b
Ga,us
)θa ( Gm,b
Gm,us
)θm ( Gs,b
Gs,us
)θs
(40)
In order to find out what generates this difference, I look at the changes in
the each component that make up the equation (40). It is presented in Ta-
ble 42. If the values under ‘% change’ are positive it means the changes due
to the migration is contributing positively to the convergence. For example,
the nominal wages, wb and wus, are converging due to the migration under
both scenarios (1.83→ 1.64 under CRTS and 1.72→ 1.70 under IRTS), thus
contributing to the real wage convergence. On the other hand, the compos-
ite manufacturing price for the U.S., Gm,us, becomes relatively cheaper due
to the migration under both cases (
Gm,b
Gm,us
= 0.82 → 0.90 and 0.93 → 1.12).
And this acts as a divergent force.
Table 42: Decomposition of the changes in real wages
CRTS IRTS
BL CF % change BL CF % change
wus
wb
1.64 1.83 11.8 1.70 1.72 1.5
Ga,b
Ga,us
1.30 1.37 4.8 1.28 1.40 9.0
Gm,b
Gm,us
0.90 0.82 -8.9 1.12 0.93 -16.7
Gs,b
Gs,us
0.72 0.65 -10.5 0.70 0.69 -1.5
BL: baseline, CF: counterfactual,
% change: CF-BL
BL
, contribution of the migration
Now I analyse the difference between the CRTS and the IRTS case.
First, it can be observed that the nominal wages converge more under the
CRTS than under the IRTS (11.8% vs. 1.5%). One of the main forces that
drives the convergence in both cases is the relative changes in labour produc-
tivities. In the CRTS model, the labour productivity in U.S. primary and
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manufacturing sector decreases as it intakes more labour force while those
of Britain increase as it sends out labour force. This decrease (increase) in
the labour productivity leads to decrease (increase) in the nominal wage for
the U.S. (Britain) with other effects fixed. But the IRTS in manufacturing
puts a pressure on this convergent force. In this case U.S. (Britain) primary
sector still experiences decreasing (increasing) labour productivity but the
manufacturing does not. The scale economy in this sector implies a rising
productivity for the U.S. as the immigrant workers are added. So under
the IRTS specification, this counteracting force mute the convergence of the
nominal wages.
The relative price of the composite primary goods becomes higher for
the U.S. due to the immigration (
Ga,b
Ga,us
= 1.37 → 1.30 and 1.40 → 1.28).
As can be seen from Table 37, Britain becomes a relatively more agrarian
economy while the U.S. becomes a more industrial economy because of the
mass migration. It is intuitively clear that as the U.S. (Britain) produces
relatively less (more) primary goods, the price of its domestic primary goods,
pa,us (pa,b), becomes relatively higher (lower). And these changes lead to
the change in
Ga,b
Ga,us
as shown in Table 41.67
The reason that the composite manufacturing good becomes relatively
cheaper for the U.S. is very similar to the primary case. But in the IRTS
case, the change is much larger than the CRTS case. In other words, due to
the migration, U.S. composite manufacturing good becomes much cheaper
relative to Britain’s under the IRTS than under the CRTS. The main rea-
sons are the scale economy and the agglomeration effect. The migration
increases the size of U.S. manufacturing and this generates the linkage ef-
fects that cause the agglomeration of U.S. manufacturing. As the number
67It is not so intuitive how higher pa,us or lower pa,b or both lead to lower
Ga,b
Ga,us
because
the decrease in pa,b not only lowers Ga,b but also Ga,us (see equation (1) in Chapter 2).
Here a rough intuition is that because of the presence of the trade costs in the price indices,
changes in pa,b or pa,us have differential impacts on Gm,b and Gm,us
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of manufacturing firms (products) increases, U.S. consumers consume more
of their domestic products which are not subject to the trade costs. On the
other hand, British consumers consume more of U.S. products which are
subject to trade costs. Therefore the price for the composite manufacturing
for the U.S. becomes relatively cheaper than Britain.
There are many interacting forces that influence the real wages. One
main force that acts toward the convergence is the decreasing (increasing)
labour productivity for the U.S. (Britain). But also changes in prices matter
as they affect the living cost. For this purpose it is important to look at how
the mass migration changes the structure of the economy. For example, the
U.S. becomes a more industrial economy due to the mass migration and as
it specializes and produces relatively more of these goods, they get relatively
cheaper. And this change alone raises the real wage of the U.S. But at the
same time, the primary good for the U.S. becomes relatively more expensive
as now it produces relatively less of these goods. And this, ceteris paribus,
reduces the real wage. When IRTS is introduced, there exists an additional
force that diverges the wages between Britain and the U.S. Hence several
counteracting forces exist in one picture and the question comes down to
analysing which forces are stronger, quantitatively. It seems that under the
CRTS assumption, the convergent forces are stronger while under the IRTS,
the divergent forces are.
5.4.3 Endogenous Land Supply
I could argue that land expansion is endogenous to the immigration of
labour. Findlay (1993) and Harley (2010) analyse the implications of the
endogenous land frontier. Findlay constructs a Heckscher-Ohlin type model
of Europe and America where American frontier can be expanded at the
cost of capital investment. The analytical result from his model suggests
that immigration to America will induce an extension of the frontier but
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real wages in both regions will fall and land rent will rise. The Stolper-
Samuelson effect plays an important role in generating the rise of land rent
and the fall of wages even at the presence of the endogenous frontier.
Harley (2010) comes up with a different implications of the endogenous
frontier in the case of Canada from 1870 to 1930. He argues that the price
convergence due to the global commodity market had terms of trade im-
proving effects for agriculture exporting Canada during this period. This,
in turn, induced the expansion of the frontier and the land rent remained
at a very low level because of the excess land still available to them. All
the gains from trade were accrued to wages. In other words, the increase
of the relative price of land-intensive agricultural goods did not lead to the
relative increase of land rent (i.e. the Stolper-Samuelson effect does not
hold in the case of Canada). This implies the divergence of wages due to
the globalization, not the convergence as O’Rourke and Williamson argue.
If I assume that the immigration induced an expansion of land in the U.S.
the implications of this would be very similar to that of Harley (2010). In
my model, wages are equalized across sectors and as mentioned earlier more
land means higher labour productivity in the primary sector. This means
the immigration would generate a force that increases the productivity in the
primary sector, putting an upward pressure on the overall wage rate in the
U.S. I perform a simple numerical exercise assuming that the immigration
induces an expansion of the land size.
As far as I know there is no estimate of quantitative contributions of the
immigration to the increase of the land size in the U.S. during this period.
So I proceed in a very simple manner. I perform counterfactual exercises
assuming the immigration contributed 10%, 33% and 50% to the expansion
of U.S. land and see the implications on the real wage convergence. The
results are reported in Table 43.
If I assume that land is endogenous to the immigration, then it can be
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observed that the immigration contributes to the divergence more than the
baseline case. As the immigration contributes more to the land increase,
the implication of the immigration on the divergence gets larger (the last
three columns of Table 43). Again this is because more land due to more
immigration increases the productivity in U.S. primary sector and raises the
wage.
Table 43: Real wages with endogenous frontier
CRTS IRTS (BL) IRTS (endo. frontier) (%)
BL CF CONT(%) BL CF CONT(%) Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
ωus
ωb
1.46 1.54 6.0 1.58 1.56 -1.6 -2.2 -3.9 -5.4
BL: baseline, CF: counterfactual, CONT: the percentage contribution of the mass migration
to the convergence, CF-BL
BL
Case 1,2 and 3 correspond to cases that the contribution of the immigration to the increase of
the land by 10%, 33% and 50%, respectively
5.4.4 Including Capital
As briefly mentioned earlier, capital has important implications on the ef-
fects of immigration on the Anglo-American real wage convergence. A rise
in capital stock is a force that increases labour productivity and contributes
toward the divergence of the Anglo-American real wage (given that there
was a larger increase in U.S. capital stock than Britain which was the case
during this period). Given this significance, it would be interesting to anal-
yse the impacts of mass migration on the real wage convergence story when
capital is included.
Even though capital is treated as an exogenous force which is indepen-
dent of the changes in labour forces, it is hardly the case in reality. Like
the endogenous frontier argument regarding land, capital accumulation and
the immigration to the U.S. in the nineteenth century are argued to be
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closely related matters (Neal and Uselding, 1972 and O’Rourke, Williamson
and Hatton, 1994). I consider this scenario that the immigration (or more
broadly the increase in labour force) is independent of capital accumulation
together with the assumption that capital moves with labour. Again for
comparability I apply the external TFP shocks.68 The results are reported
in Table 44.
Some explanations on notations are in order. CRTS w/o K and IRTS
w/o K refer to the baseline cases without capital under constant returns
and increasing returns to scale in manufacturing production. The results
under these columns are just repetitions of Table 41. IRTS1 w/ K refers to
the scenario that changes in labour force and in capital are independent to
each other and that capital is a immobile factor. In other words, the mass
migration did not have any impact on the process of capital accumulation.
IRTS2 w/ K refers to the case where I assume that capital chased after
labour. As briefly discussed, it is not certain how much capital actually
chased after labour during this period. One fact that is certain, however,
is that Britain was a large capital exporter, mainly to the New World and
the U.S. was an importer. It is also true that capital outflow from Britain
dominated labour outflow (O’Rourke, Williamson and Hatton, 1994). In-
ternational capital market also was well-integrated in the late nineteenth
century. Given these facts I can crudely determine how much capital fol-
lowed after labour forces from Britain into the U.S. I assume that in the
counterfactual case of no-migration, capital moved accordingly so that the
returns to capital in Britain and the U.S. are restored to the baseline equi-
librium in 1913. The underlying idea behind this assumption is that a rise
in labour forces due to the mass immigration to the U.S. would decrease
capital to labour ratio initially, increasing the returns to capital. In Britain
68When I use the TFP shocks implied by the production function with capital rather
than the external shocks, the results are almost identical. So which TFP shocks to use is
not critical.
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an exactly opposite would happen that the outflow of labour forces would in-
crease capital to labour ratio, depressing the returns to capital. If, however,
capital is mobile internationally this gap in the returns to capital between
the U.S. and Britain, initially created by the migration, would be reduced
with subsequent movements of capital from Britain to the U.S. until the
point where the old baseline equilibrium is restored.69 Finally, IRTS3 w/
K considers the scenario of the endogenous frontier (that the immigration
contributed 10% to the increase of land in the U.S.) together with IRTS2
w/ K case.
Table 44: Real wages with capital
CRTS w/o K IRTS w/o K IRTS1 w/ K IRTS2 w/ K IRTS3 w/ K
CONT(%) 6.0 -1.6 17.5 -7.1 -10.9
CONT: the percentage contribution of the mass migration to the convergence,
((ωus/ωb)CF − (ωus/ωb)BL))/(ωus/ωb)BL
where CF: counterfactual and BL: baseline
First, when I assume capital is immobile (IRTS1 w/ K), it predicts
that the mass migration contributes about 18% to the convergence of the
Anglo-American real wages. This is a sharp contrast to the previous result
(IRTS w/o K) that under IRTS, the net immigration contributes to the
divergence rather than the convergence. As discussed earlier, a large increase
in U.S. capital stock would have served as an additional force that promoted
the labour productivity in the absence of the net immigration. The result
demonstrates that this strong force actually dominated the opposite force
arising from the scale economies. This is also in line with the result of
69Of course if we assume a perfect capital mobility, the returns to capital between
Britain and the U.S. should be equalized which is not the case in the model. Treating the
baseline equilibrium in 1913 as the equilibrium state regarding the movements of capital
reflects the view that the mobility is less than perfect.
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O’Rourke, Williamson and Hatton (1994) that the immigration contributed
substantially to the convergence. This assumption, however, is a bit too
extreme so let’s turn to the case where capital and labour moved together
(IRTS2 w/ K).
When I assume that capital moved accordingly with immigrants to en-
sure the returns to capital in Britain and the U.S. are equalized to the
baseline levels, a qualitatively different result from IRTS1 w/ K scenario
arises. This time the mass migration contributes about 7% to the diver-
gence of the real wages. This effect increases if I assume the possibility of
the endogenous frontier in which case it contributes about 11% to the diver-
gence. The implications under these scenarios are qualitatively in line with
the baseline scenario (IRTS w/o K).
Summing up, the scale economies alone certainly acted as a divergent
force in this Anglo-American real wage story. But when other forces are
considered together, the net effect of the mass migration under IRTS is either
quantitatively or qualitatively uncertain. To understand it more clearly, we
need to have a better understanding of the relevant histories. First, it is
important to understand how much of other factors of input such as land
and capital changed with the movement of labour forces. Secondly, the
difference in the degree of the scale economies between the U.S. and Britain
can be a crucial component. The fixed cost in the production function, F , in
my model represents this component and I assume that they are equal across
regions for simplicity. But while evidences show that U.S. manufacturing
sector exhibited substantial degree of the scale economies, there is no such
evidence for British counterpart. Considering this may be important for the
outcome and I leave this for future endeavours.
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I explored the quantitative implications of the mass migra-
tion on the quantity side of the economy as well as the price side. First,
I found that it had big impacts on the quantity side of U.S. economy. In
particular, the contribution of the immigration to the development of U.S.
manufacturing was remarkable. The net immigration coupled with the IRTS
had proportionately more impacts on U.S. manufacturing than the primary
sector. But at the same time, Britain experienced de-industrialization of
some degree due to the net emigration.
Then I looked at the implication of the mass migration on the Anglo-
American real wage convergence. Under the CRTS assumption, the mass mi-
gration implied the convergence. This result is in line with that of O’Rourke,
Williamson and Hatton (1994) even though the degree of convergence was
somewhat smaller. But under the assumption of IRTS, the mass migration
generated a divergence rather than convergence. This result mainly came
from the strong divergent forces generated by the economies of scale and
agglomeration effect. I then considered the effects of endogenizing land and
including capital. Considering the endogenous frontier story generated fur-
ther divergence but inclusion of capital acted as a strong convergent force.
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Appendix : Alternative Measure of the Changes in
Labour Forces
According to O’Rourke, Williamson and Hatton (1994), after taking the
influence of migrant children born after the move, the British labour force
would have been 16% larger and U.S. labour force would have been 27%
smaller in 1911 without the migrations from 1870 to 1911. So I use the
measures implied by these rather the ones reported in Section 2. As this
measure considers fertility decisions of the migrants counterfactually, it can
serve as a kind of an upper-bound. Table A-1 reports the result.
Table A-1 : Implications of mass migration using alternative measure
Britain U.S.
Data BL CF Data BL CF
Share in world primary(%) 1.9 2.5 2.5 14.4 13.9 12.0
Share in world manufacture 13.6 13.4 18.4 31.9 32.2 21.5
Share of LF in primary 12 23 21 30 37 39
Share of LF in manufacture 44 40 44 30 32 28
Ya,1913/Ya,1870 0.93 1.45 1.47 2.58 3.04 2.59
Ym,1913/Ym,1870 2.15 1.94 2.51 9.46 9.74 6.11
CF RGDP/BL RGDP - - 1.16 - - 0.73
BL: baseline simulation, CF: counterfactual simulation
As expected the quantitative implication of the mass migration is much
larger in this case. U.S. manufacturing loses more and Britain’s manufac-
turing gains more compared to the case in Section 3.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, I explored the quantitative of U.S. economic development
from 1870 to 1913. Even though the U.S. experienced the most remarkable
economic growth both in relative and absolute terms during this period, sur-
prisingly little amount of studies have quantitatively explored the economy
In many senses, it is important to perform quantitative analysis of this kind.
For example the debates about the role of the high protectionism on U.S.
economic development would become more clear if we know ‘how much’ the
tariff protection actually contributed. We also know that the mass immigra-
tion to the U.S. was important for its economic development but we do not
know how much it contributed to the overall economy and to each sectors.
I aimed to provide some quantitative answers to these questions.
I explored these historical events in a global framework. Because the
world or at least the North Atlantic economy was well integrated during
this period and it is generally perceived that the rise of the U.S. and the
relative decline of Britain as a closely related phenomena. Namely, the
rapid growth of U.S. manufacturing encroached Britain’s share in the global
market, overtaking Britain and consolidating its position as an industrial
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leader. For this reason the model is built to account for both the rise of the
U.S. and the decline of Britain in the late nineteenth century.
One distinct feature of my model was the assumption of IRTS in man-
ufacturing production which was reasonable given the empirical evidences
that there existed IRTS in U.S. manufacturing during this period. Even
though this is almost a conventional belief among economic historians this
feature was rarely employed in the previous quantitative studies. It would
then have qualitatively and quantitatively different implications from the
standard CRTS model.
First I performed a growth decomposition exercise to evaluate the rel-
ative contributions of important factors. The factors considered were the
productivity growth in each sector, increases in land and labour force en-
dowments and changes in trade costs. It turned out that the single most
important force in U.S. economic growth was the large increase in factor in-
puts. Especially its impacts on the manufacturing sector was massive. This
was obviously largely due to the IRTS in manufacturing. Changes in sectoral
TFPs did not play quantitatively large roles. Next I investigated the quan-
titative implications of the IRTS in manufacturing. The IRTS seemed to
contribute substantially to the growth of real GDP and manufacturing out-
put. It accounted for about one third of the growth in U.S. manufacturing
output from 1870 to 1913.
In the second chapter I investigated the quantitative implications of U.S.
manufacturing tariffs on the development of the U.S. particularly focusing
on the development of its manufacturing sector. To do this I performed
a counterfactual exercise by removing the tariffs from U.S. manufacturing
imports. It turned out that even though the tariffs helped promote its man-
ufacturing sector, it was small quantitatively. Even under the assumption
of learning-by-doing, the contribution of the tariffs was small. This finding
provides some quantitative evidence to the arguments of Irwin (2001) that
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the tariffs did not play a large role in U.S. economic development during
this period. It also seemed that the assumption of IRTS did not amplify
the effects of the tariffs as the tariffs made the manufacturing price index
of the U.S. relatively higher, creating a force against the forward linkage.
This finding is somewhat contrary to the arguments made by some papers
such as Crafts and Venables (2001) and Nunn and Trefler (2010) that under
the scale economy, the impacts of tariff in promoting the protected sectors
would be substantial.
Next I look at the implications of the mass migration. First the net im-
migration contributes substantially to the growth of U.S. real GDP. Without
the mass migration, the level of U.S. GDP would be about 80% of the actual
level. The mass migration contributes more to the development of the man-
ufacturing sector than the primary sector, accounting for about 13% and
26% of the growth of the primary and the manufacturing output, respec-
tively. Also without the mass migration the U.S. would have still maintained
its position as a leader in world manufacturing output but the gap between
the U.S. and Britain would have been reduced substantially. Two forces are
behind this. First, due to the comparative advantage in U.S. manufactur-
ing unproportionately more immigrants are absorbed in the manufacturing
sector. Secondly, the IRTS in manufacturing also created uneven impacts
of the mass migration across sectors.
Finally I explored the implications of the mass migration on the Anglo-
American real wage converegence in Chapter 5. O’Rourke, Williamson and
Hatton (1994) study this topic using a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model with
constant returns to scale technology. They conclude that the mass migration
contributed substantially to the convergence of the real wages between the
U.S. and Britain. This finding contributes to their broader conclusion from
many other related works that the integration of world economy during the
nineteenth century contributed to the factor price convergence among many
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countries as emphasized by Heckscher-Ohlin theory. But in my model the
existence of IRTS predicts a qualitatively different result about the impli-
cations of the Anglo-American real wage convergence. The mass migration
could have actually contributed to divergence rather than convergence. It
depends on how much increase in land came from the mass migration and
how much capital chased after the labour. This result changes the con-
ventional belief that the mass migration contributed to the convergence of
.
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